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The Colonization of the Normative Realm in the Age of Instrumentality 
 
Roy Edward Casagranda, PhD 
University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
Supervisor: Katherine Arens 
 
This dissertation aims to establish a contemporary model of why apolitical actors 
engage in the political realm. The project will intersperse practical cases with theoretical 
concerns. I look at two cases: the role of Soccer Hooligans in the 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution and the Occupy Austin Movement (2015). The goal of these juxtapositions is 
to provide insights into the realities behind political theories, as I accommodate 
additional strands of theory that have received little attention to date in studies of political 
motivation. I begin by showing how inadequate Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has 
proven in explaining political action and then move onto employing central concepts 
from Heidegger, Arendt, Marcuse, Foucault, Habermas, and Wendy Brown to create a 
richer picture of what choice means for subjects. With the aid of the categories these 
thinkers provide, I then build an analytical heuristic device called the Three Realms of 
Action Model. My claim is that this model, which explains the relationship between the 
normative, political and economic realms can better explain political choice. The actions 
of nonpolitical actors might seem non-rational when viewed from within a purely 
economic realm, but switching between the three realms and the rationalites they inhabit, 
provides the three-pronged lens needed to make a more nuanced study of the power 
 vi 
relations between political actors. To better illustrate how subjects negotiate the realms, I 
use familiar historical sites. Each historical event allows us to inhabit an epistemology 
that describes how the realms bargain for dominance with each other. The insight I come 
away with here is that the economic realm has colonized the normative and political 
realms in the United States. But despite the dominance of the economic realm, political 
action or choice is not driven “only” by market rationality but also by a shifting play of 
the power in the three realms where we see new and competing rationalities. This allows 
us not only to see “choice” as a more dynamic and nuanced category but also better clues 
us into how it is manipulated and even subverted.  
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INTRODUCTION:  
Being and Revolution in the 21st Century 
 
 
 
 
“The two biggest political parties in Egypt are Ahly and Zamalek.”1 
Assad, Leader of al-Ahly’s football Ultras 
 
I was inspired to conduct this inquiry by a question: “Why is voter turnout so low 
in the US?”  Yet that inspiration came not because I wanted to ask that question, but 
rather because I thought it was the wrong question. It seemed to me that the real issue 
was almost the exact reverse: “Why is voter turnout so high in the US?” In light of single 
member district representation, winner-take-all elections, winner-take-all legislative 
processes, the quirky electoral college, and gerrymandering it is actually a wonder that 
anyone would waste their time voting, at least in recent national elections. For example, 
in 2014, all but 26 congressional districts in the US House were safe districts, meaning 
                                                 
1 Montague, J, “Egypt's Politicized Football Hooligans,” Al Jazeera, February 2, 2012, accessed May 12, 
2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/20122215833232195.html. 
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that they were firmly in the hands of one party and unlikely to change, given their 
demographics.2 In other words, the outcome of the election was a foregone conclusion for 
94.0% of the US House races.  
Thus, I came to formulate the mystery of current electoral politics rather 
differently than has been conventionally done: I wondered not why is voter turnout a 
mere 36.4%,3 but rather why is it more than 6.0%. Expanding this logic into a more 
formal research question, I have claimed a more radical point of departure for the study 
that follows. I ask not only: “Why do non-political actors occasionally enter the political 
realm and undertake low cost-no reward behaviors like voting," but also: "Why do non-
political actors enter into the political realm to engage in high risk-low reward political 
actions like protests, riots, and revolutions?" 
These formulations would find little resonance within models favored by today's 
political science, I found, given that all too many current discussions of voter behavior 
remain anchored by a single heuristic, Rational Choice Theory (RCT). Here, I found little 
support for associating notions like risk and reward with political action, since RCT 
privileges the assumption that all people are rational and self-interested all of the time. 
Yet in my preliminary deliberations, it seemed to me that an actor who votes in a system 
where the outcome is a foregone conclusion is hardly rational. The "rational thing to do" 
in the 2014 election should have left turnout at around 6%, with votes coming out only in 
                                                 
2https://ballotpedia.org/U.S._House_battleground_districts,_2014#The_26_.22Most_Competitive_Districts
_in_2014.22 
3 I chose the 36.4% from 2014 as opposed to the 60.2% of 2016 to remove the turnout effect of presidential 
politics. The voter turnout in 2014 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/2014-midterm-election-turnout-
lowest-in-70-years/ 
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the very few contested districts. And yet, as noted above, voter turnout in 2014 was 
36.4%, six times more than conventional notions of rationality would predict.  
As I will argue in the following chapters, RCT becomes even less useful for 
understanding political decisions that lead to protest, riots, and revolutions. In these 
cases, the potential costs of political action include time and energy, injury, jail, and 
possibly death, in contrast to the considerably lower threshold of getting into the voting 
booth. Here again, the premise that actors are always self-interested and rational falls 
apart, because any cost-benefit ratios are massively disproportionate: after all, one can 
lose one's freedom or life protesting, but the likelihood of success and potential rewards 
by mans of political riots are low for individuals. 
Not being able to apply RCT to the study of this type of political action, I turned 
to other models for political action, especially to Heidegger, Arendt, Marcuse, and 
Habermas, to see if I could tease out another explanation. In the process of so doing, I 
began to evolve a model for understanding what goes into motivating action. As I will 
amplify in the body of the present project, I identified three categories/realms in which 
other logics for political action prevail, beyond simple self-interest: a Normative Realm 
(motivated by narratives that generate meaning or values), an Economic Realm (defining 
rationalities based on concerns about survival, convenience, and luxury), and a Political 
Realm (comprising rationalities that ground community-level steering mechanisms for 
actions within the other two realms).  
The project took its final shape as I tested my model against specific instances of 
political action that RCT did not sufficiently illuminate. To justify my theoretical 
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interventions, this project will intersperse practical cases with my theoretical concerns. 
As noted, I will focus principally on two cases: the more or less successful role of Soccer 
Hooligans in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the Occupy Austin Movement (2015) 
and the reasons it failed.  
Both examples speak to my research questions. The first involves soccer 
hooligans turned rioters; the second, a local Occupy Movement, with its sit-in protest 
tactics. Both forms of political action emerge more clearly as reasonable or rational when 
addressed though my three realms—they show how human motivation structures actually 
fluctuate as different motivation frameworks come into play, beyond self-interest defined 
traditionally. Soccer hooliganism in the Arab Spring in Egypt and Occupy Austin both 
had similar grounding, as a public that had been stripped of agency but that nonetheless 
wanted to insert itself into the Political Realm.  
In one sense, the calculus for apolitical soccer hooliganism seemed uncomfortably 
similar to that of the US voter in House races: the outcome is predetermined—whether 
you win or lose, you're going to fight the fans of the other team, because the situation has 
in it only a single rationality. Why, then, did Egypt's soccer hooligans and US voters 
decide to jump into the political realm by using the rationality of revolution, which seems 
to be irrational, by traditional norms?  As we shall see, I believe that the answer lies in 
the ability of new norms to arise and colonize the Normative Realm, under the impetus of 
new constellations of the Economic and Political Realms. Both groups of actors came to 
believe in the connection of their actions to a certain set of values in the Normative 
Realm, and so, after embracing them, they were willing to challenge the power structures 
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through what they believed were new forms of political action. The two sets of actors 
hoped to tie meaning or values to what they did—they "made it worthwhile" for 
themselves to act, creating sources of meaning that has not been accounted for in RTC.  
The goal of these case studies is to provide insights into the realities behind 
political theories addressed by theorists, as I accommodate additional strands of theory 
that have received little attention to date in studies of political motivation and make the 
case for a new understanding of political rationality as a more dynamic process. As I 
proceed, I will be drawing repeatedly on several theorists. The first is Heidegger, with his 
notion of an authentic Being-toward-death, a commitment toward a certain set of values 
that makes it worthwhile for a community to act and to structure its life against—a 
"calling" toward fulfilling action, toward (in these cases) a renewal of democratic values. 
Adding to this resource, I consider the utility of Arendt's and Habermas' ideas of political 
spaces and political action and Marcuse’s one dimensionality, which will lead me to 
propose that a more telling narrative of motivation for political action results in 
considering three realms that ground individual motivation and help it form into groups 
through transmission of dominant rationalities that help individuals understand the 
modern world. 
The ultimate aim of this project, then, is to outline a new, contemporary model of 
why apolitical actors enter the political realm and then to pursue the limits on that model 
by ascertaining what the largest impediment is towards evolving the contemporary 
political system towards a more people-friendly state.  
 6 
To set the stage for the project as a whole, the remaining sections of this 
introduction will provide an overview of the soccer hooligans' 2011 actions. In Chapter 1, 
to help explain why the soccer hooligans took part in the Egyptian 2011 revolution, I will 
examine Rational Choice Theory (the dominant paradigm in Political Science and 
Economics). I do this considering the question of how (and if so, to what degree), either 
political science or economics can shed some light on their actions in the traditional terms 
most often used in Anglo-American political theory. In Chapter 2, I will attempt to 
expand this "standard model" of political action by looking at Heidegger, Arendt, and 
Marcuse. This cross-reference will focus particularly on identifying more carefully what 
kinds of political choices are actually at play in a situation like the soccer hooligans. At 
that point of my exposition, in Chapter 3, I will introduce a possible extended model, 
which I am calling the Three Realms of Action Model. And finally, in Chapter 4, I will 
test my proposed extended model to demonstrate what the major stumbling block was for 
the Occupy Movement, in general, and Occupy Austin, in particular. 
Let me now set the stage for my project by introducing my first case study, an 
unexpected political action that took place in Egypt during 2011's Arab Spring. 
 
How Egypt’s Soccer Hooligans Might Have Saved the Egyptian Revolution of 2011  
On January 25, 2011, tens of thousands of protestors assembled in Maydan Tahrir 
(Freedom Square) in Cairo and other parts of Egypt for what became a day of rage.4 
                                                 
4 “Egypt Protests: Three Killed in 'Day of Revolt',” BBC, January 26, 2011, accessed May 23, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12272836. 
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Maydan Tahrir had played a key role in the 1919, 1952, and 2013 Revolutions, for which 
it has been known in English as Martyr Square for its role as an agora for the city of 
Cairo, serving as the site for major modern protests since the 1977 Bread Riots.5 
Moreover, the Square sits at the very heart of Cairo, and whomever controls it controls 
the traffic congestion. It is at Maydan Tahrir that the historic Qasr al-Ayni Street, now the 
home of a major medical school meets Talaat Harb Street, where major protests against 
Egyptian President Mubarak had taken place since 2005, and, following Qasr al-Nil 
Street, with its tradition of night life, the square gives access to the Qasr al-Nil Bridge, 
the first bridge that had been built in central Cairo to cross the nearby Nile River. 
Tuesday, January 25, was a difficult day for the regime of then, President Hosni 
Mubarak. This was the day when demonstrators were simply out in too great numbers for 
the regime to suppress quietly and, to make matters worse, the protesters planned to stay 
the night. Their goal was the permanent occupation of Maydan Tahrir. The numbers 
weren’t only high in Cairo, there were 20,000 protesters in Alexandria 6 and protests in 
other cities including Suez and Ismailiyah.7 What’s more is that the people demonstrated 
                                                 
5 The Egyptian "bread riots" of 1977 affected most major cities in Egypt from 18–19 January 1977. The 
riots were a spontaneous uprising by hundreds of thousands of lower-class people protesting World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund-mandated termination of state subsidies on basic foodstuffs. As 
many as seventy-nine people were killed and over 550 injured in the protests, which were only ended with 
the deployment of the army and the re-institution of the subsidies. For more on the bread riots see Mokhlis 
Y. Zaki, “IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs and their Critics: Evidence from the Recent Experience of 
Egypt,” World Development Vol. 29, Issue 11, (November 2001): 1867–1883. 
6 "Egyptians Test Tunisia's Twitter Revolution," Vancouver Sun, 26 January 2011, accessed 5 June 2011, 
http://www.canada.com/story_print.html?id=548de2b9-7d46-440c-8ac1-c4f6fcee37f2&sponsor=. 
7 "Egypt Protests: Three Killed in 'Day of Revolt'," BBC News, 25 January 2011, accessed 26 January 2011, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12272836. 
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“a remarkable combination of discipline and volume.”8 This was the day, when dissent 
and protest crystallized into a different kind of choice for the people of Egypt. 
But to the regime’s pleasant surprise, the number of protesters became much 
smaller over the next two days. In fact, the numbers fell to just a few thousand. This was 
the trigger for government action. On January 26, Mubarak ordered the Central Security 
Forces police to drive the occupiers out of Maydan Tahrir. The police marched down the 
streets leading to The Square, using the neighborhood's street grid, shaped like spokes on 
a wheel, to surround the demonstrators and limit their ability to flee. The police wore full 
riot gear, carried shields, and were armed with tear gas. The protestors on Wednesday, 
January 26, were thus hard pressed. If they were defeated, it would have allowed the 
government to then occupy Maydan Tahrir—the return of downtown Cairo to regime 
control. Though the protesters erected barriers in the square, they were in trouble. The 
media were clearly waiting for images of a Tiananmen-Square-type crackdown.  
There were several problems facing the revolution that day that made the political 
outlook unclear. First, people were simply unsure of how far their protest could go in the 
current climate. In particular, facing off against the Mubarak regime was a scary 
proposition, since the Mubarak administration was happy to use torture in suppressing 
dissent. They knew that the regime, on June 6, 2010, had murdered twenty-eight-year-old 
activist Khaled Said, Egypt’s equivalent of Bouazizi (the martyred symbol of the 
                                                 
8 Robbert Woltering, “Unusual Suspects: ‘Ultras’ as Political Actors in the Egyptian Revolution,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly Vol. 35, No. 3, Special Issue: Perspectives on the Arab Uprisings (Summer 2013): 292. 
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Tunisian Revolution), in Alexandria.9 While Said’s death had fueled a new stage in the 
Revolution, enraging the demonstrators, it also scared them.  
But it was not merely the threat of torture or death that dissuaded the participation 
of a greater number of protesters. The largest factor in their indecision was quite 
empirical, the Egyptian military is massive. If the military sided with Mubarak, who was 
a retired Air Force general, then the prospects for a successful revolution would be low, 
but the likely number of casualties high. In addition, the Army still had widespread 
support from the more general public. It was not clear that a few tens of thousands of 
people were enough to make this revolution succeed.10 
The second greatest factor in any public reticence to escalate their protests was 
even more practical than the first. Said bluntly, Egypt is not a rich state. According to the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics in 2010 Egypt’s urban population 
                                                 
9 Khaled Mohammad Said was a young Egyptian man who died mysteriously while in police custody in 
the Sidi Gaber area of Alexandria on 6 June 2010. Photos of his disfigured corpse spread throughout online 
communities and incited outrage over allegations that he was beaten to death by Egyptian security forces. A 
prominent Facebook group, "We are all Khaled Said", moderated by Wael Ghonim, brought attention to his 
death and contributed to growing discontent in the weeks leading up to the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 
(“Google Worker is Egypt's Facebook Hero," Financial Times, Feb. 9, 2011, accessed May 5, 2016, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e41c5faa-3475-11e0-9ebc-00144feabdc0.html.). In October 2011, two 
Egyptian police officers were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to seven years in prison for 
beating Said to death ("Egypt Jails Police over Activist Khaled Said's Death," BBC News, 26 October 2011, 
accessed May 5, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/15467022.). They were granted a retrial and sentenced to 
ten years in prison on 3, March 2014 ("Khaled Said's Killers sentenced to Ten Years in Jail," Al-Ahram, 3 
March 2014, accessed 3 March, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/top-news-khaled-
said-s-killers-sentenced-to-ten-years-in-jail.). For more on the role Khaled Saeed played in the Egyptian 
revolution see Rodolfo Diaz, “From Lambs to Lions: Self-Liberation and Social Media in Egypt,” Harvard 
International Review Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 2011): 6-7. Also see Chapter 4, entitled “Emergency Law 
Martyr” in Ashraf Khalil’s, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Liberation and the Rebirth of a Nation, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012). 
10 For more on Mubarak’s support base see: Galal A. Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-
2011 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2011), 100 and Saad Z. Nagi and Omar Nagi, 
“Stratification and Mobility in Contemporary Egypt,” Population Review 50, no. 1 (2011): 6. 
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has an average (not median) annual household income of 30,000 LE. With an exchange 
rate in 2010 of just under $0.18 to the 1.00 LE, that means that the average annual 
household income of an Egyptian worker family was $4259.11 To complicate matters, 
“nearly half of all Egyptians [lived] under or just above the poverty line, which the World 
Bank sets at $2 a day.”12 Missing a day’s worth of work thus would have made paying 
rent or eating even more difficult than it already was because of the tight margin of 
surplus income for that average family.  
By Wednesday, January 26, in consequence, many protestors had left the square 
to go to work, diminishing the numbers who had appeared the day before. To counter this 
diminution, the protest planners had adopted the tactic of allowing people to take shifts at 
Maydan Tahrir—a weak tactic where most jobs start in the morning and end by 
afternoon, guaranteeing that, even with people on shifts, there would always be a smaller 
turnout in the mornings. In addition, the planners' hope was that those who could not 
participate by occupying the square could still support it by bringing food and drink to 
those who were there. And this is exactly what happened. The sense of community 
building was palpable. As Nasser Rabbat has pointed out, the Arab Revolutions literally 
took back the public space by creating new types of communities.  
                                                 
11 According to Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, “the average annual 
Egyptian household income during 2010-2011 was LE25,353.” Given that the average exchange rate for 
the Egyptian pound was 0.168 for 2011, LE25,353 is $4259. The agency said that the average household 
income in urban areas was about LE30,205, compared to LE21,370 for families living in the countryside 
“Egyptian family's average annual income is LE25,000, agency reports,” (Egypt Independent, November 
28, 2012, accessed May 5, 2016, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egyptian-family-s-average-
annual-income-le25000-agency-reports). 
12 Newsmax.com quotes AP in “Egypt's Poverty, Unemployment, Push Youths to Breaking Point,” on Jan. 
31, 2011, accessed May 1, 2016, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Egypt-poverty-unemployment-
unrest/2011/01/31/id/384555/. 
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The protestors stand together in their square, hoisting their banners and chanting 
their slogans demanding the departure of the corrupt regimes. The squares virtually 
become their homes, their operation rooms, and our window on their revolution. They 
sometimes morph into the places where they live, sleep, pray, socialize, demonstrate, and 
shape their destiny. Many lost their lives defending their squares and their burgeoning 
revolution therein against the attacks of the security forces and the regime’s thugs (named 
differently in different countries). Others found meaning to their lives in finally breaking 
the chain of fear and revolting against the regimes that had dehumanized them for so 
long. In fact, squares such as Tahrir Square in Cairo, … have come to frame the Arab 
revolutions and to represent their exuberance and anguish at the same time. To a world 
that watches with wonderment, they have acquired the same mystique that other squares 
of revolution had gained before: the Place de la Bastille in Paris, the Red Square in 
Moscow, the Azadi Square in Tehran, and, most famously for our short-memoried 
present, Tiananmen Square in Beijing. 13 
The regime’s tactic of asserting physical control of Cairo's urban space was an old 
tactic of the state's security apparatus. What this revolution was doing was disrupting that 
pattern and creating a whole new community who were learning how to fight the 
regime.14 
The situation got even less clear from the national perspective. To make matters 
worse, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, the single largest group opposing 
                                                 
13 Nasser Rabbat, “The Arab Revolution Takes Back the Public Space,” Critical Inquiry 39:1 (Autumn 
2012): 206. 
14 Rabbat, “The Arab Revolution,” 207.  
 12 
Mubarak, had initially condemned the uprising, saying that they did not want to desecrate 
National Police day by holding it as planned. Over the next days, the Brotherhood 
subsequently issued a flurry of mixed messages. First, they refused to collectively back 
the protesters, then they condoned individual members to march. By January 29, the BBC 
was reporting that “the Brotherhood has been careful to take a low-key role in the latest 
protests.”15 This toned-down role of the Brotherhood effectively meant the elimination 
from the ongoing protests of the largest, oldest, and best-organized opposition group in 
Egypt.  
The secular left and youth groups were going to have to win the day on their own. 
by Wednesday, it became clear that the police were going to prevail. Then something 
unexpected happened—the Ultras arrived, these were groups of Egyptian "ultra-fans" for 
the Cairo-based Egyptian Premier League football clubs. The Ultras were identified as 
part of the original protest, on Tuesday, January 25.16 However, they ended up playing a 
more fantastic role on January 26 and 27. On these days, as the protest was looking to be 
in decline, the Ultras did much more than simply adding numbers to the mass of 
protesters. The rival Ultras arrived at the square, nodded to each other, and then turned 
towards all points of the compass, towards the streets leading into Maydan Tahrir that 
were being blocked by the police. They charged up the streets and battled the police in 
pitched combat. The police fired rubber bullets and tear gas. The Ultras threw the tear gas 
canisters back at the police with oven mitts and followed them with anything that they 
                                                 
15 Y. Knell, “Egypt Unrest: Tough Questions if Revolution Succeeds,” BBC, 29 January 2011, accessed 
June 1, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12317285. 
16 Muhammad Jamāl Bashīr, Kitāb al-Ultrās (The Book of Ultras), (Cairo: Dār Dawwin, 2011), 28-29. 
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could find. For two days, protestors and Ultras fought with all that they had against the 
police in an effort to keep them out of the square. The Ultras may or may not have saved 
the day, but their combat skill and numbers certainly did not hurt the cause of the 
revolution.17 And amazingly enough, they have remained a major protest force in 
Egyptian politics ever since that day, next battling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF), then the Morsi regime, SCAF again. Today, they stand in opposition to 
President Sisi. In fact, Egyptian courts banned the Ultras as a terrorist organization on 
May 16, 2015.18 
To say this was an unforeseen event is an understatement. In Egypt, soccer boils 
down to two teams—al-Ahly and Zamalek, who are archrivals and inevitably end up the 
two teams in the finals every year. In Egypt, as in countries like the UK (with 
internationally known national teams), someone who likes soccer is not a passive fan. 
You hate one of the two teams and love the other. In 2007, some fans organized into 
these "ultra-fan" organizations: “Ultras Ahlawy” for al-Ahly or “Ultras White Knights” 
for Zamalek. Violence by the Ultras is so rampant that, if you find a store that sells soccer 
paraphernalia in Egypt, it will not carry any of the Egyptian teams. If a store did, violence 
will ensue, with or without the Ultras' hooligans present.19  
                                                 
17 Woltering, “Unusual Suspects,” 302. 
18 Amira El-Fekki, “Ultras Groups Banned by Court Order,” Daily News, May 16, 2015, accessed June 1, 
2016, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/05/16/ultras-groups-banned-by-court-order/. 
19 Muhammad Jamāl Bashīr, Kitāb al-Ultrās. ʿIndamā TataʿAddā al-Jamāhīr al-Tabīʿa (Cairo: Dār 
Dawwin, 2011), 28-29. Much of what I say here about the Ultras are based on Robbert Woltering’s article 
noted in the last footnote, a primary source, the book Kitāb al-Ultrās written by Muhammad Jamāl Bashīr, 
posts on Ultras’ Facebook pages, personal experiences at matches in Cairo in 2007 and anecdotal evidence 
provided by family and friends in Egypt. 
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Needless to say, cooperation is not the watchword of these groups. At the 
matches, all fans are separated out, in the best world traditions of controlling soccer 
hooliganism. Busses arrive, stuffed with fans cheering exclusively for one side or the 
other. The police at these matches seem to outnumber fan, appearing as they do in full 
riot gear and equipped with trucks to carry away violent fans. Once inside the stadium, 
the police form ranks to cut the stands in two, they surround the outer perimeter, and they 
surround the field. Any fan from one side attempting to enter the other will be stopped. 
Having said that, there are still acts of fan sabotage at most of these matches. Rival fans 
will don a red shirt for al-Ahly or a white shirt for Zamalek, and then sit in the section for 
the other side. At some point in time, such an infiltrator will remove that outer shirt to 
reveal the color underneath. They shout taunts as they are attacked or chased, until the 
police arrive and capture the interloper. Note, however, that these are just the everyday, 
regular fans in the super rivalry. The Ultras go further. Regardless of which team wins, 
there will be a brawl afterwards. This is what the Ultras do: they fight. They are young 
males, with high unemployment rates, who have banded together to commit acts of 
violence against Ultras from the other side. In the process, they inevitably turn on the 
arriving police.  
What made this violent group of young men decide to go from fighting each other 
to working with each other for the cause of revolution? This is the question that 
subsequent sections of this chapter will turn to. 
After 48 hours of battling the police, Friday had arrived. After the Friday morning 
prayers, and with the vast majority of the Egyptian population off for the Sabbath, turnout 
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for the Revolution soared into the hundreds of thousands. The turnout on Friday was so 
great, in fact, that a new word in Egypt was coined, “Millioniya” where a call was issued 
for Egypt’s first-ever a million-man gathering.20 All of this is in stark contrast to the 
Muslim Brotherhood which had told its members not to participate in the revolution. At 
this point Maydan Tahrir resembled a war zone. By January 29th there were roughly 2000 
injured as a result of the clashes21 and by January 30th there were 150 dead.22 By the end 
of the eighteen-day revolution there were a total of 846 dead protestors.23  
The revolution that the soccer hooligans helped to carry through has become 
known as the January 25 Revolution. Its issues had crystallized earlier, but now they were 
widely broadcast: resistance to police brutality and state-of-emergency laws, a call for 
free elections and freedom of speech, and resolutions to persistent economic issues such 
as corruption, high unemployment, low wages, and high food prices. Now, the protest 
emerged as a clear and final call for an end of the Mubarak regime and the State of 
Emergency Law24, a non-military government, and representation in all facets of Egypt's 
governance.  
                                                 
20 Ashraf Khalil, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Liberation and the Rebirth of a Nation, (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012), 210 and 212. 
21 "Update 1-Death Toll in Egypt's Protests Tops 100 – Sources," Reuters, 29 January 2009, accessed 5 
February 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-dead-idAFLDE70S0LX20110129. 
22 Goran Tomasevic, "Curfew Hours Extended in Egypt as Turmoil Continues," Sputnik International 
News, 30 January 2011, accessed 31 January 2011, 
http://sputniknews.com/world/20110130/162383449.html. 
23 This is according to the Fact Finding National Commission About Jan 25 Revolution Final Report. The 
pdf can be found here: http://www.ffnc-eg.org/assets/ffnc-eg_final.pdf, last accessed March 17, 2016. 
24Law #162 of 1958, enacted during the Six-Day War against Israel, and called into play since Answer 
Sadat's 1981 election. 
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On February 1, Hosni Mubarak announces in a televised address that he will not 
run for re-election but refuses to step down from office - the central demand of the 
protesters. Mubarak also promises reforms to the constitution, particularly Article 76, 
which makes it virtually impossible for independent candidates to run for office. He says 
his government will focus on improving the economy and providing jobs. Shortly after 
his speech, clashes break out between pro-Mubarak and anti-government protesters in the 
Mediterranean city of Alexandria, Al Jazeera's correspondent reports.25 The estimated 
number of protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square is revised to more than a million people. 
Thousands more take to the streets throughout Egypt, including in Alexandria and Suez. 
By February 9, Labor unions join protesters in the street, with some of them calling for 
Mubarak to step down while others simply call for better pay. Massive strikes start 
rolling throughout the country. Human Rights Watch says that 302 people have been 
killed since the start of Egypt's pro-democracy uprising. Based on visits to a number of 
hospitals in Egypt, the organization says that records show the death toll has reached 232 
in Cairo, 52 in Alexandria and 18 in Suez.26 Finally on February 11, after tens of 
thousands take to the streets across Egypt in angry protests, Hosni Mubarak resigns as 
president and hands over power to the army after which the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) dissolved the parliament of Egypt.  
As I noted at the start of this introduction, the most perplexing question I have 
encountered in the study of politics, “is why do people act politically?” Even if I take 
                                                 
25 “Timeline: Egypt's Revolution,” Al Jazeera, Feb 14, 2011, accessed May 13, 2016, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html. 
26 “Timeline: Egypt's Revolution.” 
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Aristotle at his word that “man is by nature a political animal,” I am left wondering why 
we as individuals make the leap from inaction to action. Of course, neither the US nor 
Egypt resemble the Athenian democracy. Our political actions are confined to rare and 
periodic elections. In the US and Egypt there is little opportunity to act politically 
between such elections and revolutions and those who serve as activists are rare. My 
point is that whether we are see ourselves as political animals or not, very little actual 
time is spent acting politically. 
The United States is essentially apolitical between elections. The principle way in 
which partisans express their political leanings is during Presidential elections once every 
four years. Presidential elections have seen voter turnout between 55% and 62% since 
2000 and turnout between 37% to 42% in midterm elections27. So, for the majority of the 
US, political action only takes place, once every four years. This means that such a 
person goes from political inaction to action once every 1,461 days, or is active for 
0.068% of the days of their lives. 
 In Egypt, there is little to no opportunity for legitimate political action. But 
Egyptians have frequently partaken in revolution. Egypt has gone into revolution five 
times over the last 137 years. That is an average rebellion every 27.4 years28.  
There is an interesting similarity between the US and Egypt, despite the obvious 
differences. If we consider the Civil War, the Progressive Era, the 1960s, and the Occupy 
                                                 
27 http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data 
28 Urabi Revolt (1879-82), Egyptian Revolution of 1919, Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Egyptian 
Revolution of 2011, and Egyptian Revolution of 2013. In fact, there are signs that President al-Sisi may be 
in the early stages of facing another revolution. 
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Movement as revolutionary moments, then it becomes clear that the US is simply not as 
revolutionary as Egypt has been. In 241 years, the US has experienced the same number 
of revolutions, five, but over a longer period of time, for an average of one every 48.2 
years. This suggests that Egyptians are about 1.76 times more revolutionary. 
An obvious conclusion might be drawn to suggest that electoral politics diffuses 
the need for revolutions, whether because the public’s demands are achieved or the 
illusion of them is. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest this. According to 
Skowronek, clusters of US Presidents are organized into “regimes” according to the 
ruling political interests of the period. If we assume that Obama marks the end of the 
Conservative Regime (a big assumption) then the average regime in the US has lasted 
31.4 years29. At that point, US regime lengths appear to only be 1.15 times longer than 
Egyptian. 
However, if we throw in the single revolutionary period, which does not overlap 
with a regime change (the 1960s), the average period of change in the US falls to 27.5 
years. The nearly identical numbers are coincidence of course, but they suggest 
something interesting about political action. Over the course of a period roughly 1.375 
times longer than a generation in length, both Egypt and the US experience serious 
political shakeups. That is to say, in Egypt the population cannot act in a meaningful 
political way for nearly three decades then it does so in a revolution. 
                                                 
29 Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1997). Washingtonian (12 years), Jeffersonian (28), Jacksonian (32), 
Lincolnian (32), Republican (40), Liberal (48), and Conservative (28). 
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In the case of the US, the public votes in presidential elections for around six 
times and then in the seventh commits itself to a political shakeup. In both cases the risk 
for participating is high. I say this because in Egypt the risk is imprisonment, death, or 
injury. In the US, the worst that can happen is that the new regime will in fact be worse 
than the one being replaced. To take this one step further, the six US elections in between 
the shapeup election are such low risk, that in many ways because so little is at stake, it is 
really political dormancy. In effect the US population becomes truly political every 27.5 
years.  
Since Egypt lacks a legitimate electoral mechanism for elites to manipulate the 
public into overthrowing other elites, revolution is left as the only real option. But of 
course, discerning such a pattern does not explain, why people in the US vote or why 
Egyptians rebel. What I want to attempt to discover is a mechanism to explain why both 
populations go from political dormancy in their day-to-day lives to politically active.  
To do this, I will first look at rational choice theory. This is the dominant 
paradigm in political science to explain political action. It treats political actors the same 
way that economics views consumers, i.e. as always rational and self-interested. From 
there, I will examine the works of Heidegger, Marcuse, and Arendt to attempt to get a 
philosophical explanation for what is taking place. Following that, I will construct my 
own model based on the works of those three philosophers. At which point I will apply it 
to the US. Of all the revolutionary events listed above, the two least impactful are the 
Urabi Revolt of 1879 and the Occupy Movement. The former because of British 
intervention.  
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The Occupy Movement is remarkable considering the age we live in. Though I 
am personally more inclined towards a more Kierkegaardian view of the world where we 
sin-repent, sin-repent and where there is no real progress, with all the technology and 
sense of personal empowerment in the contemporary period, the fact that Occupy failed 
so miserably during the Obama administration is perplexing. Foucault’s understanding of 
increasing state power is a reasonable explanation for this failure,30 but considering that 
Occupy in no longer a movement, I will apply my model for understanding this particular 
moment in US politics. 
                                                 
30 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” trans. Rosi Braidotti and revised by Colin Gordon, in The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (eds.) Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press), 87-104. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
How the Ultra Soccer Hooligans' Choices Challenge Political Science 
 
The details of Egypt's situation in 2017 are complicated and not of particular 
interest to the main question here. The main question is why the Ultras, who are no 
longer considered apolitical soccer hooligans, joined the revolution, and how their 
participation calls into question the dominant paradigm in political science: Rational 
Choice Theory. The main question in this chapter, therefore, is whether or not Rational 
Choice Theory has a meaningful explanation for why the Ultras joined the revolution. We 
will start with classical Rational Choice Theory because its project in the latter twentieth 
century has been a redefinition of the agent of political action—to try to explain the 
behaviors of the "normal" protesters-turned-voters in situations like Egypt's revolutions.  
 
How Rational Choice Theory Defines Political Participation 
The evolution of theories of government since the late 1950s have created a clear, 
dominant research and teaching focus on what is called "Rational Choice Theory" (RCT). 
How this came about is critical to trace because it helps to identify assumptions that can 
be questioned in establishing a different paradigm for considering the behaviors of 
individuals and groups with respect to questions of government and governance. As we 
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shall see, RCT was never designed to deal with situations like the one in which the Ultras 
made their political choices, but it does outline a fairly normative image of an everyday 
Western actor making political choices.  
The core of RCT, as practiced, emerged over the course of a half century for 
scholars of "government" or "political science," as they gradually changed their research 
focus away from theories and issues of government structure, law-giving and 
implementation, and the political process and moved into to a new model, one drawn 
from economics. The links made between these two independent fields would be fateful 
for the evolution of government theory in the latter twentieth century. 
At first glance, that new focus on participation based on economics would seem to 
accommodate many Egyptian complaints and demands. In his 1890 book, The Principles 
of Economics, Alfred Marshall had defined economics as the study of material pursuits. 
In his 1932 essay, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Lionel 
Robbins changed the study of economics into a study of practical reasoning and 
ultimately into what came to be known as choice theory, which focused on consumers' 
motivations rather than value, price, and profit in isolation from macro level explanations 
for economic behavior. What followed was that economists decided to look at micro-
level economic behavior while intentionally ignoring psychology—ignoring, for 
example, the lingering effects of economic deprivation and lack of economic opportunity 
that were drivers in Egypt's revolution.  
There were some attempts to repair that neglect. In 1957, in An Economic Theory 
of Democracy, Anthony Downs followed this general trend and argued that the general 
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conception of US politics, as an expression of popular government, was an illusion that 
skewed our perceptions of what was going on in the political process. He argued instead 
that political actors made decisions and acted in their own best interests rather than in 
response to governance. This implied that political actors, at least in the US political 
system, were not unlike consumers. In the years since Downs’ seminal book, Political 
Science has adopted central tenets of such an economic model of behavior as a core 
research principle, under the rubric of Rational Choice Theory (RCT), and in the process, 
both it and economics have moved away from their root fields of study (the structures of 
government and the economy) and toward what they think are more psychological issues. 
Until Robbins’ and Downs' innovations, economics had been largely the study of 
production, while political science had been the study of the state and government, 
respectively. Since that time, the two have claimed to evolve into the study of why people 
act the way that they do.  
Both fields thus moved from the analysis of larger systems (governments, 
economic systems) to a more micro level analysis, focused on the behaviors of individual 
actors that has continued to be the core of RCT. In economics, the concept "value in use 
of an object" was replaced by that of “utility,” which in turn was later modified by 
eliminating most other psychological variables and focusing instead on general, 
empirically observable behaviors as correlated with utility. In much research, however, 
utility was reduced in effect to a test of a consumer’s ability to rank their preferences, 
rather than to judge more complicated political options. In analyzing the data collected, 
scholars explained each set of preference rankings as a rationality, but often only thinly 
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defined. "Rationality" in economics and political science was thus reduced to 
"consistency with preferences" and had little to do with reason or rationality, when these 
are defined as the application of logic to problem solving. The empiricism of the field 
grew and limited its own paradigm. When addressing an individual’s consumption of 
goods this way, the base form of RCT does not fully address the psychology of the 
purchaser, or necessarily do much to address the predictability of the consumer’s 
behavior. In its simplest variant, then, RCT does not really want to account for how 
voting is not the same as purchasing a can of beans.  
That limited model is the one figuring in basic undergraduate textbooks. In the 
better variants of RCT, available in more contemporary political science research, actors 
voting are by definition acting on behalf of an entire community, even if they are only 
casting one ballot. That is to say, that, while it is likely and probable that voters regularly 
think self-interestedly (as when buying a can of beans), this approach to political 
behavior also assumes that it is also entirely predictable that voters are simultaneously 
making voting choices as part of a larger community and thinking selflessly on behalf of 
the greater good. This more evolved model thus makes a splice between the poles in the 
selfish-altruistic dilemma of all human behavior by arguing that the individual actor feels 
good when being "altruistic" and as a result, must still be seen as acting selfishly rather 
than for the abstract "greater good."  
 To say, for instance, that soccer hooligans were acting altruistically for the 
common good is a stretch, at best, especially as "altruism," is factored in RCT. Thus, this 
analytic logic, characteristic of much second-generation RCT scholarship may satisfy a 
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definition of behavior for a behaviorist-rationalist research model, but it fails to consider 
the definitions of altruistic behavior that can consider other biological and social 
imperatives. Scholars embracing a broader RCT model may satisfy its predictive needs 
by claiming that altruism does not exist in more than generalized forms. However, in 
nature, biologists have found an opposite logic at play: individuals who are most selfish 
are most successful, but communities populated by altruists are most successful.1 Since 
humans are grouped into communities and their survival depends on the health of those 
communities, these biological givens imply that, by definition, altruism is just as real and 
just as important as self-interested behavior. In effect, then, late twentieth-century 
Rational Choice Theory has come to an impasse in its oversimplifying the effects of 
individual and group psychology—a problem to which I will return, in later sections of 
this chapter. 
                                                 
1Examples of studies on altruism being biological include Daniel Batson, N. Ahmad and E. L. Stocks, 
“Four Forms of Prosocial Motivation: Egoism, Altruism, Collectivism, and Principalism,” in Social 
Motivation, ed. D. Dunning, (New York: Psychology Press, 2011), 103–126; Shankar Vedantam "If It Feels 
Good to Be Good, It Might Be Only Natural," Washington Post, May 28, 2007, accessed, 23 April 2010; 
Richard Fisher, “Why Altruism Paid Off for our Ancestors”, New Scientist, December 7, 2006, accessed May 24, 
2016, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn10750-why-altruism-paid-off-for-our-ancestors/. 
Daniel Batson is a psychologist who examined the question of how biological altruism is and argues 
against the social exchange theory which postulates that altruism only exists when benefits to the self, 
outweigh costs to the self). Batson identified four major motives for altruism: altruism to ultimately benefit 
the self (egoism), to ultimately benefit the other person (altruism), to benefit a group (collectivism), or to 
uphold a moral principle (principlism). Altruism that ultimately serves selfish gains is thus differentiated 
from selfless altruism, but the general conclusion has been that empathy-induced altruism can be genuinely 
selfless.  
Vedantam discusses an experiment that discovered that it is in fact the same part of the brain responsible 
for food and sex which lights up when people commit altruistic acts. In other words, “altruism, the 
experiment suggested, was not a superior moral faculty that suppresses basic selfish urges but rather was 
basic to the brain, hard-wired and pleasurable.”  
 Richard Fisher shows how humans may have evolved altruistic traits as a result of a cultural “tax” 
we paid to each other early in our evolution. 
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To be sure, RCT has had some positive impact on political science research of the 
latter twentieth century. Thinking of voters as people capable of rank-ordering their 
preferences and then consistently acting on that rank-ordering can help in predicting 
some voting behavior.2 Nonetheless, the totalizing reduction of all forms of interest to a 
single type does not take into account the evidence presented by the field of psychology. 
Such assumptions also foreclose central psychological motivations that play out in all 
political actions, but which are foregrounded in situations like Egypt's. Pretending that 
there are no emotions that really need to be considered in addressing the psychology of 
the voter renders such RCT relatively blind in describing most political behavior 
(especially political motivations for change, revolt, and revolution, all manifest in the 
Ultras situation). RCT adherents are not unaware of this objection. To address this 
deficiency, for instance, Rational Choice Theory has turned to what has become known 
as "Behavioral Economics," a field that has developed to correlate rational behaviors with 
psychological factors like perception of risk.  
Unfortunately, Behavioral Economics has not moved to take up a broader picture 
of what actually constitutes behavior. That claim again is revealed in textbook examples 
for the field. For example, the so-called independence axiom, which essentially claims 
that rational actors will evaluate risk linearly—that individuals will maximize what they 
expect from their choices (an assumption at the heart of most models of capitalism). 
                                                 
2 Christopher Wlezien, “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preference for Spending,” American 
Journal of Political Science 39 (1995): 981–1000. In above article Wlezien predicted the 1996 presidential 
election. However, using the same model he failed to predict the 2000 Presidential election results. His 
model predicted that Al Gore would win by 5% points, whereas he won by only 1%. 
 27 
However, when this axiom is tested in the laboratory with lottery exercises, it turns out 
that respondents overwhelmingly chose to minimize risk when risk is low and are happy 
to increase risk when rewards for doing so are high and risk is also high. In other words, 
willingness to risk is not linear but rather a function of amount of risk. This was 
discovered in 1952 when Maurice Allais presented individuals with the following two 
lottery scenarios and asked them to choose options: 
 
Figure 1: Allais’ Two Lottery Scenarios 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Gamble 1A Gamble 1B Gamble 2A Gamble 2B 
Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance 
$1 million 100% $1 million 89% Nothing 89% Nothing 90% 
Nothing 1% $1 million 11% 
$5 million 10% $5 million 10% 
 
The test subjects consistently chose 1A and 2B. To be consistent each respondent 
should have chosen 1A and 2A or else 1B and 2B—sets of choices reflecting equivalent, 
linear increases of the relation of risk to reward. However, by choosing 1A and 2B, we 
see instead that the respondents chose sure things when those were available (the 100% 
chance offered in option 1A), but when the risk of failure was high they chose to increase 
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risk for an increased reward (the difference between 2A and 2B). This is known as the 
Allais Paradox, a result which contradicts the independence axiom.3  
Unfortunately, the focus on maximalization only models a few situations, not the 
more general conflict situations of realities like Egypt's, where a so-called global 
maximizing function (Allais 1953) cannot be applied straightforwardly. Realities fraught 
with economic insecurity lead to much non-linear behaviors, which have, to be sure, been 
accommodated to a degree in economically based RCT extensions as, a set of non-utility 
theories focusing on other psychological variables like “prospect” and “regret.”  
Such work proves that RCT can indeed survive the inclusion of non-linear, non-
utility risk preferences—that the general theoretical framework may be more robust than 
its first- and second-generation researchers demonstrated. These non-expected (non-
rational) utility models - “prospect” and “regret theory” - have undone some of what 
classic Choice Theory did in the 1930s and brought psychology back into the picture.4 
Yet RCT has been slow to move in this direction. It took until 2002 for Behavioral 
Economics again became to a major focus of theoretical interest, as it brought increased 
attention to psychology and a whole new generation of research on behavior. Rational 
choice theorists were facing overwhelming evidence from cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience that, in fact, rationality was such an exceedingly rare human behavior as to 
                                                 
3 M. Allais, “The So-called Allias Paradox and Rational Decisions under Uncertainty,” in Expected Utility 
Hypothesis and the Allias Paradox, ed. M Allias and O. Hagen, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1979). 
4 For more on Prospect Theory see D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1979): 263-291. For more on Regret Theory see G. Loomes and 
R. Sugden, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Certainty,” The Economic 
Journal 92 (1982): 805-824. 
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not exist for all intents and purposes—it seemed increasingly absurd to assume that all 
human behavior was rational all of the time. At this point, RCT began to incorporate a 
series of non-linear risk models to explain how humans make their risk choices based on 
preferences (not rationality in and of itself, but psychologically based rationales).  
For example, one attempt by RCT to deal with the problem of non-expected 
utility was to claim that humans are both rational and non-rational—on the face of it, a 
good assumption for situations like Egypt's Ultras. Or in effect, it assumes that people are 
torn between what they should do and what they are tempted to do. The normative right 
thing to do is defined as a linear risk function, while a non-linear risk function (non-
expected utility) was defined as what people wanted to do. In this case, the Ultras would 
need to be seen as spanning two poles: correct politics and their own desire to fight for 
their rights. However, one tries to spin that, however, the Ultras are not accommodated in 
these images of actors within choice scenarios. What they chose was a truce, which is 
rational to the outside, but not to the identity politics of their own groups; in attacking the 
police, their risk was anything but non-linear, if their goal was winning. One has to go 
further, as I address in the final section of this chapter.  
I am not alone in noticing the limits of that theory, but what that "going further" 
might mean in theory was not particularly helpful, if one follows the subsequent 
evolution of RCT. Familiar with neuroeconomics, RC theorists after the millennium 
decided that the rational part of the brain was being overridden by the emotional or 
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affective parts of the brain as a result of evolution.5 In effect, in such studies, the newer 
generation of RC theorists had decided that the observed behavioral norms that 
contradicted RCT were actually flaws in human evolution rather than flaws in their own 
hypotheses. Non-rational behavior was seen as a weakness or lower order behavior and as 
reflecting the inability of the rational part of the mind to overcome the affective systems.6 
In this model, then, self-deception and self-manipulation are seen, not as socially useful 
mechanisms for creating socially acceptable and altruistic behavior, but rather as flaws 
that hinder a person’s true nature as a self-interested, linear, mathematical, and rational 
being. So, the Ultras become simply throwbacks behind the civilized protesters.  
This mean that RCT had gone from a model that attempted and failed to describe 
what actors would do at the micro level, to a model rationalizing the seemingly 
incongruous abyss between the evidence presented by psychology and the assumptions 
made by RCT practitioners. RCT did not admit the flaws in its model, but chose instead 
to designate human behavior as flawed. At this point, proponents of rational choice 
theory literally came to call for paternalistic policies, since people were incapable of 
making their own rational choices, while in the long-term people were reeducated in 
rationality.7 This is a significant problem in addressing political actors like the Ultras, 
                                                 
5 C.F. Camerer, G. Loewenstein and D. Prelec, “Neuroeconomics: How Neuroeconomics can Inform 
Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol XLIII (2005): 9-64. See also I. Brocas and J. D. 
Carrillo” The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization,” American Economic Review, Vol 98 (2008): 1312-
1346. 
6 Camerer et al., “Neuroeconomics,” 18.  
7 See O. Morgenstern “Some Reflections on Utility” in Expected Utility Hypothesis and the Allias Paradox, 
ed. M Allias and O. Hagen, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 180; J. C. Harsanyi 
“Review of Gautier’s ‘Morals by Agreement’,” Economics and Philosophy 3 (1987): 83 and J. Elster, 
“When Rationality Fails,” in The Limits of Rationality, ed. K. S. Cook and M. Levi (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), 19. 
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because their roots are in collective (if negative) action and identity politics, rather than 
in individual choice. 
 
Correcting RCT: New Considerations 
Clearly, even this most current generation of RCT has not necessarily dealt with 
its own model's failings in describing the political actions of groups like the Ultras, since 
they persist in defining people (political actors) as essentially rational, whose reason is 
overruled by emotion. Such descriptions make no sense of the Ultras decision to join the 
revolution: they had to have more than a normal reason to act (hooligans have no trouble 
finding fights), they must also have a desire to act (desire is often driven by emotion 
(they had to want to call a truce and attack the "real enemy")). The Ultras are not alone in 
being mischaracterized, if we follow RCT. After all, any political theory that stresses 
rational political action ignores the fact that all actors make their decisions to act based 
on emotion and then rationalize their actions in an internal post-action narrative. By so 
doing, individual political actors like the Ultras can appease their self—or culturally—
imposed need to be rational and also, in the case they are asked that most poignant of 
questions, “Why did you do that?” so that they can project themselves as rational, as in 
control of their acts. The Ultras came out to the protests, they didn't just happen upon it. 
To put this distinction in Marcuse’s terms: “Technological rationality has become 
political rationality.”8 
                                                 
8 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, 2nd 
edition, (Boston: Beacon Press 1991), 12. 
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The more rational, productive, technical, and total the repressive administration of 
society becomes, the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered 
individuals might break their servitude and seize their own liberation. To be sure, to 
impose Reason upon an entire society is a paradoxical and scandalous idea - although one 
might dispute the righteousness of a society which ridicules this idea while making its 
own population into objects of total administration.9 
 In reality, the need to be rational or at least to be perceived as rational, requires 
actors to take on a level of self-deception, self-manipulation, and dishonesty about one’s 
motives to a constant, but imaginary audience; it constitutes essentially a rewriting of 
original events and reactions. In effect, in a situation like that of the Ultras, rationality 
becomes a sort of socially constructed but self-administered, after the fact, superego. 
“The Superego,” which according to Marcuse, “in censoring the unconscious and in 
implanting conscience, also censors the censor because the developed conscience 
registers the forbidden evil act not only in the individual but also in his society.”10 The 
Ultras had to shake hands before confronting the police, after all. 
More recent innovations in economics are initiating an area of investigation 
known as Prospect Theory, bridging psychology and economics. Psychologists like 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have proposed a different sort of conclusion than 
that used by RC theorists trying to adapt classical forms of the theory to neuroeconomics. 
Quite reasonably, they suggested that RCT as a utility theory worked in highly 
                                                 
9 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 16. 
10 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, 64. 
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transparent situations (where choices are so self-evident as to be virtually pre-chosen), 
while non-expected utility worked well in complex situations. In consequence, they stress 
that the difference between these two models’ abilities to predict outcomes is not 
descriptive of gaps between rationality and irrationality in human behavior, but rather in a 
more complex set of factors that adhere to the situations in which individuals find 
themselves. Predictable outcomes rise in actions where information is high, emotions are 
low, and calculations about situational variables become possible, thus offering a more 
intuitive heuristic for action.  
In his 2003 seminal paper, Kahneman explores three assumptions central to this 
new approach to economics that broaden our definitions of what motivates actors: 
selfishness, rationality, and taste.11 He notes that, in the classic Ultimatum Game familiar 
to generations of economists, notions of fairness also play a role in decision making. In 
the Ultimatum Game, a player is given a sum of money. He or she then has a partner with 
whom he or she must split the money. If the partner agrees to the split, then both receive 
that money as it was split. If the partner refuses, then neither player gets any money. RCT 
in its classic form, of course, predicts that the first player will offer considerably less 
money than they will take, and that assuming the offered sum is even a small amount, 
that the second player will accept, because some money is better than none. However, 
two things happen more often than RCT would predict: first, the offered sums are higher 
than would be expected (often half as great), and second, the second player refuses more 
                                                 
11 D. Kahneman, “A Psychological Perspective on Economic,” American Economic Review, P&P 93 
(2003): 162-168. 
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often than would be predicted (never). In both cases, a sense of fairness (not just 
rationality or self-interest) seems to be at the heart of these decisions (Fehr and Schmidt 
2004).12 Nonetheless, Kahneman did not push these insights to developing an alternative 
to Rational Choice Theory. Instead he wrote, “But the rationality model continues to 
provide the basic framework for these models.”13  
Despite such attempted reforms, RCT and the model of the rational actor which it 
relies on does not survive the contradictory evidence provided by neuroscience and 
cognitive psychology, which it originally rejected nearly a century ago, and then in recent 
years has desperately attempted to assimilate; RCT, even with the sort of reforms 
implemented by Kahneman and the like, has remained largely unsuccessful.14  
                                                 
12 E. Fehr and K. M. Schmidt, “A Theory of Fairness, Cooperation and Competition,” in Advances in 
Behavioral Economics, ed. C. F. Loewenstein and R. Rabin (Oxford/Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
13 Kahneman, “A Psychological Perspective,” 163.  
14 Another classic problem from RC theorists expands our vision of what is at stake in an evolutionary 
model - the Allais Paradox. Instead of looking at it as a function of greed, an inconsistency in rationality, or 
a failure on the part of the participant to understand statistics, what if we did the same lottery, but instead of 
dollar we put survival and the likelihood passing on DNA to the gene pool as our reward/loss.  
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Gamble 1A Gamble 1B Gamble 2A Gamble 2B 
Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance 
Survival 94% Survival 83% Death 89% Death 90% 
Death 6% Death 7% Survival 11% 
Survival with a 5 
point increase in 
the survival the 
next time risk 
happens 
10% 
Survival with a 5 
point increase in 
the survival the 
next time risk 
happens 
10% 
In Experiment 1 there is no benefit from taking Gamble 1B. This is true because 94 % x 94% is 88.36% 
from 1A, while in 1B there is an 83% that you will face at least the 94% again, and a 10% chance that you 
will survive 99% on the second time, meaning that your chance of survival in 1B is 81.77% 
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(93%*(83%*94%+10%*99%)). The extra risk in 1B reduces the likelihood that such a person will pass on 
his or her DNA, because the extra risk actually decreased the likelihood of survival.  
In Experiment 2, however, if I chose 2B, my chances go from 10% to 15%. So assuming two risk 
events, the survival rate for 2A is 1.21% (11% x 11%), while 1.50% for 2B (10% x 15%). In other words, it 
is entirely consistent with evolution that people would be rewarded for taking greater risks for greater 
rewards when risks were high, while they would also be punished for taking greater risks for greater 
rewards when risks were low. Our evaluation of risk is thus consistent with evolution, since there is a 
survival reward for thinking in accordance with the Allais paradox and a survival penalty for thinking 
consistently with the independence axiom. 
Obviously, if the above exercise were altered enough, scenarios where increasing risk in the short term 
decreased risk in the long term could be created, even where risk was small. For instance: 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Gamble 1A Gamble 1B Gamble 2A Gamble 2B 
Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance Winnings Chance 
Survival 94% Survival with a 5 
point increase in 
the survival the 
next time risk 
happens 
93% 
Death 89% Death 90% 
Death 6% Death 7% 
 
Survival 11% 
Survival with a 5 
point increase in 
the survival the 
next time risk 
happens 
10% 
In this scenario, survival for two events (if you chose 1A) would be 88% (94 % x 94%). But 
survival for 1B is 88% from 1A, while in 1B there is a 92% that you will survive both events (93% x 98%). 
This is a significant boost in survival; however, we have to remember that there is a serious short-term 
effect here. If I choose 1B over 1A, in the short run, the likelihood of me dying increases from 6% to 7% 
for an increase of 17%. On the other hand, if I choose 2B over 2A my likelihood of dying goes from 89% 
to 90%, which is only an increase of just over 1%. In other words, what the Allais Paradox is not properly 
considering is that if survival is at stake, there would be a serious change in my likelihood of dying when 
risks were small, but a much less noticeable one when my risk was high. 
This kind of effect pertaining to topic of the risk is magnified when we consider the role of time. 
Let us say that the time interval between risk events is 20 years. If we consider that, then the likelihood that 
I will choose 1B drops dramatically. If on the other hand the interval between risk events is 1 year, my 
likelihood of choosing 1B increases dramatically. Moreover, my age will likely be a determining factor, as 
well. If I am young, I might be personally more interested in 1B, than if I am older. As I get older, health 
issues are going to become a factor. In a time when life expectancies were considerably less than today, say 
35 years, I am going to be less willing to risk the healthier now for the later years. All of this is made all the 
more complex if I am in my reproductive years. A short term increase in risk for a long term decrease in 
risk might be good for me personally, but if I make such a decision in my reproductive years, so that I can 
live into my post reproductive years, the benefit might be less than the gain in terms of passing on DNA.  
Again, those assessments might change if the causal agent for the risk is changed. For instance, if 
we are looking at instability in weather systems (such as droughts) as the risk causing factors, if such events 
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Despite all the promise that neuroeconomics seemed to hold, the collaboration 
between neuroscientists, psychologists, and rational choice theorists over the last half 
decade or so has produced little useful data and little to confirm their hypotheses. It turns 
out that finding out what parts of the brain are used during problem-solving does little 
more than tell us what parts of the brain are used when problem-solving, not what is 
actually happening in the act of problem solving. In one sense, this is a relatively 
mechanistic approach to understanding choice, if it is considered a biological attempt to 
explain behavior.  
What is perhaps more interesting about this approach to understanding choice is 
that it does not attempt to explain behavior biologically, but rather psychologically—
potentially opening up considerations of non-rational grounds for choice that are rational 
for the individual, if not normatively so. This of course also seems to feedback into 
behavioral choice theory. In fact, the first decade of the twenty-first century has seen a 
large proliferation of neuroscience articles that expand what we can see about brain 
                                                 
occurred every 10 years, there would be a serious genetic advantage for a person age 15 to choose 1A over 
1B. While 1B might improve the chances of such a person getting to age 35, 1A maximizes the likelihood 
of getting the benefit of the reproductive years from age 15 to 24, which of course are those reproductive 
years that will most likely result in DNA being passed on. As a result, there is a very serious genetic reward 
(which self-reinforces from generation to generation) for choosing 1A over 1B. 
Moreover, all of the choice periods matter for evolutionary purposes, even for those people past 
reproductive years. A person past their reproductive years could still contribute to the passing on of their 
own DNA or related DNA since they can assist the survival and wellbeing of descendants and relatives. In 
other words, those past reproduction years can increase the likelihood that their DNA will be passed on. At 
an older age 1A will almost certainly be preferable to 1B. 
I mention all of this not necessarily as conclusive support for evolutionary influence on how we 
make decisions, but rather to illustrate that there might be more to such choices than simply assuming that 
people make logic “errors.” Considering how impossibly complex human behavior is to describe and 
predict, it seems extremely reductionist to make the sort of judgments that the Allais Paradox provides the 
test for a RCT model—one needs a better model than simply to assume that people are acting irrationally 
because their risk evaluations are not linear. 
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function. This is, in large part, because of technological improvements, especially 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The goal of a current generation of 
neuroeconomic research follows up on these newer possibilities, seeking the discovery of 
the anatomy and physiology of choice behavior in the brain, for individuals and 
collectively. Enthusiasm for the possibilities of this approach was expressed widely at the 
time it became feasible: “[R]emarkable advances in neuroscience now make direct 
measurement of thoughts and feelings possible for the first time, opening the black box 
which is the building block of any economic interaction and system—the human mind.”15 
Optimism does not necessarily guarantee results. The fMRI or any brain scan cannot read 
the brain, "In fact, fMRI is not and never will be a mind reader."16 At best, the fMRI 
discovers a where parts of our thoughts originated within the brain, but through inference 
rather than direction observation. The fMRI does not see where the brain is thinking, but 
rather measures where blood flow has increased within the brain—a problem, given the 
brain's complexity.  
Despite such limitations, in Fall of 2008, a special issue of Economics and 
Philosophy was devoted to Neuroeconomics. On the enthusiast side, it noted that “the 
goal of neuroeconomics is to build up a mechanistic and mathematical theory of choice 
and exchange.”17 In effect, their hope is that a model for choice drawn on a neural basis 
will be created. Of course, such hopes are pinned to what must be a comprehensive map 
                                                 
15 Camerer et al., “Neuroeconomics,” 53. 
16 N. K. Logothetis, “What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI,” Nature Vol. 453 (2008): 
869. 
17 C. F. Camerer, “The Potential of Neuroeconomics,” Economics and Philosophy 24 (2008): 369. 
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of the brain, a tool which is very much still missing. On the other side, a skeptic noted 
that neuroeconomics “has been dazzling images of light bulbs popping on in different 
parts of the brain, but unimpressive economics.”18 Ariel Rubenstein (2008, 485-6) 
explains why he finds it hard to accept neuroeconomics:  
I can think of two reasons. The first is my position on the mind-body problem. I 
fear the approach in economics in which decision makers become machines with no 
souls. The second reason (discussed in Rubinstein 2008, and Harrison 2008) is 
neuroeconomics’ style and rhetoric.19 Conclusions are hastily drawn on the basis of 
scanty data. Lack of knowledge and uncertainty are swept under the rug. Colourful 
diagrams, which mean nothing to economists, are presented as clear evidence. To me, 
they look like a marketing gimmick like those used to sell a new product in the 
supermarket… 
When I read Neuroeconomics papers, I don’t get the impression that those who 
make claims for Neuroeconomics know how it will change Economics. Part of the 
problem is that many brain researchers misunderstand the meaning of economics.20  
Such comments demonstrate how the hope for neuroeconomics has been so high, 
that social scientists like Jack Vromen and Emrah Aydinonat believe that 
neuroeconomics will be able to determine whether participants who reject offers in 
                                                 
18 G. W. Harrison, “Neuroeconomics: A Critical Reconsideration,” Economics and Philosophy 24 (2008): 
338. 
19 A. Rubinstein, “Comments on Neuroeconomics,” Economics and Philosophy 24 (2008): 485-494 and 
Harrison, “Neuroeconomics.” 
20 Kevin McCabe, “Neuroeconomics and the Economic Sciences,” Economics and Philosophy 24 
(2008):345-368. 
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situations like the Ultimatum Game or the Ultra Soccer Hooligan uprising are making 
their choices because of fairness or not.21 They also try and predict what other affective 
issues might be implicated.22 In fact, Aydinonat takes it one step further and concludes 
that that part of the brain that will regulate fairness coincides with the part that creates 
disgust23—a focus that much more closely approximates the situation for groups like the 
Ultras.24 
At present, hopes in this direction are limited: brain research in this form is far 
away from dealing with affective choice. Petri Kuorikoski and Jaakko Ylikoski point out 
that knowing where a complex thought like the rejection of an Ultimatum Game offer in 
the brain takes place does nothing to enhance our understanding of that rejection, either 
for the individual or for a profiled group like the Ultras.25 We already know that the 
                                                 
21 J. J. Vromen, “Where Economics and Neuroscience Might Meet,” Journal of Economic Methodology 17 
(2010): 180 and N. Emrah Aydinonat, “Neuroeconomics: More than Inspiration, Less than Revolution,” 
Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2010): 159-169.  
22 Thus Glenn Harrison and Don Ross point out that neuroeconomics is making a mistake, first by treating 
the fMRI data as first-order observations and second, by forgetting that typical fMRI datasets generally 
have small sample sizes. As a result, the reliability of inferences from such data is in doubt (G. Harrison 
and D. Ross, “The Methodology of Neuroeconomics,” Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2010): 191).  
23 Aydinonat, “Neuroeconomics: More than Inspiration,” 166. 
24 The research on the power of disgust exemplifies the ground for such hopes. When liberals and 
conservatives were asked about how they felt about homosexuals, as expected liberals responded more 
favorably than conservatives. But when a homosexual who was openly expressing his sexual preferences 
was put in a room with respondents, both the liberal and conservative respondents responded unfavorably 
about homosexuality (Alison George, “The Yuck Factor: The Surprising Power of Disgust,” The New Scientist, 
July 11 2012, accessed June 6, 2016 https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528731-800-the-yuck-factor-the-
surprising-power-of-disgust/. 
 2012). The research on disgust suggests that is it such a powerful force in determining human behavior that 
if fairness and disgust were caused by the same part of the brain, it would seem then that a person’s sense 
of fairness could not be overcome by “education” and that, at least in the case of the Ultimatum Game, the 
notion of rational choice as proscriptive or normative would be off the table.  
25 Petri Kuorikoski and Jaakko Ylikoski, “Explanatory Relevance across Disciplinary Boundaries: The 
Case for Neuroeconomics,” Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2010): 220. 
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rejector is rejecting because he or she thinks that the offer is unfair.26 Despite these 
hopes, then, neuroeconomics is not merely redundant for existing behavioral economics, 
it also does little (if anything) to add to RCT. “Neuro-science evidence cannot refute 
economic models, because the latter make no assumptions or draw no conclusions about 
the physiology of the brain”.27  
Despite these issues, Rational Choice Theorists still attempt to save the 
hypothesis. For instance, one such position is that there is a pre-historic or maybe even a 
pre-homo sapiens sapiens mind—the affective—and a modern or possibly homo sapiens 
sapiens mind—the reasoning. That these two systems evolved independently and 
contradict each other allows them the dual system hypothesis, where an actor is rational 
(modern), but is held back by the primitive affective mind. One can read this insistence as 
an attempt to justify capitalism by insinuating that we have evolved to a state of rational 
self-interest because our brains developed a rational mind. However, we still also act in 
ways that contradict the "dog eat dog" mantra of our economic system, because we are 
tied down by a primitive mind that evolved before we were fully human (Brahic 2012). It 
is too long a digression here to go into further details used in today's neuroeconomics 
research. One can simply conclude that RCT is not entirely wrong about the dual system 
of unconscious and conscious motivations. While fMRI results remain dubious, the brain 
                                                 
26 Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, “Explanatory,” 211. Nonetheless, they continue: “the explanation hardly goes 
beyond the trivial point that behavior is (to a large extent) controlled by processes in the brain” (ibid., 223). 
And beyond that, even most neuroeconomics experiments either rediscover outcomes already discovered 
by conventional economics, or more likely are biased towards certain experiments, because they have 
already been exposed to those outcomes. 
27 F. Gul and W. Pesendorfer, “The Case for Mindless Economics,” in Foundations of Positive and 
Normative Economics ed. A. Caplin and A. Schotter, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26. 
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injury results seem to indicate very clearly that there are two distinct types of mental 
processes one that looks like classical motivations, and then something more affective.  
However, RCT's assumption that the affective mind is primitive and that the 
rational is advanced and that the two are in competition with each other is not upheld by 
the results of brain injury research, nor by neuroanatomy in general.28 And again, applied 
to the Ultras, such judgments make little sense. They were not a mob when they chose to 
stand and fight the police together. Moreover, at least one scholar, Damasio, underscores 
how badly the mind works without emotion.29 In effect, emotion, is what allows us to 
make the decision30—an assertion much closer to the situation of the Ultras. Damasio’s 
brain-damaged, fully rational, emotionless patients lose their jobs, their families, and any 
sort of normalcy. What this tells us is that Rational Choice Theory, in its prescriptive 
form, only works for a dysfunctional human being, and not for a political movement that 
has distinct local configurations and implications.31 
In fact, Damasio’s observations suggest that our reasoning is more often than not 
trumped by subconscious processes and that without that mechanism we would be utterly 
incapable of making decisions. Lacking the ability to make decisions has negative effects 
on our day to day functioning and even survival. Our minds are dual only in the sense 
                                                 
28 See Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide (Boston: Mariner Books, 2009). 
29 A. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010). 
30 “When a person is drawn to a specific receiver, or a certain entrée on the menu, or a particular romantic 
prospect, the mind is trying to tell him that he should choose that option. It has already assessed the 
alternatives—this analysis takes place outside of conscious awareness—and converts that assessment into a 
positive emotion” (Lehrer, How We Decide, 18). 
31 Moreover, “neural localization of different reasoning mechanisms is not tantamount to evidence for 
qualitatively distinct reasoning systems” (Osman, M. “An Evaluation of Dual-process Theories of 
Reasoning,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 11 (2004): 1005). Just because the brain processes different 
parts of a thought in different locations does not mean that there is competitive dual system. 
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that there appears to be an affective part and a rational part. Damasio, in 2010, states that 
the conscious is essentially an advisor to the unconscious.32  
There remain some hopes for neuroeconomics, Damasio thinks that recent 
experiments confirm that unconscious and conscious are working together. He goes on to 
say, that non-conscious thought has been trained by conscious thought (Damasio 2010, 
275). I would add and modified by instinct and personal preferences.  
 
A Corrective is Necessary: But What? 
As the thumbnails I have provided above outline in brief, theories of government 
since the late 1950s have preferred "Rational Choice Theory" as their corrective to their 
discipline's older norms. Over the last half century, political scientists used this theory to 
change their focus from issues of government structure, law-giving and implementation 
                                                 
32 Tests to confirm this were conducted by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren in A. Dijksterhuis, L. F. Nordgren, 
“A Theory of Unconscious Thought,” Perspectives oil Psychological Science Vol. 1 (2006): 95—109), 
where they set up three different groups of participants. One group was given plenty of time to decide 
between 4 apartments, one groups was asked to decide immediately, and the last group was repeatedly 
distracted during the time that they had to decide. Each apartment was described by 12 features and one 
apartment was intentionally made the nicest, one was the worst, and the other two were in the middle. 
Those being distracted were of course expected to have to decide unconsciously since they were not 
actually allowed to engage their conscious mind by the distractions. Amazingly they did the best.  
 However, this does not mean that unconscious is better than conscious thought. From Damasio’s 
patients with damage Orbitofrontal Cortexes we already know that conscious thought is ineffectual without 
unconscious thought. But just because the distracted participants did best in one experiment this hardly 
constitutes iron-clad proof. Indeed, Gonzalez-Vallejo et al, did their own experiment with car selection. 
They had 6 cars with 40 features. They found that only 6 of the 23 respondents picked “correctly” 
unconsciously (“correctly” as defined by market rationality, technological rationality, or instrumentality), 
about the same as random guessing should have derived. They then allowed the respondents to consider 
their choice consciously and discovered that nearly all of them made the “correct” choice. In other words, 
when combined conscious and unconscious processes resulted in the “correct” choice. (C. Gonzalez-
Vallejo, G. D. Lassiter, F. S. Belleza and M. J. Lindberg, “‘Save Angels Perhaps’: A Critical Examination 
of Unconscious Thought Theory and the Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect,” Review of General 
Psychology Vol 12 (2008): 282-296.) 
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to a new model, one drawn from an economics that believed that value and price were 
used rationally by individuals. Certain deficiencies in their model emerged almost 
immediately; examples like the Ultras illustrate them, in which reason seemed to have 
been consistently overruled by emotion, as they defined the terms. To correct this RCT 
then turned to what has become known as "Behavioral Economics," a field that has 
developed to correlate rational behaviors with psychological factors like perception of 
risk. The problem with this attempted reform is that RCT does not survive the 
contradictory evidence provided by neuroscience and cognitive psychology, nor explains 
how, in situations like the Ultras, that "risk" may be defined in extraordinary ways—that 
the risk of having a future state that does not work might trump the risk of losing a job or 
suffering harm in a riot.  
In the end, Rational Choice Theory, does not incorporate or address what seem 
more to be philosophical-ethical choices rooted in particular situations. In light of all of 
the contradictory evidence provided by psychology and the existence of compelling case 
studies, RCT has attempted to adapt by recasting itself as a normative or proscriptive 
field, based on essentially old terms. 
The subsequent chapters of the present project are constructed around the belief 
that the materials exist to do a much better job of describing what choice means in 
situations that RCT would virtually be forced to call irrational: 2500 years of philosophy 
have addressed the issue of choice, as well. From the point of view of philosophy, the 
source of what I am considering a persistent error is clear: the Rational Choice movement 
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retains, at its base, the image of the early Enlightenment subject, a model which works by 
equating the human with the rational, and rationality as a prime goal. 
I will thus turn now, to a very brief selection of post-enlightenment philosophers 
that speak to the problem and that I will use in the next chapter to help remedy theories 
like RCT in modeling political choice and political action in ways that account more 
broadly for human behavior—accommodating more precise distinctions between macro- 
and micro-level analyses of the behaviors of individuals and groups. 
These are the topics of the next chapter: a brief recapitulation of RCT's "failures" 
with respect to the Ultras, and then a review of certain philosophical solutions that open 
out the vision of what choice in the political sphere means—work that moves beyond the 
too-simple premises of rationality or utility that RCT and the limited vision of economics 
that it draws on. This approach may seem pedantic, but because RCT remains so 
powerful in both political science and economics, I don’t believe that I can simply ignore 
it. So, the question at stake for the next section is: why did soccer hooligans go from 
politically inactive to full-fledged revolutionaries? Rational Choice Theory tells us that 
all people are rational and self-interested, and their actions are aimed at creating benefits 
that outweigh the costs. Otherwise, by definition, their actions would be irrational.  
 
The Rationalities of the Ultra Revolution: Some Conclusions 
So, what are the benefits of the revolution for the Ultras? What might be 
recoverable from the Ultra affair, if we move beyond the scope of Rational Choice 
Theory. 
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If we look at the political process from the point of view of 26 January, when the 
situation was just escalating toward extreme choice, the answer about benefits that one 
probably would have gotten from the demonstrators is: ending the Mubarak tyranny and 
possibly ushering in a new age of Egyptian democracy. 
What are the costs of this revolution, including the Ultra's acts? Injury, death, 
imprisonment, torture, chaos, a failed state, the rise of Islamists, and a collapsed 
economy.  
Such a situation simply does not compare to the more abstract benefit inherent in 
the free and fair elections in an electoral system—the case that classical RCT was 
designed to address. Add to that considerations of how the Egyptian political system is 
open to economic manipulation by the wealthy, and the personal cost to the protestors of 
injury, imprisonment, or death, it becomes shockingly obvious that RCT is designed to 
designate anyone who chooses to join a revolution either not rational or not self-
interested (there is a strange irony in RCT that an individual who was not self-interested 
and not rational would make similar choices as the person who was both rational and 
self-interested, since he or she would make irrational choice relative to his or her 
altruism). Revolutionary values held by a group, like self-sacrifice, are not considered to 
be motivating factors by RCT. Nor is a commitment to a partial outcome. At best, in the 
Egyptian situation, the Ultra actors had scant hopes at success. As actors, they could hope 
for a less repressive state or slightly better economic conditions, and those only at a 
distance in time, when political actors might eventually curry favor with voters by 
creating policies that make some attempt at better economic equality, and such an actor 
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might achieve a sense of accomplishment. While all of these factors are definitely 
beneficial to the citizens of a state, they are abstract, long term, and distributed over a 
population of millions, rather than directly granted to the individual. In contrast, the costs 
for such participation is manifest in a very real worldly, painful, time consuming, and 
very directly on an individual basis.  
Here is the first issue that RCT does not consider: a choice whose costs very 
directly impact the individual, while the benefits accrue to the community. Despite such a 
situation being familiar historically from many important political situations (especially 
long-term ones like the Civil Rights Movement in the US, which took a series of court 
cases over years to realize the legal work for). Almost without question, RCT would 
require that a paradigmatic self-interested actor-citizen would simply have to opt out of 
participation in such movements. Yet at present, "revolutions" of various definitions 
happen regularly, and since December 2010, they occur so routinely that they have 
become background noise for our daily lives, in the form of demonstrations, sit-ins, 
torchlight parades, or armed resistance that ultimately force political transformation to be 
engaged. 
But let us consider our soccer hooligans specifically. It is difficult to see how the 
behavior of soccer hooligans in any situation is rational or self-interested, or enlightened, 
compassionate, or community oriented for that matter—the social type associated with 
the term is portrayed in the media as disruptive, vehement, anti-social, and guilty of 
gratuitous violence. Yet such "outsider" social formations have long been recognized as 
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potentially providing an element of community.33 Being a soccer hooligan, therefore, 
means that you are expressing your allegiance, even if only symbolically, to your favorite 
soccer team, but even more powerfully, you become the member of a group of fellow 
fans sharing that allegiance. In an act of hooligan violence, you become an active 
member of your community. Comradery among soccer hooligans undoubtedly becomes a 
powerful motivating factor in choosing action.  
To be sure, the community of soccer fans may be only a tiny community in a 
much broader state. Moreover, through the violence between two rival soccer hooligan 
gangs, the community at large, may be harmed. There might be damage to property, 
injuries to police, and hospital expenses. And although your gang might prevail on a 
particular occasion, there are likely prices to be paid, in the forms of injuries and lost 
work, or even jail time or fines. If your group is defeated, the psychic outcome would be 
even worse, because you not only have suffered for your cause, you have also proved 
unworthy as an actor who is trying to serve the group's interest. In other words, even if 
there is devout loyalty to your soccer hooligan gang, your actions would by RCT and 
other followers of Enlightenment definitions of subjectivity, be seen as inherently self-
destructive, and your insular community not at all a viable one. 
At best, soccer hooligans are irrational, if judged by roles of "proper" social 
behavior; they are aberrant social actors. At worst, they seem to be neither altruistic nor 
self-interested because the news associates them with violence against people and 
                                                 
33 M.S. Jankowski argued for street gangs as surrogate families a quarter-century ago in Islands in the 
Street: Gangs and American Urban Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).  
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property. That is to say that the very ground assumptions of RTC's debates—whether we 
are altruistic or not, conventionally "rational," or not—may not even apply to the Ultras. 
Remember that RTC advocates advance the claim that no individual ever acts 
altruistically, because even if they give money or volunteer time, they are still getting a 
benefit. Perhaps they improve their reputation, or their actions made them feel better. But 
in terms of basic logic, however, the claim essentially reduces to the form “self-interest” 
= "altruism" (direct or indirect benefit) = “behavior.” To distinguish lines between 
altruism and self-interested behavior in what the Ultras did would be challenging, if not 
impossible.  
What benefit is there to anybody in beating up fans from the opposing side? Then 
fighting the police when they show up to stop the brawl? What could possibly motivate a 
group of people who seemingly had no political, community, selfish, or economic 
interests in their routine behavior to suddenly put aside all their pent-up hatred to join 
each other in a revolution? 
Remember that the situation in Egypt started with competing ultrafan groups 
acknowledging each other. When the Ultras for Ahly and Zamalek arrived in Maydan 
Tahrir they nodded to each other and then turned down different streets to battle the 
police. That is, they acknowledged that they were both soccer fan groups that like to 
fight, and that they were different, but that they had in this moment a greater enemy to 
their common culture. 
A Rational Choice defender might reduce this situation to the immediate 
situation- to direct habits of self-interest: “Well these soccer hooligans love to fight. They 
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joined their gang to have the excuse of fighting each other. It is self-interested, because 
this is a vehicle for being able to express your violent nature. Now they get a better-
armed enemy, and they will prevail.” This is a clear oversimplification of human 
motivations in this case. I doubt very much that there are many individuals who say to 
themselves, “I really want to go express my violent nature. I know! I will go beat up the 
cops because they're such an easy target…” That kind of description of what was an act 
of bravery or perhaps even chivalry makes it irrational, at best.  
But let us accept that premise for the sake of looking at the move in joining the 
revolution through RCT's lens. If their primary goal is the expression of their violent 
nature, then why not just meet up somewhere and beat each other up? Because January 
26 would have been an excellent occasion for such activities, seen as a rational way to 
fulfill this (irrational?) desire. With the police in large numbers in Maydan Tahrir battling 
protesters, the likelihood of a speedy response to a soccer hooligan brawl was low.  
And to make things more interesting, perhaps those desires could be satisfied 
even more overtly: attacking the police directly not only increased the chance of police 
intervention from relatively low to absolutely certain, it also increased the costs for such 
an action. If the two rival gangs had just beaten each other up in a location away from the 
police, fatalities would have been a possibility. But the probable mortality rate, in light of 
rubber bullets being fired by the police, would be lower if the Ultras fought each other, 
rather than attacking the police directly.  
And here we reach a logical impasse. If the primary objective was to commit acts 
of violence, then joining the revolution was simply irrational in light of the increased 
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cost, unless we believe that the group found the risk acceptable for the reward of 
attacking the police (a superior power) rather than their ultra-fan peers. Using the excuse 
that the Ultras were ignorant of these costs will not work in this analysis either, because 
the difference in attacking each other rather than the police, is very much obvious. 
Indeed, if the goal of the groups in this engagement had simply been to commit acts of 
violence, the Ultras could have lowered their cost even more dramatically by attacking 
the protesters—to side with the police and become part of what would emerge as even a 
more violent force. It is not certain that police would have ignored their unofficial 
participation indefinitely, but considering that the police were struggling to clear the 
protesters they might not have objected to the "assistance."  
These options for choice of action, defined as they are around the concept of 
enacting personal needs to commit violent acts, simply fail to capture the exigencies and 
the public reaction to this situation. Rational Choice Theory thus fails to explain much of 
anything in this situation—it can construct scenarios that do not adequately encompass a 
larger range of motivation in human action. What the Ultras chose was something beyond 
violent action. Their "reward," considering there was a reward, was unclear at best, 
negative at worst; their "self-interest" or "altruism" lied outside the immediately visible 
frame of the event. It lied in a fundamental redefinition of "hooliganism" as a group 
identity that helps individuals give meaning to their lives, a redefinition that transcends 
personal self-interest. That realization lies beyond RCT's vision, but not beyond certain 
strands of twentieth-century philosophy that allow us to model the self/subject and the act 
of choosing in different ways, as we will turn to in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
Heidegger and His Children—The Three Realms Model 
 
What kind of a model will allow us to capture the meaning of choice in the sense 
of the Ultras? In this chapter, I will look for an approach different from RCT to the 
question of why the Ultras joined and saved the 2011 Revolution. Central concepts from 
Heidegger, Arendt, Marcuse, Foucault, and Habermas show us different sides of what 
choice means for subjects. Specifically, I will look at Sein-zum-Tode (Being-toward-
death) the homo faber-animals laborans-vita activa model, the one-dimensional man, the 
idea of governmentality, and the system-lifeworld model. These terms each flesh out 
what an encounter like the Ultras really shows us.  
In my introduction, I laid out the role of the Egyptian soccer hooligans in the 2011 
Egyptian Revolution, which is of course part of the broader so-called “Arab Spring.” 
Then I considered Rational Choice Theory, discovering that the dominant paradigm in 
political science and economics, was based on the experiments conducted by Rational 
Choice Theorists and psychologists not descriptive of human behavior. The notion that 
all people are rational and self-interested all the time has been largely disproven. To put it 
in Daniel Kahneman (the psychologist with an Economics Nobel Prize) words, “We 
think, each of us, that we're much more rational than we are. And we think that we make 
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our decisions because we have good reasons to make them. Even when it's the other way 
around. We believe in the reasons, because we've already made the decision.”1 
Rationality, it turns out, is very rare and that the defenders of Rational Choice Theory 
today see RCT as more proscriptive rather than descriptive. When we applied it to soccer 
hooliganism and the Ultras actions in the revolution we found that the model told us 
nothing. 
To shift the discussion, then, I will build a model based on the works of 
Heidegger, Arendt, Marcuse, and Habermas that will describe the nature of contemporary 
society in terms of realms of action, interspersing parts of the model with re-descriptions 
of the Ultra soccer hooligans' actions in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Then in the final 
chapter of this study, I will apply this model to discover where the US is relative to 
political actions like the 2011 Revolutions by looking at the Occupy Movement. My hope 
is to shine a light on why there has been so little political action on the part of non-elites 
since 1970. My hope is that my model will allow us to explore a different way of talking 
about how political action is encouraged or discouraged and how in the case of the soccer 
hooligans, those actors might have sought to do something good and meaningful that 
transcended mortal boundaries of their selves, to uncover another interpretation of soccer 
hooliganism. What we will discover is that soccer hooligans engage in violent collective 
behavior in order to create a new sort of social capital that transcends the actual monetary 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 8, “How Decisions Happen” in Daniel Kahneman’s, Thinking Fast and Slow, (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013). 
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capital of the upper middle class. In effect, the hooligans became Ultras in order to 
compete with males of greater economic means in a manner that has a low entry cost. 
Because of the powerful influence of Heidegger on the other four names, I will 
start with his terminology as a re-setting of the problem of what it means to be an actor in 
the world, and then will nuance those acts with reference to the other thinkers above.  
 
Beyond Self-Interest and Altruism: Heidegger's Redefinition of Human Action 
In Being and Time Heidegger proposes that a cause for people in taking action is 
“being-toward-death.” In the beginning of division two, Heidegger takes up the question 
of what it means for the human being to "be in the world" (to be part of Da-sein, being in 
the world of human comprehension). He points out that any act that comes from the being 
of a human in the world has in it a temporal dimension, a pro-ject, a projected outcome 
into the future. Engaging in an act like Care, caring-for, caring-about something in the 
world splits the individual into frames of being, disrupts him as an ontological whole.  
Heidegger writes: 
Care, which forms the totality of the structural whole of Da-sein, obviously 
contradicts a possible being whole of this being according to its ontological sense. 
The primary factor of care, “being ahead of itself,” however, means that Da-sein 
always exists for the sake of itself. “As long as it is,” up until its end, it is related 
to the potentiality-of-being. Even when it, still existing, has nothing further 
“ahead of it,” and has “settled its accounts,” it’s being is still influence by “being 
ahead of itself.” Hopelessness, for example, does not tear Da-sein away from its 
possibilities, but is only an independent mode of being toward these possibilities. 
Even when one is without illusions and “is ready for anything,” the “ahead of 
itself” is there. This structural factor of care tells us unambiguously that 
something is always still outstanding in Da-sein which has not yet become “real” 
as a potentiality-of-its-being. A constant unfinished quality thus lies in the essence 
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of the constitution of Da-sein. This lack of totality means that there is still 
something outstanding in one’s potentiality-for-being.2 
 
The language of this quotation is difficult, but it clarifies that every attitude assumed by 
the subject in the world (care, hopelessness) orients the person in a particular way, 
turning them towards or away from certain illusions (facts?) of Da-sein and leading them 
to project certain outcomes and meanings for their acts (possibilities is his word). In the 
case of care, it projects outcomes forward, thus describing the subject who cares as 
engaged in a state of being "ahead of itself" and "unfinished." 
What is striking about the above Heidegger quote is that we can imagine the 
Ultras fitting the description of “hopelessness” as an "independent mode of being 
toward." Chronically unemployed, young, living in a state with few economic 
opportunities, and fewer still means of expressing one’s self, the Ultras take a different 
line toward the future of their own existence than mainstream subjects might prefer. 
Perhaps, soccer hooliganism is an attempt to find something in the hopelessness—or 
rather, in defining something as hopeless, are also implicated in a description of what 
might be hoped for. But what Heidegger does with hopelessness here is interesting for 
this reason, as well. He is in effect saying that being still looks to the future, even when 
all future possibilities are exhausted, as seen from the now. Similarly, care of the self also 
still implicates a future, but in terms of where the self will be in it. For the present, 
however, we will not pursue the hopelessness of the Ultras, but must rather turn to their 
                                                 
22 Martin Heidegger, On Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press, 2010), 219. 
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willingness, in the face of hopelessness, to set aside care for their personal futures and 
engage in a risk behavior that could lead to injury or death.  
What I am after with Heidegger is a description of why a person chooses action 
over inaction in the moment of seemingly no benefit for the self. The answer lies in the 
orientation of life as a being-toward-death: “Death does reveal itself as a loss, but as a 
loss experienced by those remaining behind.”3  
Thus, death reveals itself as the ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be 
bypassed. As such, it is an eminent imminence. Its existential possibility is grounded in 
the fact that Da-sein is essentially disclosed to itself, in the way of being-ahead-of-itself. 
This structural factor of care has its most primordial concretion in being-toward-death. 
Being-toward-the-end becomes phenomenally clearer as being toward the eminent 
possibility of Da-sein which we have characterized.4 
As we engage in our daily lives we cannot help but notice death around us and its 
inevitability. What that means is that, because of the knowledge that death is invisible, 
the stakes of life become visible in ways that may have been lost to consciousness by 
individual subjects: “The fact that tactically many people initially and for the most part 
do not know about death must not be used to prove that being-toward-death does not 
“generally” belong to Da-sein, but only proves that Da-sein, fleeing from it, initially and 
for the most part covers over its ownmost being-toward-death.”5  
                                                 
3 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 219. 
4 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 251. 
5 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 252. 
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What Heidegger accomplishes here is realigning questions like "choice" and 
making them structural in the sphere of being rather than personal. Thus, it is not 
paradoxical when he says that we can avoid death through engagement in the mundane 
activities of life: “The publicness of everyday being-with-one-another ‘knows’ death as a 
constantly occurring event, as a ‘case of death.’” That is: “Someone or another ‘dies,’ be 
it a neighbor or a stranger. People unknown to us ‘die’ daily and hourly. ‘Death’ is 
encountered as a familiar event occurring within the world. As such, it remains in the 
inconspicuousness characteristic of everyday encounters.”6 And for our purposes here, 
the everyday is the form of the Da-sein, being-in-the-world, within which human actions 
like choice need to be understood—part of a larger system, not simply a problem of 
individuals and what they "should" do. 
In one sense, this seems counter-intuitive, when Heidegger speaks of death. We as 
individuals should be aware of death because we cannot help but be witness to it in our 
daily lives. However, it is precisely our exposure to death as part of being-in-the-world, 
our alignment towards it, and the relationship to death that is constituted by being-in-the-
world, that makes avoiding it possible. “The public interpretation of Da-sein says that 
‘one dies’ because in this way everybody can convince him/herself that in no case is it I, 
myself, for this one is no one. ‘Dying’ is levelled down to an event which does concern 
Da-sein, but which belongs to no one in particular.”7 In this sense, then, Heidegger is 
                                                 
6 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 253. 
7 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 254. 
 57 
arguing that self-interest such as is posited for the Ultras will not necessarily be governed 
by fears of individuals: 
The evasion of death which covers over, dominates everydayness so stubbornly 
that, in being-with-one-another, the ‘neighbors’ often try to convince the ‘dying 
person’ that he will escape death and soon return again to the tranquillized 
everydayness of his world taken care of […]. But, basically, this tranquilization is 
not only for the ‘dying person,’ but just as much for ‘those who are comforting 
him.’[. . . ] Even “thinking about death” is regarded publicly as cowardly fear, a 
sign of insecurity of the part of Da-sein and a dark flight from the world. The they 
does not permit the courage to have Angst about death.8 
It would be easy to re-conceive soccer hooligans' choice nexus (not personal choice) in 
terms of such an orientation toward the world. As a set of groups, they have made an art 
out of confronting death (either social or physical).  
For the hooligans, high risk attacks against each other can result in the arrival and 
violence of the police (social death if not real death). If someone were to die from within 
their ranks, they will easily shift to adapting to act as Heidegger would charge them with 
doing: using the death of others to affirm one’s own state of not being dead: 
Entangled, everyday being-toward-death is a constant flight from death. Being 
toward the end has the mode of evading that end—reinterpreting it, understanding 
it inauthentically, and veiling it. Factically one’s own Da-sein is always already 
dying, that is, it is in a being-toward-its-end. And it conceals this fact from itself 
by reinterpreting death as a case of death occurring every day with others, as a 
case which always assures us still more clearly that “one oneself” is still “alive.”9 
In essence, the hooligans live because some among them can and do die: they use the 
death of another in their group to point to them and make death into a binary, affirming 
that that person is dead, but I am still alive.  
                                                 
8 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 254-255. 
9 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 255. 
 58 
Note, however, that this is an understanding through which a self is constituted. 
Heidegger’s charge is that such understandings are by definition false. In its facticity, as 
we live, death becomes more and more a part of each of our lives. But as projected into 
being-in-the-world, Da-sein, it is parsed into the appearance of time, so now is not then, 
they are not I, a set of distinctions that turn into a cultural interpretation of death. To 
understand what is being papered over, in turn, requires an act of disclosure: “The 
existential project of an authentic being-toward-death must thus set forth the factors of 
such a being which are constitutive for it as an understanding of death—in the sense of 
being towards this possibility without fleeing it or covering it over.”10 To understand 
what an actor in the world is doing, and for that actor to be authentic to his position in 
Da-sein, we and that actor must embrace that death is happening, always already, and 
everywhere. But when we do that, as interpreter or actor: “In Angst, Da-sein finds itself 
faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence. Angst is anxious 
about the potentiality-of-being of the being thus determined, and thus disclose the most 
extreme possibility.”11 The act is seen in relation to mortality.  
And here, we as interpreters may see something different in the position of the 
Ultras than was done in RCT: It is not that they are self-sacrificing (altruistic) or 
embracing violence, each of which would be a judgment referencing something outside 
their experience of the now. Instead, they are thrown into (geworfen) a now with what can 
be embraced as stoicism, but which more profitably is seen as a procrustean bed, a 
                                                 
10 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 253. 
11 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 246. 
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permanent and unforgiving state of being. We see that they embrace the possibility of the 
terminality of being as something that cannot be escaped—the most general goal of being 
is to end. Heidegger continues: 
Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the fundamental attunement of Angst, 
and, as the most elemental disclosedeness of thrown Da-sein it confronts being-in-
the-world with the nothingness of the world about which it is anxious in the Angst 
about its ownmost potentiality-of-being. What if Da-sain, finding itself in the 
ground of its uncanniness, were the caller of the call of conscience?12 
That is, what is produced in the person thrown into such a situation is a confrontation 
with being-in-the world, one which makes us recognize its uncanniness and thus 
produces in us a psychological state: angst, anxiety.  
That confrontation of self-manifest in Da-sein and the "nothingness of the world" 
requires us - calls to us—conscience, as motivations like care take shape between the 
poles of Da-sein as a temporal assessment. The effect of the confrontation calls forth in 
the subject a cognitive reaction to it:  
Conscience reveals itself as the call of care: the caller is Da-sein, anxious in 
thrownness (in its already-being-in…) about its potentiality-of-being. The one 
summoned is also Da-sein, called forth to its ownmost potentiality-of-being (its 
being-ahead-of-itself…). And what is called forth by the summons is Da-sein, out 
of falling prey to the they (already-being-together-with-the-world-taken-care-
of…). The call of conscience, that is, conscience itself, has its ontological 
possibility in the fact that Da-sein is care in the ground of its being.13 
Perhaps this is, in some way, the most radical thing that Heidegger says, and the thing 
which best describes what happened when the two Ultra camps saluted each other and 
took their individual roads to confront the police. They found in this moment of authentic 
                                                 
12 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 255. 
13 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 256. 
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self-awareness of mortality their call to action. That call comes from somewhere, 
Heidegger says—some say God, others biology, it does not matter which. The call is a 
call to conscience. At that moment when we realize we will be dust rather than selfishly 
flying in fear of our end, we come to care, both about ourselves, but more importantly 
about others.  
Critical for the present case is that this is less a question of choice than it is of 
affect: “[T]he call addresses Da-sein as ‘guilt’ or, as in the warning conscience, refers to 
a possible ‘guilt’ or as a ‘good’ conscience, confirms that one is ‘conscious of no 
guilt?’”14 Here, again, Heidegger stresses that the human does not produce meaning, but 
rather that the call—virtually the intentionality—this structure of being-in-the-world 
conditions the subject to certain forms of judgment. The call to affective reaction is a 
blank that individual action and predispositions fill up: the predisposition of the person 
determines whether they feel guilty or it confirms their sense of “good.” Thus, care 
manipulates our understanding of being temporally. “The being of Da-sein is care. It 
includes in itself facticity (throwness), existence (project) and falling prey.”15 It is our 
role in the world to care, and "being guilty constitutes the being that we call care.”16  
Here again, Heidegger displaces choice onto the structures of world 
understanding, away from the individual: “Understanding the call is choosing, but it is 
not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having 
as conscience as being free for one’s ownmost being-guilty. Understanding the summons 
                                                 
14 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 259. 
15 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 262. 
16 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 264. 
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means: wanting to have a conscience. This does not mean wanting to have a “good 
conscience,” nor does it mean willfully cultivating the “call”; it means solely the 
readiness to be summoned.”17 It is this call from the framework of world understanding 
that makes us take action. Heidegger thus has an interesting answer for why soccer 
Hooligans saved the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. In effect, as they sat around after the 
first day, they were confronted with a call for the second day, because the dimensions of 
the situation called for it, not because of individual choice about the situation: “Thus 
wanting to have a conscience takes over the essential lack of conscience within which 
alone there is the existentiell possibility of being ‘good’.”18 And “As authentic being a 
self, resoluteness does not detach Da-sein from its world, nor does it isolate it as a free 
floating ego… Resoluteness bring the self right into its being together with things at 
hand, actually taking care of them, and pushes it toward concerned being-with the others” 
(274).19 The hooligans were pushed toward "being-with" within that situation. 
Those soccer hooligans found themselves drawn into the revolution not because 
they had a choice, but because the call to conscience implicates a concomitant call to do 
good that takes shape within this situation. It cares, it is resolute, it requires engagement 
with the world: 
The situation cannot be calculated in advance and pregiven like something 
objective present waiting to be grasped. It is disclosed only in a free act of resolve 
that has not been determined beforehand, but is open to the possibility of such 
determination.20  
                                                 
17 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 265. 
18 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 265. 
19 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 274. 
20 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 284. 
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After years of inauthentically living in a culture of hopelessness and violence, the Ultras 
found before them the moment of moments. They had the skills and the resoluteness in 
the face of police violence to handle a vicious state apparatus designed to crush 
revolutions. The calling was theirs to have; all that they needed was the openness to it. 
Care does not need a foundation in a self. But existentiality as a constituent of 
care gives the ontological constitution of the self-constancy of Da-sein to which there 
belongs, corresponding to the complete structural content of care, the factical falling prey 
to unself-constancy. The structure of care, conceived in full, includes the phenomenon of 
selfhood. This phenomenon is clarified by interpreting the meaning of care which we 
defined as the totality of being of Da-sein.21 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that the hooligans found themselves in 
being hooligans-for-the-good in attacking the police instead of each other. But this is not 
where Heidegger stops: 
Every ontic experience of beings, the circumspect calculations of things at hand 
as well as the positive scientific cognition of things objectively present, are 
always grounded in the more or less transparent projects of the being of the beings 
in question. But these projects contain an upon-which from which, so to speak, 
the understanding of being is nourished. If we say that beings “have meaning,” 
this signifies that they have become accessible in their being, and this being, 
projected upon its upon-which, is what “really” “has meaning” first of all. Beings 
“have” meaning only because, as being that has been disclosed beforehand, they 
become intelligible in the project of that being, that is, in terms of the upon-which 
of this project. The primary project of the understanding of being “gives” 
meaning.22  
                                                 
21 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 297. 
22 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 298. 
 63 
The hooligans's world became intelligible to them in new ways as they engaged a new 
project to become more themselves.  
In effect, Heidegger is showing us that we need to understand ethics by going 
beyond simply listening to some sort of mystical calling. Instead, ethics and choice come 
into being when a situation calls for us and makes us want to “have meaning.” We are 
called to create meaning, to make a “project” that gives meaning to our lives. The Ultras 
adopted the revolution and in that moment had their project and their meaning—they 
achieved an authenticity in this set of acts  
Care is being-toward-death. We defined anticipatory resoluteness as authentic 
being toward the possibility that we characterized as the absolute impossibility of Da-
sein. In this being-toward-the-end, Da-sein exists authentically and totally as the being 
that it can be when “thrown into death.” It does not have an end where it just stops, but it 
exists finitely. The authentic future, which is temporalized primarily by that temporality 
which constitutes the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness, thus reveals itself as finite.23 
If it were not for death there would be no incentive to action. Why would we 
bother to write a dissertation if we knew we had thousands of years to procrastinate 
before bothering with it. It is precisely the shortness of our existence that gives our 
actions their resoluteness.  
In fact, it is the discovery of our mortality that calls us to action now, rather than 
in the future. “The ecstatic quality of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that it 
                                                 
23 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 303. 
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closes the potentiality-of-being, that is, the future is itself closed and as such makes 
possible the resolute existentell understanding of nullity. Primordial and authentic 
coming-toward-oneself is the meaning of existing in one’s ownmost nullity.”24 And this 
call to action has as part of it an ecstatic imperative. In a strange way once one is 
authentically being-toward-death one can achieve a sort of immortality. The actions of 
care, conscience, that are part of the undertaken project leave an impact on the society 
around us. That impact will linger even after our death. That is to say we get a sort of 
Greek immortality where the remembrance of us reinvokes us from death, but it will not 
be our names that are remembered but rather the sum of our actions will have impacted 
our community into the future and so it will be the actions of our descendants, students, 
descendants of friends, people affected by good deeds in the past, etc. who will invoke 
our being every time they benefit from and take action in the community that we changed 
as a result of our actions. The hooligans saw a way to become memorable by using their 
own strengths in a memorable way. 
This is Heidegger's claim to a kind of Existenzphilosophie, as well because he 
shows that alternative is otherwise quite horrible. Had the hooligans not embraced being, 
they would have become irrelevant in their frame, and beyond it in history: 
The pallid lack of mood of indifference to everything, which clings to nothing and 
urges to nothing, and which goes along with what the day brings, yet in a way 
takes everything with it, demonstrates in the most penetrating fashion the power 
of forgetting in the everyday moods of taking care of what is nearby. Just barely 
living, which “lets everything alone” as it is, is grounded in giving oneself over to 
                                                 
24 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 303. 
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thrownness and forgetting. It has the ecstatic meaning of an inauthentic having-
been.25 
This different understanding of what the Ultras did, of how they can legitimately be 
conceived of as actors in their world, is critical to opening the space for a philosophy of 
action that moves beyond rational choice as a question of individual actors.  
In the next sections of this chapter, I will offer an account of a theory that 
supplants rational choice theory, while accommodating Heideggers demands of seeing 
collective action as resulting from a situation rather than an individual choice—from a 
kind of self-interest construed very differently than has been done in the theories of 
choice in political action that I have discussed in the earlier chapters of this project.  
 
Origin of the Three Realms of Action: Adding the Economic Realm to Action 
The first step in recasting theories of political action is to realize that groups like 
the Ultras in today's world come together in their projects quite differently than have the 
groups who appear in the examples of earlier political theorists used in today's rational 
choice theories and their extensions. 
Today the economic realm is master over much of human behavior in the United 
States, but this has not always been the case. On a more mythic level, we might note that, 
when government first planted itself into the black soil of the Nile Valley some six and a 
half millennia ago, its function was to modify and regulate the normative and economic 
realms of action. It did this in order to create the sort of mass behavior required to meet 
                                                 
25 Heidegger, On Being and Time, 317. 
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the needs of the Egyptian people. Today, however, government does not have that power 
in its own right. Instead, it is the economic realm that does the modifying by 
manipulating the normative and political realms. Accordingly, any political space driven 
by economics does not necessarily exist to meet the needs of the public, but rather to 
maximize profit and consumption in order to meet the needs of the system.26 The space of 
politics thus becomes understood in terms set by economics' definitions of being-in-the-
world, which means that "needs," too, assume different forms, as do the behaviors that 
this understanding calls forth from the actors in it. 
The very definitions of behaviors will change. In the case of the Ultras, the 
hooligans became the heroes when their lives were engaged in their revolution. But I will 
argue that this violent uprising in the streets is not the only kind of revolution we 
recognize today. This condition of economic realm dominance means that new sorts of 
revolution are possible, among which I count the Occupy movement in the US, which 
will be discussed in the last chapter. 
What I note now is that, in addition to the normative-ethical and political 
rationales that have been attributed to individuals making choices, the economic realm 
has emerged in a new significance and salience for understanding individual political 
actions. Whereas, in previous periods most civilizations subordinated their economic 
systems to normative and political institutions, our contemporary era has subordinated the 
                                                 
26 By system I mean it exactly in the way in which Habermas defines it, where complex, rational 
institutions differentiate and decouple from the lifeworld and become the steering media of culture by 
returning to the lifeworld and colonizing it (Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol II, 
trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 82-85, 115, 154, 165). 
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political and normative realms of action to the economic realm. This is perhaps nowhere 
more pronounced than in the US, where using rhetoric like "free markets" and "trickle-
down," nearly all action has been subordinated to the whims of profit generation, rampant 
consumerism, and market forces. It is the crux of Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and 
its consequences, and the greatest source of Arendt’s lamentations in The Human 
Condition, to which I turn in later sections of this chapter. 
At this point, I suggest that we need to follow Heidegger's logic and look for a 
more encompassing ground from which to understand human action. I posit here that a 
model of Three Realms of Action will be more profitable. As I will explicate here, the 
three realms that determine the emergence of actors with choice are the political, the 
economic, and the normative—three determining frames of reference on their being-in-
the-world.  
Although, my three-realms-of-action model is influenced by Plato’s allegory of 
the metals and Aristotle’s Private/Public dichotomy, it also accommodates critiques of 
the modern world, including Freud’s id, ego, and super-ego, Arendt’s animal laborans, 
homo faber, and vita activa, Habermas’ lifeworld/system dichotomy, and the works of 
others. In fact, as Arendt describes a world, in the Human Condition, where animal 
laborans has usurped power over homo faber and as Habermas describes, in chapter 8 of 
Communicative Action, a world where system has colonized the lifeworld, in these most 
modern accounts of the realms of political action, the economic realm has usurped 
control over the political realm and eviscerated the normative realm. I hope to use my 
model to discover new insights into the human condition. 
 68 
To this point, as we have seen in my critique of theories of Government and 
economy as conditioning political actors, the political realm has been the most 
researched and best defined; it is the ideal within which civil society exists, steered by 
media. That is to say, most analyses see the political realm today as the site within which 
deliberate manipulation of the economic and normative realms occur, prompted by actors 
who script their actions according to what they understand as the norms of society. The 
normative realm is where all meaning is generated to populate the scripts directing these 
actions. It is most profitably seen as the point of origin of Heidegger’s call to conscience, 
the realm where religion, morals, ethics, heroics, family, patriotism, nationalism, identity, 
mythology, mysticism, self-worth, a sense of belonging, love, and purpose come from, 
and where a group like the Ultras can find the tools to define and redefine their identities 
and find justification for their acts.  
Yet in the most primitive sense, the economic realm has been conceived as the 
most primordial of the three realms. It is where we find food and shelter, it is 
consumption, appetite, and survival. The economic realm grounds the existence of the 
other two realms, but until recently, the public would not have conceived of it precisely 
that way. In the world of an ancient Egyptian farmer 4,000 years ago or even a European 
peasant from the Middle Ages, the statement, “What you are doing is economic,” would 
have only told part of the story. The serf or guild member was just as likely to say, “I am 
serving my baron and God by laboring” as making ends meet.27 Money (in the form of 
                                                 
27 For more on labor as a category during the Middle Ages see Mark Addison Amos, “The Naked and the 
Dead: The Carpenters’ Company and Lay Spirituality in Late Medieval England” in The Middle Ages at 
Work, eds. Michael Uebel and Kellie Robertson, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2004). Amos's 
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cash or wages) existed, as did sophisticated bookkeeping, but the rhetoric that would turn 
it into a full-fledged realm for identity production was a much later emergence.  
In the earlier state forms, these three realms of action were more tightly coupled, 
where today they can be decoupled and understood separately.  
Around 800 AD, new discourses of philosophical justification arose when 
philosophy was redefined in conjunction with natural science, in the context of the new 
religion of Islam as well as Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle. A few Arabs, a lot of 
Persians, a few Christians, a few Jews, and a lot of Muslims ended up as the architects of 
natural philosophy—in some accounts, the origin of physical sciences, but also for new 
discussions of the relation of the relation of reason to norms (be they religious or 
political).28 Here again, however, the evolution of the normative realms was hindered. An 
example of how is found around 1100 AD, when al-Ghazali’s book Incoherence of the 
Philosophers took aim at the ungodliness of philosophy in general, but in particular 
                                                 
assessment of guild life in the late Middle Ages examines how the economic, social, and political interests 
of crafting guilds were colored by religious purpose. Amos's essay is a reminder of just how intricately the 
institutionalization of medieval labor is bound up with the cultivation of “both” worldly and spiritual 
success. Taking as his example the Carpenters' Company, Amos shows how guild life operated as a buffer 
against future privations, measured culturally and spiritually. A 'theology of work' emerges where secular 
activities dovetail with religious missions. Such a theology of labor justifies the inevitable exploitative 
dimensions of an emergent capitalism in terms of salvific benefits. 
28 For more on the scientific contributions of the Islamicate world during the Middle Ages see George 
Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Transformations: Studies in the 
History of Science and Technology), (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2011). Just to give you an idea, I'm referring 
to the innovations of al-Khwarazmi, al -Kindi, al-Bukhari, Muslim, Ishaq, al-Farabi, ibn a- Haithem, Ibn 
Sina, Nizam al-Mulk, Maimonides, and Ibn Rushd. They invented zero, algebra, translated Aristotle and 
deconstructed his idioms, invented literary analysis in order to unravel which of the hadith were legitimate, 
invented hydraulics, invented modern agriculture, created the first scientific method, invented the lens, 
discovered that light had a finite speed, asserted that all objects in the universe exerted gravity on one 
another, invented modern medicine, described the application of reason to politics, and more. Men like al-
Farabi questioned the very fundamentals of Islam and men like ibn Sina skirted around the subject of God 
in order to lay the foundations of what would become phenomenology and the concepts of entropy and 
singularities. Nizam al-Mulk pushed the boundaries of politics by questioning the norms of his time. 
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targeted Ibn Sina, al-Farabi, Plato, and Aristotle. Despite an attempt by Ibn Rushd, in his 
The Incoherence of the Incoherence, al-Ghazali’s critiques held, leaving politics and 
religion closely conjoined in the normative realm. It would not be before the Renaissance 
when the normative realm grounding action would decisively be split from the political, 
with reason becoming the defining element of all realms of action and identity 
production. Reason allowed not only the production of skepticism, but also different 
norms for justifying action and producing identities, and its use allowed for the 
emergence of media as ways to enforce rational norms outside of the direct control of 
politics.  
This separation is critical as the basis of modern Western thought, bringing with it 
what has been called the Enlightenment, but also its attendant ills: religious fanaticism, 
extremist ideologies, environmental degradation, luxurious convenience, genocidal wars, 
and exponential technology growth, all held in place by the media as much as they are by 
governments. And finally, it appears that in our age of massive technological growth we 
have given our sovereignty over not to the public as we would like to pretend, but rather 
to our consumer appetites, Arendt so eloquently points out in The Human Condition. The 
sort of reason that we apply to our daily lives is not the rich reason of Socrates, but rather 
the toxic “technological rationality” that Marcuse describes in One-Dimensional Man.29 
And with such theories of the Enlightenment, as I shall now turn to, we reach also the 
point where the economic realm plays its role.  
                                                 
29 “Technological rationality has become political rationality," (Herbert Marcuse One Dimensional Man, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), xvi). 
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Let me now outline each realm and political, normative, and economic realms in 
detail and then demonstrate the power relationship between them. This will help me to 
evolve my model and explore evolution of the realms in order to show what we have 
done to get here and how the realms are differentiated and separated from each other. In 
the remaining sections of this chapter, I will outline how economic and economically-
based social theories have influenced our ideas of realms of political reaction (and in my 
conclusion, I will return to the Occupy Movement, specifically Occupy Austin) to 
exemplify why economic theory needs to be added as an independent factor in political 
action, in light of the current shape of our political and economic intuitions.  
 
The Three Realms of Action: An Overview 
Let me now return to theories of government to see why we need to assume three 
realms of action—economic, normative, and political—to understand political action in a 
more encompassing way. This is not to say that all action discreetly fits into one of those 
three realms, even in my model. I do not pretend that the boundaries between the three 
realms of action are always well defined. Nonetheless, post-Heideggerian theory 
indicates that we need to pursue how we differentiate between them even when such 
differentiation may not actually exist. Much contemporary work on government, 
construes work as economic, voting as political, and family-life, religious activities and 
making art as normative-ethical. When choice and judgment are spoken of in this way, 
three realms appear carefully differentiated in day-to-day life, and we are careful with 
each other in addressing them: “Never discuss politics and religion in polite company.” 
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While there are numerous variations of the saying, the meaning is always the same: your 
religion (normative realm beliefs) and your politics (political realm beliefs) should be 
held in private. 
What this de facto separation implies can best be exemplified with some practical 
examples from government.  
Institutions are often created in one realm of action specifically to manipulate 
another realm of action. Some institutions, such as the Supreme Court, seem to operate in 
more than one realm. The Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the land, may rule over 
the normative realm through moral, ethical, ideological, or legal decisions. However, the 
seeming overlap here is misleading. It is true that the Supreme Court can affect the 
normative realm in a ruling. However, that does not make the Supreme Court a normative 
institution: the Supreme Court belongs to and was created by the political realm to 
adjudicate laws. It was designed in large part to regulate the political realm even if the 
Supreme Court uses normative realm justifications.  
Congress can pass a law that affects the economic, normative, or political realms. 
A corporate lobbyist comes from the economic realm and is mandated by the economic 
realm specifically to manipulate the political realm. When the Protestant religious right 
in the US specifically organized (three decades ago) to get their people elected into 
political positions across the US, that was an example of normative realm institution 
acting within the political realm. Advertisers are economic realm actors who specifically 
target the normative realm by using normative realm symbols to alter how you feel about 
a product (economic), a norm (normative), or a candidate (political). In this case the 
 73 
economic realm needs to be understood as infiltrating the normative realm in order to 
manipulate any of the three realms. Despite these constant crossing-over events this does 
not change the nature of the institution making the cross over. The advertiser is still at the 
end of the day an economic realm entity. 
This kind of institutional overlap is important for recasting our prevailing model 
of political action. Most Marxists and capitalists today would both likely argue that 
nearly all behavior has some economic component or motive. As we have seen, this is 
certainly the premise behind Rational Choice Theory, as well as of much of Marx’s 
analysis about human behavior. Aside from its relation to economics, for example, 
Marxian anthropology is premised on the notion that all cultural traits exist for some sort 
of Darwinian survival purpose.30 Only those cultural traits that lend themselves to the 
group survival will be retained by the group. Those that harm will either have to be 
abandoned, or else they will lead to the demise of the group. In economic terms, from this 
perspective, in a society that has endemic theft, the function of theft might be understood 
as adaptive: to redistribute the wealth to those who need it more. So while we might look 
at the theft as counter-productive or ethically evil and see it as detrimental to a 
community’s well-being, the Marxian anthropologist could argue that we simply have not 
identified the economic importance of the behavior. In Marxist terms, this is necessarily 
the case, because economically harmful behaviors would have evolved away or caused 
the community’s demise and therefore the demise of the destructive behavior. 
                                                 
30 Barbara J. Price, “Cultural Materialism: A Theoretical Review,” American Antiquity, Vol. 47, No. 4. 
(Oct. 1982), pp. 709-741.  
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With such assumptions, we arrive again at Rational Choice Theory, which posits 
that all actors are essentially rational all the time, that they seek to maximize their self-
interests while simultaneously minimizing cost, and that they are capable of knowing 
“what they want and can order their wants transitively.”31 The result is that they say that 
these situations make people essentially lazy (because "efficiency" means figuring out 
what the minimal is that one needs to do to get by), and that altruism does not exist. 
Neither option is as open as Marxist economic theories would assume, but Rational 
Choice theory remains stuck in that paradigm. Even Anthony Downs’ 1957 hallmark 
work, An Economic Theory of Democracy. led to the emphasis on big data and prediction 
of trends. This happened because political science theory has taken economics to mean 
econometrics, rather than examining how a theory like Marxism would affect the concept 
of rational choice.  
Factoring in economics as a realm of action, however, highlights an aspect of 
today's government theory that carries such emphases on big data forward, with little 
theoretical innovation. It mirrored the same sort of dichotomy in physics between the 
theorists and experimenters. The theorists in political science lost. A job search on the 
website of the American Political Science Association should dissuade most graduate 
students from becoming theorists, because the lack of listings mentioning that skill. 
Indeed, the lack of reflection within political science has become so acute that the 
American Political Science Association produced a painful report in October 2011 
                                                 
31 William H. Riker, “The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory,” Political Psychology, Vol. 16, 
No 1, (Mar. 1995), pp. 23-44. 
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demonstrating that Political science “tends not to be self-reflective about the analytical 
limitations of many of its traditional methodological approaches.”32 The report goes on to 
say that "[t]he tendency to accept its approaches as 'objective' science, for example, tends 
to inhibit the development of a more critical debate about the potential phenomenological 
bases of much empirical social science."33 In practice, this means that the interface 
between economics and choice emerges as particularly under-theorized, given that extant 
work sometimes is little more than dropping a data set into SPSS and looking for high R2. 
“Research, the report notes, is ‘the Holy Grail’ in academe, determining career 
advancement and the prestige of professors and departments. And when research is 
evaluated on quantity and impact, ‘rarely does the discussion’ focus on such questions as 
‘alleviating inequality or advancing the cause of social justice,’ the report says.”34 
The reductionism of economics in this way (which can include classical, 
nineteenth-century Marxian analysis, where everything is about its economic importance 
in the sense of value, price, and profit), has a very serious consequence that leads to a 
failure to understand behavior. This way of seeing the universe is reductionist in the same 
                                                 
32 Political Science in the 21st Century, American Political Science Association: Task Force Report, 
October 2011, accessed 4/7/2017, 
http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Task%20Force%20Reports/TF_21st%20Century_AllPgs_webres9
0.pdf. 
33 Political Science in the 21st Century. 
34 See Scott Jaschik, “Ill-Equipped Political Science,” Inside Higher Education, October 24, 2011 
(https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/10/24/political-science-urged-diversify-itself-and-its-faculty). 
Ultimately, even the APSA report cited in the last footnote had to distance itself from the Rational Choice 
debate lest it be thrown into the garbage pile “[T]his discussion is not meant to be a repeat of the same 
qualitative versus quantitative debate that is decades old within the political science discipline," the report 
says. "The critique is not of empiricism per se, of science, or of quantitative methods write large, but rather 
of scientifically oriented research that is not sensitive to the ways in which an emphasis on objectivity 
sometimes obfuscates the normative assumptions implicit in how a study is framed, carried out, and 
analyzed." 
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way that saying “we eat to gain energy” is. It is true that eating gives us energy, but it is 
not the only reason that we eat. We also eat because we are compelled to do so by pain 
and instinct. We also eat because it brings us enormous pleasure. We also eat because it is 
a social action, and we are social beings. It is true that the energy provided by food is 
crucial to our survival, but it is not the only motivation that causes us to consume food. In 
fact, as far as motivation goes, energy is probably low on a person’s list, unless they are 
poor or facing famine-like conditions.  
And now we come to the other side of trying to factor in economics as part of the 
three realms defining motivation. Ever since critiques of Enlightenment and neo-
liberalism have become possible, political scientists have been quickly inclined towards 
believing that all action boils down to economics and that the other two realms (ethical 
norms and political structures) are merely façades used to motivate economic behavior—
that, ultimately, norms and politics exist simply to foster economic outcomes. This 
modern simplification of traditional control vectors has led economic behavior to be 
considered as itself rational. Here, again, however, this is a historicized corruption of the 
idea.  
My own formulation of three realms of action is itself tainted with that 
corruption, because, as I have suggested earlier, any division among the normative, the 
political, and the economic is done strategically within modern contexts. That conceptual 
grid divides private vs. public, rational vs. irrational, Christian vs. heretic, etc., in order to 
essentialize our motivations for human action. Since Marx in economics and Downs in 
 77 
political science, the contemporary paradigm stresses only economics and only one kind 
of data-driven economics, based on the idea of capital. We are in Marcuse’s nightmare. 
Now, it is important to pull in other models for economic and political action, in 
order to open out the vision of how money, capital, and capitalism might be modeled in 
ways more commensurate with the kind of thought we explored in Heidegger. Two terms 
come into question as of primary importance 
In Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: 
A Critique of Functionalist Reason,35 the philosopher moves to a more system-based 
project. First, he defines lifeworld as the living realm of informal, shared, culturally-
grounded understandings, values, beliefs, and mutual accommodations. He then defines 
system as those bureaucratic institutions which decouple from the lifeworld only to return 
to it and colonize it. The colonizing of the lifeworld, rising in part out of the secularism of 
modernity, serves to dismantle it and yields a general loss of meaning. These terms 
amplify what is at stake in a reading of a model like Heidegger's, applied to real 
behaviors. Lifeworld becomes a term summarizing many patterns of naturalized values in 
the normative realm; system refers to particularly the institutions which exist to enforce 
such patterns, as well as to propagate acts of essentialization according to the desiderata 
of the political winds in which they function. In the next sections of my argument, I will 
assume that when I mention economic, political, or normative realms that both system 
and lifeworld components are contained within them. Habermas's original text, however, 
                                                 
35 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). 
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leaves out the third realm, the economic, and so I will supplement that third column with 
reference to one of his contemporaries, Hannah Arendt, because it is critical to see how 
all three realms need to be accounted for.  
In The Human Condition,36 Arendt amplifies the notion of economics by pointing 
to the idea of appetite (or desires) and work as part of the economic domain of life. She 
first defines animal lobrans as the consumer, the appetites. At the other focus of this 
shared dynamic, we find the homo faber, the entrepreneur who feeds the desires of 
animal laborans. Homo faber innovates to create new markets and generates profits in 
the process. However, in the process homo faber also falls victim to his or her success in 
capitalism, because the consumptive appetites of animal laborans cannot be met because 
they are illusory and always subject to revision. 
Even worse, as homo faber generates new markets or creates new ways to satisfy 
old consumptive desires, he or she will eventually produce just to feed the consumption, 
becoming emptied of all meaning—what at one point might have been choice has 
become empty routine for both producer and consumer, reproductive rather than 
productive in nature. There is an additional issue for those assuming that the economy 
determines consciousness. Eventually, as the system persists in action, the addiction of 
profit-making becomes so great that homo faber no longer rules over the economy, but 
instead is ruled by animal laborans. Considerations such as the consequences of over-
production or damage to the environment are lost to both homo faber, who cannot 
                                                 
36 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
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produce fast enough and animal laborans who cannot consume responsibly. Both groups 
within the economic cycle, as Arendt models it, have become alienated from life, and 
both will eventually be in situations that will be (or are) regulated by the system. Homo 
faber begins to become a cog in the system, creating new niches that serve no purpose 
other than creating more consumption. The result is a world that will in effect, to use 
Habermas' term, consume itself in abstractions/administered systems.  
To resolve this danger, Arendt counsels moving away from vita contemplativa, 
which she says is already operative (it is how homo faber innovates), and instead turn to 
vita activa. To her, this is a new definition of the intersection between politics and 
economics. The vita activa is not merely a life of action; it is one that engages in the 
political system. It is not completely clear how this engagement or level of action will 
transform the political system, but what Arendt is counseling is to put the political realm 
in charge of the economic realm.  
These two bodies of thought allow for an outline of representative forces within 
the three realms. The Three Realms Model can best be illustrated in a chart with cells 
occupied by typical entities, so that it becomes clear that "choice" will take on different 
faces for individuals in various positions:  
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Figure 2: Habermas and the Three Realms of Action 
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The relationship between the Three Realms of Action Model I am proposing here 
and Arendt’s model in the Human Condition has much overlap in the Economic realm. 
To clarify the space between her work and my own, it is worthwhile to show how much 
more simply Arendt actually structures her ideal of world experience:  
 
Figure 3: Arendt and the Three Realms of Action 
REALM ECONOMIC NORMATIVE POLITICAL  
ANIMAL LABORANS consumer - - 
HOMO FABER creator subversive - 
VITA CONTEMPLATIVA problem solver observer observer 
VITA ACTIVA  problem solver activist activist 
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I believe that Arendt's animal laborans and homo faber together make up what I 
identify as the economic realm of action. Indeed, my discussion of the contemporary 
modern form of the economic realm is in part a reconstruction of Arendt’s model. Yet she 
does not differentiate other forms of action, most likely because she is writing a critique 
especially aimed at the capitalist West. As I read her project, vita activa and vita 
contemplativa fit into all three realms since they are not specifically realm-oriented 
activities, but rather ways of relating thinking and acting. Of course, Arendt points out 
that vita contemplativa already exists within homo faber, which is why it is not a 
solution, but rather a part of the problem.37 
Let us now turn directly to the advantages of integrating definitions like 
Habermas' and Arendt's into a model for choice and action in a more comprehensive 
world picture, rather than as a logic of individual advantages. 
In the next chapter, I thicken the description of this three realm of action model. 
My claim is that this model can better explain the public political choice taken by the 
soccer hooligans and those involved in the Occupy movement. These actions seem non-
rational when viewed from within an economic realm that utilizes the lens of market 
rationality. The question, then, is the following: If Rational Choice Theory is unable to 
explain what seems like non-rational behavior, can switching between realms help us 
better describe the reality of choice? Switching between realms then become an analytic 
                                                 
37 Without vita contemplativa, homo faber would not be able to conceive of new tools, markets, and new 
ways to increase consumption, p. 304. 
 82 
heuristic device for the study of power which, although an abstract concept at first, begins 
to gain explaining power through the use of familiar historical sites. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
The Three Realms as an Analytic Heuristic for Power Relations— 
The Evolving Definition of Public Political Choice 
 
This chapter amplifies the brief overview I just gave of my three realms model for 
political action. It will do so in two ways: first, by explicitly correlating each realm with 
the types of action it comprises, and then by expanding on them in a historical 
epistemology. The point of the first approach to the three realms is to more precisely 
locate what types of action are predicated in each; the second approach, in turn, correlates 
the identities of the three realms with familiar historical sites used to analyze the nature 
of political action. The goal of these two approaches is to establish the three realms 
model as a flexible typology for opening out analyses of human choice and action in what 
will emerge as an extended political context, one that changes our inherited notions of 
what political action might actually be. The results achieved here will be tested in the 
next chapter, which takes up a modern case that inherited models for political practice 
have not successfully addressed. 
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The Three Realms of Action: Extended Version 
As indicated in the last chapter, an early form of the economic realm is perhaps 
the most primal site of being-in-the-world and hence the most overt ground for personal 
action and choice. But as Arendt's example points up, it is also the realm that requires 
nuancing, if it is to be considered as more than a realm providing instrumental motivation 
for individuals. 
 
1. The Economic Realm 
All living beings are part of the economic realm and thus act within it as one 
understanding of the lifeworld in which they exist (Habermas's term). In its primordial 
form, the economic realm comprises what Arendt had described as pure animal laborans. 
In effect, in the primordial economy, all living beings are actors and can be acted upon by 
the fundamental conditions of their labor. That labor, seen economically, also implicates 
a transformation of the environment: that labor transforms the earth and its resources., All 
economic activity is some transformation of the environment, as it acts upon the Earth 
and all its resources. In fact, it is precisely the acting upon other lifeforms that fuels the 
basic core of all economics, even for the historically later, extremely complex form of the 
economic realm. After all, the primal center of all such economic activity rests in the 
collection of food and shelter.  
Such economic activity may, of course, be considered the primal politics of being-
in-the-world. The simple form of the economic realm is that which existed before the 
emergence of civil society as we know it, but we must be cautious about not equating the 
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primordial with the primitive, because this primal order already features tools and tool-
making. The primal politics associated with economics comes into being as soon as the 
human become homo faber. That simple form, in addition, relates to an order of being, 
not completely limited to humans, but to tool = users, including chimpanzees, sea otters, 
and beavers—it is the realm of life-preserving action. 
The simple form of the economic realm is also a necessary precursor for the 
members of that economic group to attain a civil form, because it allows animals to 
transcend the physical limitations of bodies. Metaphorically, the simple form of the 
economic realm lies at the boundary between "nature" and "culture": once sea otters 
“discovered” that they can break into crustaceans with a stone, they could supplement or 
even alter their diets—they participate in their own economic development. That advance 
in simple economic organization, in turn, allows for a larger population of sea otters. 
When food can be acquired by more than one means, this community has the space for 
other changes in behavior, e.g. the acquisition and keeping of a “favorite” stone. In effect, 
sea otters transformed themselves into something new when they enter an economic 
realm and become agents within it. This is the rudimentary form of an economic realm, 
shared by all being in the world, but it usually is quickly overcome in human groups.  
The civil form of the economic realm comes into being only once specialization 
occurs and when the economic realm begins to sponsor differentiated economic identities 
(as in the case of the differentiation between workers and consumers). At that moment, 
individual identities emerge as determined by systems of exchange that have come into 
being. If I am a specialist in that economic realm (e.g. I make pots), I survive by 
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exchanging a portion of my pots for food, or I will perish. As a specialist, by definition, 
my identity in the economic realm has changed: I no longer participate in the simple form 
of the economy: I do not produce (all) my own food, I trade for (at least part of) it.  
The implications of this kind of shift have been documented many times, 
especially since Ferdinand Tönnies made the distinction between Gemeinschaft 
(community) and Gesellschaft (society) in 1887 (and thereafter). In a Gemeinschaft, 
identities within the community are often similar, but at least transparent: each person 
was capable of and knowledgeable about all the functions within her or his community. 
The community might practice divisions of labor based on gender or age and even the 
level of expertise, but, seen broadly, the members of this sort of society could potentially 
take up the tasks of any other member. When specialization increases and the community 
evolves towards being a society (Gesellschaft), such community identities become 
fragmented across an economic realm with a more articulated civil form, and the 
Gemeinschaft recedes into history, in a process that, in history, took the better part of a 
millennium. In the modern era, however, some proponents of the Gemeinschaft remain: 
some forms of conservative ideology (e.g. fascisms and fundamentalisms) and 
proponents of nostalgia keep trying to roll back the purportedly divisive identities of the 
Gesellschaft into what they construe as the more coherent ones of the community. 
Precisely this rejection is part of the attraction of works by Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Oakeshott and Foucault.1 
                                                 
1 Examples include Beyond Good and Evil, Being and Time, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, and 
Madness and Civilization, respectively. Leslie Paul Theile does come close to surveying their rejection of 
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Psychologically and physically, another factor comes into play, as Heidegger sees 
it. According to Heidegger, “Our encounter with the question of Being, however, 
produces anxiety and pain, for it involves an encounter with not being, with nothingness 
and death. Being itself thus repels us from the question toward answers, toward an 
interpretation of Being as something, as some being.”2 In one sense, this is literally true: 
the primary orientation of the economic realm is towards death, or perhaps more 
precisely towards avoiding death, because, at its core, economic behavior is about food, 
water, shelter, and reproduction. However, as the economic realm becomes more 
complex, the available identities within that realm build on more factors, including a 
desire for luxury or convenience, monument building, transportation, trade, 
specialization, etc. Such identities begin to reshape the potentials in the economic realm, 
and especially being, to move it toward the normative realm, first by enforcing standards 
of taste, propriety, or power, as conditioning forms of identity. 
Yet some of these potentials turn into ideologies, with possible consequences. For 
example, religion ameliorates the pain of death by creating a narrative that allows 
believers to transcend death and thereby confront it with less fear and dread. In the 
process the events of a person’s life purportedly become meaningful, because the 
individual's identity is not lost at death, but continues thereafter. As Heidegger would 
note, however, becoming such a believer means that the agency of the individual is 
                                                 
Gesellschaft with his article “Reading Nietzsche and Foucault: The Hermeneutics of Suspicion?” The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2. (Jun., 1991), pp. 581-592.  
2 Michael Allen Gillespie, “Martin Heidegger's Aristotelian National Socialism,” Political Theory, Vol. 28, 
No. 2. (Apr., 2000), pp. 140-166; here, p. 141.  
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disseminated in the role: believers cannot be authentically being-toward-death; they never 
truly have to face obliteration. Authentically being-toward-death in an identity would 
mean accepting a total end and requires the individual to do something meaningful with 
one’s life in order to make sense of the events of one’s life. Yet in most cases, that 
authentic being, Heidegger would note, tends to become part of a new realm of being-in-
the-world: the normative realm.  
 
2. The Normative Realm 
In one sense, the normative realm is also oriented towards death, and it serves to 
help individuals regulate their behavior and orient their lives, in the face of death and 
oblivion. The normative provides the materials out of which identity can be constructed 
within the Gesellschaft. It is the place of symbols, language, art, tradition, monuments, 
flags, religion, morals, philosophy, and more. Because we as individuals and as 
communities invest so much into avoiding death, death plays a large role in the normative 
realm raising the spectre of inauthenticity within being-toward-death. While it is the role 
of the economic realm to stave off death through the supplying of food and shelter, it is 
the role of the normative realm to help individuals create identities by providing the 
materials to help them understand the meaning of death and make sense of life.  
The normative realm is also the space wherein societies anchor their identities. 
They build monuments (e.g Egypt's pyramids, the tombs in the Valley of the Kings, etc., 
through which Egyptians hoped to transcend death and continue to live in the afterlife). 
Symbolically, the normative realm achieves its own life, as is well documented in the 
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"immortality" that is marketed in the tourist industry and in Egyptian exhibits in 
museums around the world. The Greeks and Romans achieved their immortality through 
heroic deeds memorialized in epics and tales. Both kinds of memorialization enter the 
collective memories of the living and add to the culture and mythos of the living (their 
memories add to the normative realm’s meaning). The Christian and Islamic religions, in 
contrast, refer identity to the afterlife, and thus subsume individual identity into a 
different kind of group narrative, one dealing in standards of ethics or morality.  
In all three examples above, the normative realm in effect cancels death, and, in 
so doing, the examples also show how that realm subsumes individual identities into 
group narratives. In Heideggerian terms, what the normative realm has historically done 
is give people a means to inauthentically be-toward-death—to subsume "their own" 
choices into group narratives, and, concomitantly, to prescribe "appropriate" scenarios for 
action. In essence, individuals choose among ready-made actions, each of which has 
familiar benefits; individuals thus actually choose which types in the normative realm 
they are going to represent. Thus, in Christianity and Islam the actions in life are really 
only meaningful to the extent that at the moment of death one must reconcile them with 
God, and one is expected to be humble in both Abrahamic religions, because public 
displays of “good” behavior might cancel their “goodness” if they were mixed with sinful 
pride. In contrast, Greeks and Romans were expected to tell tales that became public acts 
of heroism. In Egypt, class figured into its identity-creation in the normative: the ruler 
had to bring his community into the afterlife.  
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 Heidegger reminds us of another dimension of being-in-the-world in the realm of 
the normative: it creates ideologized spaces. In the cases above, the Greeks find identity 
in public acts reinforced by public narratives that propagate normative virtues. In other 
words, in order to become the Greek equivalent of immortal you have to act within the 
public sphere because you have to have your name spoken posthumously. In Christianity 
and Islam, the requirement for becoming immortal, which here means living well in the 
afterlife, is to act meaningfully in the private sphere. This does not mean that acting 
heroically doesn’t engender greater bounty in the hereafter, it just isn’t a necessity. For 
example, in the Christianity and Islam, excellence in child-rearing is one of the many 
tickets into paradise. In this sense, the practicing Muslim or Christian in the economic 
realm—the individual created as an understanding within that realm—looks to a legacy 
that does not necessarily include the glory of one's name. Nonetheless, that individual has 
made meaning in the normative sphere by embodying its values and acting according to 
them, thus bearing witness to what that sphere does.  
 
3. The Political Realm 
The individual acts out of economic interest and in relation to the norms that help 
constitute his or her agency in acting. But the normative is also not entirely a voluntaristic 
product, a realm in which individuals choose to participate. Beyond it, the political realm 
exists to manipulate the economic and normative realms. It could exist to manipulate 
those realms to meet the needs of the people or it could manipulate those two realms in 
order to serve the needs of the state or more likely, the elites whom the state serves. 
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The political realm likely came into being to modify economic behavior, when, 
for instance, community leaders needed to convince or force a community to act together. 
It is very easy to see the benefits for a community to deliberately and collectively 
manipulate the economic realm in cases like needing to stockpile grain for long-term 
food stability. Building an irrigation ditch, a fort wall, or setting aside a portion of the 
population to guard a granary are all reasonable responses to easily imagined problems. 
Yet it is not so easy for individuals to be motivated for such long-term projects on an 
economic basis only. It is more likely that the community leaders will need to manipulate 
the normative realm to make such collective planning possible. And not infrequently, 
reason and self-interest may not satisfy individual desires.  
To make matters more difficult, to put it in Habermas’ terms, the person who 
proposes that a community band together must pass three validity claims for his or her 
speech to be able to enforce a new norm for action—to transform an idea into a collective 
political will:  
(a)  to establish and renew interpersonal relations, whereby the speaker 
takes up relation to something in the world of legitimate (social) order: 
(b) to represent (or presuppose) states and events, whereby the speaker 
takes up a relation to something in the world of existing states of affairs;  
(c) to manifest experiences—that is, to represent oneself—whereby 
the speaker takes up relation to something in the subjective world to which 
he has privileged access.3 
                                                 
3 Habermas, Jurgen, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One, Reason and the Rationalization 
of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 308. 
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Habermas says that a person's rejection of what another says actually constitutes a "no" to 
the act of accepting the speaker's legitimacy to establish personal relations, to be 
representative of the social order, and/or to take personal experience as a key to a ground 
for collective action. All three are difficult, because most potential actors in the proposed 
collective are influence more by personal experience and norms rather than testimony 
about the empirical. Not that we are dealing with the question of individual agency and 
will within the collective.  
In such cases, the speaker's truth claims may be based on fact, but the receivers 
who should be influenced by these claims could fail to understand it, but reject it as not 
factual, or understand it, accept it as factual, but reject it anyway because it contradicts 
that person’s interests or more likely that person’s normative perception of the world. But 
to make matters more complicated it is entirely possible that a listener could understand a 
claim, accept it as fact, agree to act accordingly, but simply be too lazy to properly follow 
through. Indeed, an actor might want to follow through for a plethora of reasons: to 
advance interpersonal relations, to better one’s community, in one’s self interest, etc. Yet 
here history intervenes: such an actor might even enthusiastically pursue actions 
suggested by the speaker, but then over time such a listener might lose enthusiasm for the 
project of trying to establish new norms. 
And with this, we find the conditions for the necessity of the emergence of the 
political order, rather than assuming that a collective will be established on the basis of 
voluntary acts. Rationality and reason are thin. Emotions on the other hand are thick. If a 
speaker can appeal to a person’s emotions, she or he has a much better chance of 
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changing behavior. Emotions are exactly the energy of the normative realm. In other 
words, if an actor has a choice between using reason or emotion to convince someone to 
change their behavior or the norms to which they adhere, the actor is advised to choose 
the latter. Such is the power of the normative realm as it predicates individual activity 
and the "acceptable" acts, and another restatement of the failure of classical Rational 
Choice Theory. 
But the willingness or ability of an individual to assume leadership and try to 
change the norms for collective behavior, opens up a break between the normative realm 
and a new political realm. In that situation, we speak not only of actors voluntarily 
following norms, but of overt political action, where different level causes offer 
individuals new grounds for political action, grounds that transcend the memory and 
experience of individuals.  
A person who survives a famine, for instance, is likely be a very enthusiastic 
contributor to a community granary in the short term. However, as the experience of the 
famine fades from memory and the survivors are replaced by a new generation of 
political actors who are expected to affirm a choice based on past facts, their commitment 
to maintaining a community granary will erode. Yet if someone can lead the society by 
implanting the granary as a norm in a different collective memory, then members of the 
community can be brought to different types of political actions. Thus, if a king or priest 
can convince the people that it is the will of the gods to bring the grain to the granary 
annually, then a change in economic behavior will be greeted enthusiastically and 
eventually will become routine. This is the power of the political realm: the ability to 
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make new norms and convey them to potential political actors to create new types of acts 
according to norms—now, validated as political and hence authoritative in new ways. 
Referring back to Hannah Arendt's terms, what happens here is that individuals, each 
with their own vita contemplativa can be brought into new forms of the vita activa within 
what has become a realm of political norms and acts, vouched for by the reasons and 
rationalities of others, rather than personal experience. That is, the political realm brings 
people to a vita activa through manipulation of norms that purportedly benefit the 
collective—a clear extension of the idea of choice and its motivations than what is used 
in Rational Choice theory, with an alternate account of what might demand personal 
motivation to action. 
Let us now return to significant moments in history, to chart the problems of 
identity and motivation that we have identified as remaining in the wake of Rational 
Choice Theory. These cases will argue the importance of making these distinctions by 
returning to history and seeing how they open out these conventional reference points for 
choice analyses of specific historical moments. The result of looking at this series of case 
studies will be an account of power and the various ways that actors emerge in relation to 
the specific types of power in each realm.  
The main point I make here is that while the ancient and medieval worlds where 
dominated by the normative realm, the early modern era saw a transition away from the 
hegemony of the normative first into the political and later into the economic. My hope is 
that the following historical case studies will make that clear. 
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Historical Case Study 1: Frederick II Challenges the Dominant Order of the 
Realms—The Political Realm Competes with the Normative Realm 
After explicitly correlating each realm with the types of action it comprises we 
now turn to familiar historical examples in order to better see the evolution of the three 
realms. The most straightforward cases of the interaction of the three realms are to be 
found in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. These were societies (no longer just 
communities) to a great degree dominated by a normative realm that still carried the force 
of a political realm and in which the economic realm remained very localized, with a 
very few exceptions. Political leaders emerged as those who mastered the normative 
realm, who constituted the value systems of their normative realm. That is to say that, the 
normative realm was often the source for decision making in the political realm. Today, 
the political realm’s main objective seems vested in manipulating the normative realm; in 
the Middle Ages, it would be more accurate to say that political leaders were guided by 
normative realm considerations. This is, of course, the set of functional relations that 
form the basis for theocracy.  
At the same time, we must not forget that the normative realm stands in a 
dynamic relation with its others, especially the political realm. Frederick II, King of 
Sicily (1198-1250), King of Germany (1212-20), King of Jerusalem (1225-28), King of 
Italy (1220-50), and Holy Roman Emperor (1220-50), is an example of a figure from the 
political realm who was able to intervene in the normative realm. He did so using their 
tools: his love of science and learning and his knowledge of Arabic allowed him to read 
philosophy. He and members of his court translated ancient texts back into Latin and 
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Greek, and he found himself in frequent conflicts with the Papacy. Speaking six 
languages and being a marvelous soldier made him a Renaissance man a century before 
the Renaissance began. The consequence of a political figure intervening in a normative 
realm so closely centered around the papacy were unsurprising: he was excommunicated 
four times, and Pope Gregory IX even called him the “Antichrist.”4 
But looking at this relation as a conflict between a normative realm and a political 
one (or, more properly, when there was a clash between two normative realms, each with 
its own politics, but with one-sided abilities to intervene) offers a somewhat different 
picture of how the power of persuasion can work as an act that calls locals into political 
decision-making. Consider a world without birth certificates, identification cards, a 
massive prison industry, and police states, where "persuasion" through physical coercion 
was the norm on the side of the political realm—persuasion was often negative and 
positive at the same time, with the negative threatening fines, flogging, 
excommunication, and execution, and the positive, a seat in heaven. Moreover, the 
Church had control of the narrative prescribing acts with the most promise for ordinary 
people, and so the numerous petty states of western and central Europe sent a steady flow 
of cash to the Papal States, and in return, the Popes gave their vocal support of temporal 
kingly rule and blessings for all who contributed. This constitutes the decision nexus for 
action in a world where papal authority had the most profitable narratives justifying 
action—narratives that included such extreme promises of salvation as those issued by 
                                                 
4 Richard Bressler, Frederick II: The Wonder of the World, (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 
2015). 
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Crusaders, or the complete control of one's soul in cases where blessings, coronations, 
and annulments were needed by the secular authorities. Papal authority thus extended far 
across Europe in the normative realm, even if Papal armies (and the realm of its most 
visible direct politics) were very much confined to Rome, Urbino, and Romagna. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Typical Ancient and Medieval Vectors of Power within the Fused Realms 
To make the transmission of power in the normative realm of medieval Europe 
even more pronounced, those leaders were raised in the system and in the forms of action 
it allowed to emerge.  
In this constellation of power, then, the three realms model enables us to recover 
the large area of normative actions shared by the emperor and the pope, while 
understanding how the hierarchy of norms created very distinct types of benefits of the 
fusion of the three realms served political elites. Even if some saw past it, the benefits of 
differentiating the realms might not have seemed immediately obvious.  
Frederick II represents a precursor to the absolute monarchs who challenged 
everyone’s authority. He takes on the symbol of normative power in Europe and is an 
early example of an attempt at transitioning from a normatively dominated system to a 
politically dominated one—an attempt that fails but foreshadows the 16th century 
absolute monarchs.  
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Historical Case Study 2: The Republic of Venice Challenges the Dominant Order of 
the Realms—The Economic Realm Competes with the Normative Realm 
The Most Serene Republic of Venice offers a different model of how power flows 
in the three realms, one that would not have been possible in the Middle Ages proper. 
Venice shows us that as early as the 12th century, the three realms are already in 
competition. Venice's decisions appear to be ruled, at least in part, by the economic realm 
in a way that was not present in earlier eras or elsewhere in Europe. The alignment 
between the political and the economic came into focus when the elected government had 
nationalized its navy and the traditional differentiation between a merchant ship and a 
military ship ceased to exist, in practice and on paper. This meant that the military was 
identified as one with the primary economic force in the maritime republic. However, this 
also meant that the merchant class was also the military class. The Venetian state had by 
nationalizing the merchant fleet fused the economic and political realms so that they 
were no longer separate entities. 
One of the first indicators that Venice was clear about this fusion of realms was 
the Pactum Warmundi. This treaty between Venice and the Kingdom of Jerusalem lasted 
from 1124 until 1298 and gave Venice one quarter of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to rule 
as if it were an extension of its own territory, for Venice's own economic benefit and not 
for the benefit of the crusaders. In other words, Venice demanded one quarter of all the 
economic wealth of the crusader state in return for its assistance—more than a simple 
payment but closer to a large minority shareholding in the territories. Venice was 
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therefore not even pretending to participate in the Crusades for the benefit of 
Christendom (for a normative cause), but rather for its own economic benefit.5 
By 1202, the Venetians, under the leadership of Enrico Dandolo, used the Fourth 
Crusade to recapture the Dalmatian town of Zara from the Catholic Kingdom of Hungary 
(who were, at least on paper, participants in the very same Crusade, and hence should 
have been treated as allies in an assessment guided by the normative position of Christian 
unity).6 In the process, Pope Innocent III, the very same pope who called for the Fourth 
Crusade, threatened the Fourth Crusade and its leaders with excommunication, including 
Venice’s ruler—Doge Enrico Dandolo. Yet the Venetians, full well knowing the 
consequence of their actions, proceeded with the conquest of Zara, were summarily 
excommunicated. The leaders however managed to keep the excommunication a secret 
from their Crusader army underling their cynicism towards normative values despite 
knowing the importance it held for the common man. The cynicism of the gap between 
normative and economic interests was made even more clear two years later when the 
Venetians used the Fourth Crusade to capture and occupy Constantinople, in the process 
incurring even more Papal sanctions. The Venetians used holy war as a tool to attack 
fellow Christians, and, despite receiving the worst of Papal sanctions, they continued to 
act along the same lines. They controlled Constantinople for the next 57 years in an 
attempt to expand their power. Sanctions from the normative realm concerning rights to 
                                                 
5 For more on this see Joshua Prawer, Crusader Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
6 The Fourth Crusade only yielded 50,000 of the 80,000 plus silver marks that it had agreed to pay the 
Venetians for transport to Egypt (the original target of the Fourth Crusade). Doge Enrico Dandolo 
convinced Boniface of Montferrat (the leader of the Crusade) to invade and return Zara to the Republic of 
Venice as partial payment for the missing 30,000 silver marks.  
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the afterlife no longer coerced or persuaded the Venetian leadership, nor did they have 
the revolutionary effect on the Venetian public, given that the crusading army was made 
up of mostly non-Venetians, that might have been expected. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Venice’s Vectors of Power within the Fused Realms  
 
In terms of a three realms model, the shift between values directing choice was 
evident, and modeled in the diagram above: this situation was only possible because the 
Venetian leadership (the Doge and the merchant class) no longer believed in the 
supremacy of the normative realm. They could attack fellow Christians with a Crusader 
army (a holy army) and suffer excommunication (the ultimate normative sanction) 
because, in their new value system, the normative realm no longer held sway over them 
personally and politically—it had been supplanted by the economic, just as the military 
now acted in conscious espousal of economic motivations. This latter assertion is made 
all the clearer because the populace of Venice did not rebel, even when given a choice 
because of the traditions of papal sovereignty, nor did the Crusader army (many did 
however desert on the way to Constantinople, especially). Moreover, Venice did not 
simply occupy the lands, it set up complete economic and civic centers in every city 
controlled by the King of Jerusalem and made huge concessions to the use of Venetian 
P 
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law in the territories: this was full-scale economic colonization. The prize of ruling 
Constantinople as a vassal state (The Latin Empire of Constantinople) was seen as 
something greater to the Venetian leadership than the salvation of their souls.  
I stress here the shift in motivations because it effectively changed the overt status 
of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. There is no doubt that the Crusades overall were heavily 
motivated by financial gain from the very first. Similarly, this is obviously not the first 
time that rulers began to act outside the normative realm, but it is the first time that an 
entire government would shift away from negotiation in the normative realm actions and 
stay that way—in effect, the entire conception of Venice was fundamentally redefined. 
Indeed, by 1229, the power of the merchant class had been codified into the Great 
Council (a sort of House of Representatives) and the Senate. Venice had become a 
plutocracy rather than a state defined by loyalties and values.  
How the economic realm played out over longer terms also suggests how Venice's 
shift from normative values to economics was not the only such shift in consciousness 
about political deal-making and decisions. Despite being a Mediterranean superpower 
from the 12th century to the 15th century Venice fell into decline after the fall of 
Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks, the discovery of the Americas rerouted the major 
world trade routes, and the Cambrai League’s war against Venice. Venice served as 
inspiration to Nicolo Machiavelli, who decried Rome for having formed the League of 
Cambrai specifically to harm Venice, as was proved in the great war between Venice and 
the League between 1511 and 1514.  
 102 
In Rome’s mind, Venice had become too powerful (powerful enough maybe even 
to unite Italy),7 and so Machiavelli shows us an image of Venice as an example for what 
to do in alleviating class crisis.8 He certainly refers to the Republic in the Prince, 
especially in Chapter III when Machiavelli recalls the six failures of King Louis XII of 
France as an oblique but clear reference to his own Republic of Florence as a state whose 
political decision-making was very different from that of Venice. 
 
Historical Case Study 3: The Republic of Florence Challenges the Dominant Order 
of the Realms—The Political Realm Competes with the Normative Realm 
In the case of the Republic of Florence we see a decline in normative hegemony 
but unlike in the case of Venice an ascendency not in the economic but in the political 
realm. Machiavelli suggests that, unlike the Most Serene Republic of Venice,9 both the 
First and Second Florentine Republics had been born from uprisings. Uprisings are, of 
course, attempts by a class of people or group of people not in power to seize control of 
the political realm. It is here that the Second Florentine Republic especially takes an 
interesting turn that can be explained in terms of the three realms I have been defining.  
                                                 
7 Nicolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 55. 
8 Ibid., p. 34. 
9 The founding of the Most Serene Republic of Venice did not happen all at once. The community of 
Veneta was founded to a large degree because of the Fall of the Roman Empire and a desire to preserve it. 
The City of Venice was largely founded with the symbolic value of the capturing of the body (not including 
the head) of Saint Mark from Alexandria, Egypt and the establishment of his reliquary on the Rialto in 828 
AD. Despite Saint Mark’s religious symbolism, the establishment of the city on the Rialto meant a physical 
and symbolic distancing of Venice from the Church, which was already established on the islands of 
Malamocco and Castello. Republic was formally established in 1223 with the creation of an advisory board 
of Rialto elites and with the creation of the Senate in 1229.  
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In its birth from uprisings, Florence had also made a move to transform its 
decision-making, but it had moved in a different direction than Venice. From 1494 to 
1512, the Second Republic had for its leadership eight priors, one gonfaloniere (standard-
bearers) of Justice,10 16 minor gonfalonieres and the Great Council.11 It is this Great 
Council that is perhaps the most interesting argument for the present analysis because it 
was made up of all Florentine citizens over 27 years old. In effect, the Florentine 
Republic was a form of democracy, because it placed citizens in power rather than simply 
a hereditary elite.12 In it, the people were directly defined as a primary organ of 
governance. In effect, the state's legitimacy was defined within the political realm in a 
very modern sense. That political realm was such that it could assert itself directly upon 
the other two realms, because its legitimacy was neither normative (referenced against a 
set of abstract principles) nor economic, but rather popular—it depended heavily on the 
choice of its citizens. As one might visualize the flows of power in Florence, power had 
aggregated to the people who could revolt: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Piero Soderini was the only one to serve; he served as the Gonfalonier of Justice from 1502 until the 
Republic was lost to the Papal backed Medicis in 1512. 
11 For more on Florentine history see John M. Najemy, A History of Florence, 1200-1575, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 
12 J. Wilde, “The Hall of the Great Council of Florence,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 
Vol. 7 (1944), pp. 65-81. 
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 Figure 6: Florence’s Vectors of Power within the Fused Realms  
 
My diagrams by no means intend to deny that there were normative realm 
influences exerted upon Florence.13 It was a Christian state that defined itself by the 
principles of the church. Rather, it is intended to highlight how, for the most part, 
political realm decisions came from a government that was motivated by the people and 
their ability to revolt, not by normative principles or economic visions. 
Within the Italy of that era, however, populism could only lead to the ultimate 
demise of the Florentine Republic's political power. Florence was in effect changing the 
vectors of power away from that Realm which its neighboring Papal States was most 
keen to see enforced—the older normative realm of abstracts. Florence’s example 
threatened Papal authority not only in Italy, but in Europe in general. Given this history, 
it is not surprising that Machiavelli’s The Prince and his Discourses on Livy are appeals 
to the leaders and populace14 of Europe for the ascendance of the political realm. He has 
a sense of what has gone wrong, and he directly conceives of Florence's difficulty as a 
shift in realms of political motivation.  
                                                 
13 For example, the conviction of the Prior Savonarola for heresy and his subsequent burning at the stake at 
the insistence of the Pope Alexander VI. 
14 “What was truly bold about [The Prince] was not so much what [Machiavelli] said, but the fact that he 
wrote it in a text intended for public circulation” Viroli, Maurizio, Machiavelli, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), p. 51. 
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Machiavelli does not fault Florence's basic conception of the source of political 
power. For him, the normative realm is not the proper arbiter of political decision-
making. “Since all authority not rational, ultimately depends on something divine, 
Machiavelli thought it politically necessary (reason does not require it) to draw the line 
between reason and authority at the boundary between this world and the next.”15 Thus 
any assumption of power stemming from norms was unreasonable. In The Prince and The 
Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli calls for the reduction of the normative realm and the 
reinvigoration of the political realm to make its rationality supreme over the other two 
realms, and actions within the political realm the core of politics. 
Although the language of the Three Realms of Action model is not the language 
that Machiavelli uses, he nonetheless identifies the normative realm as his antagonist. 
First, he makes clear, by chapter VI of the Prince, that the finest of principalities are 
those new principalities created by virtue—by a Prince who embrace doing the good in 
creating “new orders and modes.”16 Machiavelli realizes that this creation of “new orders 
and modes” is the role of the political realm: indeed, the political realm exists precisely 
for what he defines as the virtuous act of creating new orders and modes. Newness is 
critical for acts to bring political power. By definition, if something is newly created it 
cannot yet operate in the manner that norms do, which is without thought. When a person 
first learns something, they must think through their lessons, but as time goes on, they 
                                                 
15 Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1979), 260. 
16 Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Prince, trans. Leo Paul S. de Alvarez (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland 
Press, Inc., 1980), p. 34. 
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enter a more normative framework which can operate from those lessons without 
thought. That is how the normative realm works. If a Prince is making “new orders and 
modes,” he or she is, by definition, breaking with tradition and also opening the people to 
real political action. This is Florence's virtue, but also its downfall, when it was set 
against the Papal States, with its insistence on political action. Ultimately, early 
Renaissance society resisted distance among the three realms, and the normative ground 
for action provided by the Church prevailed. 
 
Historical Case Study 4: Theodore Roosevelt Challenges the Dominant Order of the 
Realms—The Political and Normative Realms are in Dialogue and Subordinate the 
Economic Realm  
In this, our contemporary era, the destruction of the bonds that bind the realms 
together has been quite thorough. It is not complete, of course, and there have been global 
reactions against it (e.g. the rise of fascism in the 1920s and 30s, Iran’s Islamic revolution 
and even Foucault’s endorsement of it17, the US’ Third Awakening and the rise of 
Evangelical politics in its wake). 
The critical move in understanding what the political realm offers as a rationale 
for action can be best illuminated by turning to another example: the US presidency, a 
major actor in accounts of political action. Yet if one looks more closely at such actors, 
the picture of what power actually exists in the political realm changes. Contrary to much 
                                                 
17 Michel Foucault., “What Are the Iranians Dreaming About?” Le Nouvel Observateur, October 16-22, 
1978. 
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government theory, the institutions of the political realm are shockingly light on inherent 
power.  
Consider if you will what would happen if an average US citizen suddenly 
became President of the US. That person, while nominally entitled to exercising power, 
would actually not be in a position to exert much authority. That is to say, “that the mere 
assertion of formal power is rarely enough.”18 In other words, the institution of president 
only gives some potential for authority and political action. There are many other factors 
which include the power that a person brings to the presidency: the president’s 
personality and charm, the public’s mood, the “emergency” level of the US’ 
circumstances,19 the popularity of the President’s party, or even where the President is in 
the regime cycle.20 A clear example of this is of course the presidency of Donald J. 
Trump. We have now entered the third month of Trump’s presidency and even though 
both houses of congress belong to the President’s party, not much in the way of policy 
has actually been made into law.  
There is a great deal that shapes the sort of power that a president will have—an 
account that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, I wish to use one 
particular president to illustrate a point about the power of the political realm in 
                                                 
18 Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan, (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 11. 
19 Neustadt, 5. 
20 Stephen Skowronek in his brilliant study on the US Presidency, The Politics Presidents Make: 
Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, Revised Edition Belknap Press; Revised edition (March 25, 
1997) discovers a cyclical nature to the US President. 
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determining choice: Theodore Roosevelt.21 Here was a president who although entrusted 
with the office was never really designated "presidential" by the Republican party.  
First, within traditional party-based narratives of authority and accession to 
power, Roosevelt was never meant to be president, when he became McKinley's vice 
president in 1901. All too often, becoming vice president was at that time considered a 
sort of career ender for US politicians. The last time a vice president had become a 
president was in 1837, and it was only the second time it had happened in US politics. 
When McKinley was assassinated six months after his second inauguration, Roosevelt 
rose despite those expectations, due to circumstances rather than anything he did to 
justify a reevaluation of his own political power. Second, the vice-presidency was 
especially weak in Roosevelt’s case because of his weak position in the Republican 
Party—he was nominated for vice president in no small part because it took him out of 
his governorship of New York. Most nineteenth-century presidents were party machinery 
creatures and derived their power from the party machine, as the head of a network of 
political influence and favors.22 But Roosevelt was not heavily invested in that system, 
which was essentially a normative realm defined by a Republican identity, but supported 
by an economics of patronage. 
On September 14, 1901, Roosevelt had two options to claim political power by 
dint of his new role. Option one was that he could begin the long climb up the Republican 
Party machine ladder. Given how little history he had in this hierarchy, if he chose this 
                                                 
21 For more on Theodore Roosevelt see Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, (New York: 
Random House, 2001). 
22 For more concerning partisan presidencies see Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 145. 
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option, he would spend his first presidency giving out favors like a slave working the 
fields of concessions and graft. This was not a desirable path for Roosevelt, in part 
because he was ambitious and idealistic, and in part because there was little hope for a 
second term in office in his era. Of the presidents from number eight (Van Buren) to 
number 25 (McKinley), only three had attained two consecutive terms.23 Of those three, 
two were assassinated in the first year of their second terms, and the third had a miserable 
and corrupt eight years. Thus, setting one's sight for achieving political power through a 
gradual process of network-building would have seemed a less than desirable risk. 
Option two was to make a new power source—in a sense, to follow the path like 
the one that Venice had followed when it created its power in the economic realm. The 
solution that presented itself to Roosevelt would have likely pleased Machiavelli, who 
could have praised him for creating “new orders and modes.” Roosevelt struck upon 
political gold by identifying and exploiting a new source for a political realm and its 
power: the US had just become an Empire in 1890 when soldiers were sent to 
Argentina,24 which created a public face for the administration that he could control. 
Roosevelt realized that if he could achieve victories, symbolic and otherwise, in 
international relations, public support would turn his way, no matter what the party might 
                                                 
23 Grover Cleveland had two terms but they were split by the Benjamin Harrison administration. 
24 See Zoltan Grossman, “History of US Military Intervention since 1890,” accessed 4/6/2017 
http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/interventions.html. I acknowledge that the US had a history of 
military interventions overseas prior to 1890. The first being the First Barbary War (1801-05) and in fact 
the 1890 invasion of Argentina was the second. The first was in 1832 for essentially the exact same reason, 
to protect US business interests. However, I am using Grossman’s 1890 date to delineate between a 
relatively weak US focused on continental expansion and a US ready to enter the global scene. In effect, I 
think it is safe to say that I am agreeing with Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis in “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History” that the 1890 census indicates that the US western frontier was closed. 
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have expected. In effect, he turned to the public’s need for political meaning in their 
lives, making it important to them when the US won international relations victories—
and, by extension, when they became more important citizens on the world stage. In 
effect the Panama Canal, The Great White Navy, negotiating peace treaties, and the sort, 
were ways in which Roosevelt created normative legitimacy for his political actions, 
usurping the roles the party had reserved for itself. The result of that move is well-known 
to history: Roosevelt became so powerful that he not only won a second term and the 
Nobel Peace Prize, but he actually went after his own party’s interests in the form of 
“trust busting” and enforcing regulation on industry.  
We note that in Machiavelli’s time, political actors had much the same problem 
that Roosevelt faced: how to create enough power and authority to be able to act 
politically. At that time, church teachings and renaissance culture created norms for 
political action and power, where Roosevelt found them in publicity and civil identity. 
Machiavelli, however, had realized that the political realm had an innate tendency to 
maintain the status quo, if it followed or reinforced those policy outcomes already 
established. Roosevelt's genius would have been evident to Machiavelli, who realized 
that the princes who just follow what has already been established are not actually 
utilizing the full potential of the political realm. Significantly, his examples in The Prince 
of Romulus, Moses, Theseus, and Cyrus the Great all point out what can potentially be 
achieved when a political actor does not just maintain what currently is, but dreams of 
what could be—-not only to use political institutions and the norms that hold them in 
place, but to build or control new ones.  
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To be sure, through laws, edicts, and orders, a prince could change behavior 
temporarily without creating new orders and modes, by direct action within existing 
norms (e.g. he could go to war against enemies defined by the status quo, or assassinate a 
political actor—all good descriptions of dysfunctional internal party politics in the US, as 
well). Yet Machiavelli saw the world around him as in need of deep change, when the 
normative realm itself was too dominant to sponsor action or choice. The normative 
realm that Machieavelli recognized supported the status quo and failed to solve problems, 
essentially rendering Italy incapable of acting in the face of papal control of norms for 
political agency.25 Thus he celebrates rulers like Cyrus the Great as exemplary princes 
who revised the political realms they inherited.  
In Chapter XVIII of the Prince, “The Way in Which Princes Should Keep the 
Faith,” Machiavelli first counsels the use of rationality in the affairs of the state. He tells 
the prince not to be ruled by the normative realm, but that rather, he should pretend to 
operate within the normative realm when convenient. Machiavelli's prince must always 
appear to operate from the normative realm:  
It is not necessary, then, for a prince to have in fact all of the qualities written 
[below], but it is indeed necessary to appear to have them. I shall rather dare to say 
this: that having them and observing them always, they are harmful, but in 
appearing to have them, they are useful—so as to appear to be full of pity, faithful, 
human, open, religious, and to be so, but with one’s mind constructed in such a 
mode that when the need not to be arises, you can, and know how to, change to the 
contrary.26 
 
                                                 
25 Machiavelli gives many lamentations to the state of Italy in both The Prince and The Discourses. For 
example, he laments how easy it was for King Charles V of France “to seize Italy with chalk in hand.” In 
fact, he says that Charles was “allowed to.” He blames short-sighted Italy leadership, Christianity, and the 
Pope for much of this. 
26 Ibid., p. 108. 
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This distinction opens up a clear space between the normative and political realms that 
can be exploited. He is not only recommending that a Prince be manipulative, cynical, 
and ruthless—or, in modern terms, that he act out of self-interest. Machiavelli is also 
specifying that political action does not emerge only top-down, but also in conjunction 
with those being ruled. He says, “and to be so, but with one’s mind…” This point is not 
Machiavelli's alone; others had put it down in print that a leader ought to look beyond 
Christian morality for a guide to political action (e.g. Francesco Guicciardini27).  
Machiavelli is after something much deeper: a broader definition of the rationality 
behind action that concerns the public. Rationality for rationality’s sake was no longer 
sufficient in his era, when religion set the terms of those rational norms. In effect, what 
Machiavelli is showing the Prince is that, to rule well, one must be able to look beyond 
the normative realm—to make precisely the kind of moves that Roosevelt made when he 
turned away from the Party as the source of his ability to govern and chose a different 
kind of rationality.28 Party insiders would have called Roosevelt non-rational, but in fact 
he had inverted the directions in which power flowed, from the public to the ruler rather 
than from the institutions defining up to that point political action as normative action as 
                                                 
27 “Guiccardini developed the concept of reason of the state which supersedes Christian morality in a text 
never intended for publication.” Viroli, Maurizio, Machiavelli, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 
51. 
28 Eric Vogelin explains in this text that, once Egypt underwent Christianitzation its symbols fell by the 
weighside and the Coptic culture that followed, never succeeded in anything resembling the glory of the 
previous 4,500 years. “This matter can be understood by considering the methods the Christian sect 
employed against that of the pagans; they obliterated all of its institutions, all of its religious ceremonies, 
and suppressed the memory of its ancient theology." (Anamnesis, trans. Gerhart Niemeyer [Columbia, 
Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1978]). 
28 Mansfield, p. 168. 
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they knew it. The normative realm, in this kind of move, is no longer the principal vector 
of power. 
This does not mean that the normative realm disappears as a rationale for human 
decision-making. Machiavelli does believe that the normative realm is a necessary realm 
from which a society must operate. But his diagnosis continues in ways that also 
illuminate what Roosevelt was facing in the Republican Party: the normative realm at 
both moments was subject to charges of corruption:  
The first is that because of the evil examples set by this court, this land has lost all 
piety and religion; this brings with it countless disadvantages and countless 
disorders, because just as we take for granted every good thing where religion 
exists, so, where it is lacking, we take for granted the contrary. We Italians have, 
therefore, this initial debt to the church and the priest, that we have become 
irreligious and wicked, but we have an even greater debt to them, which is the 
second cause of our ruin: that is, the church has kept and still keeps this land 
divided.29  
 
Machiavelli makes his case even clearer in Chapter XIII, using the example of the flood 
of Lake Albano, which demonstrates how actors from the normative realm manipulated 
the political realm in order to achieve victory over Veii: 
[T]he leaders of the armies employed religion to keep their armies resolute in 
their undertaking: since Lake Albanus had miraculously increased in size that 
year, and the Roman soldiers were weary of the long siege and wanted to return to 
Rome, the Romans discovered that Apollo and certain other soothsayers were 
saying that the city of Veii would be defeated during the year in which Lake 
Albanus overflowed its banks; this made the soldiers endure the hardships of the 
siege.30 
 
                                                 
29 Machiavelli, Discourses, p. 55. 
30 Ibid., p.56. 
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The powers-that-be in the normative realm concocted the story of Apollo from the 
normative realm in order to give their men hope that the siege would not last long, the 
hope of course coming from the non-rational world of myths. What Machiavelli points 
out is not simply a critique of lying politicians, but also the fact that oracles can serve 
political leaders. Roosevelt, turned iconic Rough Rider and outdoorsman had his own 
oracles to serve him.  
In fact, the difficulty in regulating the normative realm is such that Machiavelli 
realizes from time to time it must be renewed (not unlike Eric Voeglin’s concept of the 
decay of original national symbols in Anamnesis).31 The norms themselves must be 
revitalized because the state of all symbol systems and meaning structures is such that 
over time they not only lose meaning, but they will lose their ability to affect behavior: 
To conclude, therefore, nothing is more necessary in a community, whether it be a 
religion, kingdom, or republic, than to restore it to the reputation it enjoyed at its 
beginnings and to strive to ensure that either good institutions or good men 
achieve this effect and that it does not have to be brought about by some external 
force, for although an external force may sometimes be the best remedy, as it was 
in Rome [when Rome was captured by the Gauls in 390/387 BC], it is so 
dangerous that it is in no way to be desired.32  
The political realm will derive its authority from the normative power of the state—but 
that power has to be renewed: to keep its legitimacy at a high level, the state needs to 
renew its symbolism.33 Machiavelli notes that such renewal is often sparked from outside, 
                                                 
31 Eric Vogelin, Anamnesis: Collected Writing of Eric Vogelin, trans. Gerhart Niemeyer (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1990). 
32 Machiavelli, Discourses, p. 250. 
33 As an aside Machiavelli makes it clear that in order for Italy to unify, the temporal power of the Papal 
States must be weakened if not destroyed. “We Italians then owe to the Church of Rome and to her priests 
our having become irreligious and bad; but we owe her a still greater debt, and one that will be the cause of 
our ruin, namely, that the Church has kept and still keeps our country divided” (Ibid., p. 55). So powerful 
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which poses a risk, and so renewal should be undertaken from within. Roosevelt's 
hallmark achievements (establishing national parks and expanding the fleet which are 
best remembered today) did precisely that. They took him back to his founding personal 
image of Rough Rider and conservationist, out of the cities and the back rooms, quite 
literally as a breath of fresh air for his public image. 
Roosevelt's situation thus prompted innovations in what the political realm in his 
era should look like. Machiavelli had stopped at cautioning against Christianity itself as 
having “made the world weak and to have given it over to be plundered by wicked men, 
who are easily able to dominate it, since in order to go to paradise, most men think more 
about enduring their pains than about avenging them.”34 His Italians were enfeebled by 
false humility and a belief that this world is not real, and so he demands “new orders and 
modes” be put into place at the normative level. He is a disarmed founder-captain and 
because of his unique status having a “free commission” he is “the founder-captain who 
transcends the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs because he is not devoted 
to any one ‘public’ or state.”35 Roosevelt transformed the presidency by means of his 
bully pulpit, and in so doing, did not only put new values into place for his state, but 
decisively also opened up space between the normative and the political realms, casting 
their interactions as a dialogue and changing how power moved within his society. 
                                                 
indeed is the normative strength of the Church in Rome, that even after Italy managed to finally annex 
Rome in 1870 and complete its union by moving the capital of Italy from Turin to Florence to Rome, the 
Vatican City still managed to regain its independence in 1929, some 6 decades later. Even after 59 years 
the normative power of the Papal States allowed it to avoid total assimilation into Italy.  
34 Ibid., p. 159. 
35 Mansfield, Harvey C., Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1979), page 298 and also 225. 
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The Three Realms of Action: A Historical Epistemology? 
The examples above are by no means meant to be exhaustive, but rather indicative 
of how adopting my proposed new model for political action can offer a consistent but 
flexible model to track strategies for understanding the exercise of political power in 
more subtle ways than rational choice could do so. 
My examples suggest that certain major breaks in how the three realms 
(normative, political, economic) mapped power relations within states may also 
contribute to historical understandings, not only political ones. Consider for example the 
Protestant Reformation. The Reformation creates a situation which had the potential to 
fundamentally realign the normative realm against the political one. Coming as a direct 
challenge to the top-down exercise of power negotiated between Pope and Emperor, the 
Reformation bought a realignment of the nobility vis-à-vis old normative institutions.  
We have seen that normative power can be slow to transform itself in response to 
new situations. It also relies on custom and tradition to transform itself—acts of 
institutional and social habit, rather than legislation. Thus, in the case of Venice and 
Florence sketched above, the normative realm was detached to a degree and separated 
from the political realm, while the political realm was enlarged by the independent action 
of the economic realm. The latter two, however, remained fused in a mercantilism that 
would become the hallmark of this era, because new institutional actors were added. The 
normative realm of church dogma, however, was certainly challenged, as it became 
vulnerable in new ways, since norms that work well in one place might become harmful 
in another. In the Renaissance and Reformation, however, the power of rational choice 
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migrated to new normative spheres, including that of economics. In this way, the seeds 
for a sort of normative relativity were planted, as well. And the same was true for the 
political realm. The active appeal of the political realm to different logics opened up any 
and all normative logics to scrutiny and evaluation. Since the political realm relies most 
heavily upon the normative realm for its authority, this new situation also meant a 
weakening of traditional political leadership. 
By the late eighteenth century a whole new set of changes alter the relationship 
between the three realms of action, especially ones that foster power in the economic 
realm. Slowly we become witness to a loosening of the fusion between the economic and 
the political that had come to be forged in Machiavelli's Renaissance. In fact, the 
eighteenth century saw many challenges that called for redefining the power of the 
political realm, from Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations through the Declaration of 
Independence, and often in terms of economics. Both documents, like many others 
(particularly those aimed at rights) saw the state as too powerful, and the economic realm 
as too subordinated to it, yet neither one specifically counseled the end of the role of the 
political realm in the regulation of the economic realm. Remember, too, that Machiavelli 
already noted that, if a state promises its people meaning, they will happily die for it. In 
this sense, through a powerful manipulation of symbolism, the state acts as a massive 
super-family or super-community in the modern era becoming a vehicle of meaning 
generation for people. 
However, something has gone wrong in this image of the state, in the interval 
between the eighteenth century and today. As Marcuse shows us in One Dimensional 
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Man, meaning generation through symbolism has been replaced with meaning generation 
through consumerism. The normative realm has thus become a different kind of realm in 
the modern age. It has always been the source of political power, of meaning, and the 
source of day-to-day behavioral regulation, but as Roosevelt’s case illustrated, it has 
become accessible to new, potentially dangerous political orders. The economic realm, on 
the other hand, may not be dangerous just for the body. As the source of life, it cannot 
motivate reasonable people to act beyond survival, unless it is reified as a quasi-
normative value system which creates its own kind of symbolic economy (e.g. those 
reified norms which drive obscene hoarding behavior or trophy style consumption). 
Finally, the political realm becomes the space in which humanity regulates itself and is 
steered. This realm, in its full extent, can be used by many types of individuals to 
exercise power within its space of being "public." 
Seen historically, these three realms found their particular forms of mobilization 
at specific moments, when they become sites that transform individuals' relationships to 
their political identities and choices. Arguably, the political realm received its 
paradigmatic mobilization in 1513 with Machiaavelli's Prince, 36 the normative realm, in 
the era of the Protestant Reformation (and thus dating back to 1517 with Martin Luther’s 
95 Theses or to Francis Bacon's great 1603 treatises on science), and the economic realm 
in 1776 with the publishing of the Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith.  
                                                 
36 The Prince was published in 1532. 
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Yet in our contemporary world, I will argue in the next chapter, it is the economic 
realm that has taken on new urgency. In it, I will first argue, what is at stake is modern 
redefinitions of the economic realm, again with reference to historical examples, and then 
I will turn to Occupy Austin to demonstrate what sensitivity to these new configurations 
of political power fueled by the economic realm can produce.
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CHAPTER 4:  
 
The Contemporaneity of the Economic Realm— 
Domains of Rationality and Manipulations of the Normative Realm  
 
In the cases sketched above, we have seen that, when the economic realm is 
subordinated to the political realm, then it can be ruled through the decision-making 
structures of the state, as it did in the case of Venice above. However, when the economic 
realm is set apart and allowed to do as it pleases in an electoral republic something 
unanticipated happens. What that "something" is will be the focus of the present chapter. 
It outlines how, in the contemporary world, it is indeed possible that the economic realm 
can colonize the political realm in much more extreme ways than we have historical 
examples for. 
 
The Political Realm in Extremis: When the Economic Realm Rises to Power 
As the case of Theodore Roosevelt suggests, the conscious embrace of symbols 
can help consolidate power in new ways. But what that case does not bring to the fore is 
how, in an era in which the economic realm is not brought under the control of more 
traditional ideas of political power, the economic realm can in fact create circuits of 
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power far beyond that employed by Roosevelt. Roosevelt used his new power as 
president to direct the public's drive as animal laborans to consume and as homo faber to 
produce a new image for the US as a nation of patriotic citizens, each contributing to that 
nation in their own ways. 
 When, however, the economic realm ascends to independent action at a certain 
time or place beyond the ability of the political realm to maintain its parity, then what 
ought to be described as a colonization of the political realm takes place. This happens 
through mechanisms long familiar to political theory, yet not necessarily theorized as 
offering a source of power that can actually supersede that of the traditional political 
sphere and its institutions. In other words, in such cases, the economic realm begins to 
impose a different set of symbols as guiding action, signaling a different rationality at the 
base of its power: maximizing the efficiency of the economic institutions, which leads to 
a concomitant delegitimization of any decisions in the political realm that stand in the 
way of profit-making for those institutions. 
This account converges quite directly with critiques of organized corporate capital 
since President Dwight D. Eisenhower's famous warning about the military-industrial 
complex, delivered in his farewell address on January 17, 1961. Here, he identified in his 
era the emergence of an "iron triangle"1 which he identified as political contributions, 
corporate government contracts, and lobbying for industries and the government 
institutions that (often nominally) regulate them. In such interactions, the economic realm 
                                                 
1 See Robert Higgs, Depression, War, and Cold War: Studies in Political Economy: Studies in Political 
Economy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 138.  
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can invade and subordinate the political realm. At the extreme poles of this evolution, 
campaign financing, advertisements, and lobbyists all conspire to make electoral 
republics little more than corporate interest legislative machines. Amidst all this we “see” 
cynical politicians in the US supporting “campaign finance laws” that often seem more 
like blatant corruption or even overt bribery. Such commonplaces of the contemporary 
economic world explain at least in part why voting groups might refuse to vote or vote 
against their own economic interests.  
The colonization of the political realm by the economic realm means that 
decisions made are not necessarily those that benefit the public or the state. It also means 
that they are not required to be rational. Here again, however, we might better analyze the 
situation by positing a reimagination of political power rather than blaming the voter for 
derationalization: the decisions made will, quite simply maximize profit. Separating the 
economic realm from the political realm and thereby maximizing the efficiency of the 
economic institutions simply allows the emergence of another kind of efficiency, one that 
capitalism itself provides. It might always be in the best interest of shareholders of a 
corporation to be efficient, but that might not be true for the state or the community that it 
serves. And since the primary motivation of a politician is his or her reelection and not 
the benefit to the community, it means that the state’s actors will be motivated by 
different interests or rationalities from the state and the community that they serve. Such 
decisions become "not rational" only because their interests are different and the 
decisions made contradict the interests of the public and the state. In practical terms, this 
means that, when corporations are legalized and assert their influence from within the 
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economic realm, economic institutions become fabulously wealthy. In electoral politics, 
the economic realm then can colonize the political realm through campaign financing—
the modern version of the Venice example. This also means that Rational Choice Theory 
is once again unable to explain behaviors and predict outcomes since what determines 
actions in the political sphere are not rational choices at the individual level but choices 
constrained by rationalities that structure the economic, political and normative realms.  
One serious result is, effectively, the death of political rationalities itself. Whether 
the campaign finance capital directly benefits politicians or not, is irrelevant. Since in 
most parts of the US, a politician cannot win office without some economic support, if 
politicians were to rebel against their backers following their elections, then the economic 
interests would simply back opponents in the subsequent election. While money is not 
everything in elector politics, we have seen big political figures go down in recent years 
in precisely this way, when economic power invalidated their power in the political realm 
(e.g. Max Cleland and Russell Feingold). If the elections were a onetime event, such 
politicians might be able to ignore their backers once in office, but with the prospect of a 
future election on the horizon, a politician seeking another term is obligated to support 
the causes that financers want backed. In effect, the economic realm will soon create a 
class of politicians who were owned and trained to espouse as Wendy Brown calls it, 
“market rationality” rather than any political rationality about community or state 
welfare.2 Even if a President is elected promising large political reform, the economic 
                                                 
2 Wendy Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy” in Edgework: Critical Essays on 
Knowledge and Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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elite can simply back the opposition party in Congress and limit reforms by creating 
divided government—it almost seems as if the economic realm can overcome any 
rationalities in the political realm.  
One can argue that the politician class leans back by threatening to withhold 
support unless the economic interests come through with campaign financing. However, 
the direction the finance arrow points is irrelevant. The result is the same—the politician 
class legislates to the whims of the strongest elements in the economy. A brief example 
of how those "strongest elements" shift may make clear the importance of historicizing 
the “domains of rationality” involved in decision-making by voting publics. 
This example is historical, but politicians have since the beginning of elections 
motivated voters to shift their grounds for rationality. Consider Mexican politics in the 
early 1830s. The Mexican state had only had a couple of elections before politicians 
began to focus on Texas. Increasing Anglo immigration, introduced the presence of 
slaves. These shifts in Texas were highly emotional issues for Mexican voters, but ones 
which had little or no impact on the day-to-day lives of the majority of Mexicans 
because, in Mexico proper, the slaves brought by Anglos did not legally exist. In 1810, 
during Mexico’s independence revolution, Mexican revolutionary Miguel Hidalgo y 
Costilla had declared slavery abolished. The next year the Spanish Empire also declared 
an end to African slavery in all but Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico. Then in 1813 
Mexico’s revolutionary government ended slavery. In 1820, Mexico again abolished 
slavery. In 1824, the new Mexican constitution abolished slavery. In 1829, the last 
Mexican slaves (outside of Tejas) are freed. So why, then, in 1830 does Mexican 
 125 
President Anastasio Bustamente order the end of slavery in Tejas, given that Mexico had 
already abolished African slavery some five times?  
The "cause" of this political shift was not immediately evident. That Anglos in 
Tejas were still practicing slavery was a result of a little bit of neglect, a little bit of 
Tejas’ lack of importance, and a little bit of turning a blind eye to the very clearly 
unconstitutional behavior in a marginal territory. The Anglos, on their side, evolved a 
political work-around to avoid coming into open non-compliance with the Mexican law 
they nominally lived under: they made their former slaves sign contracts for permanent 
indentured servitude.  
Here, however, the domains of rationality at play began to shift, as the region's 
normative concepts of the law began to be shifted towards different rationalities. 
Bustamente’s order (banning slavery for effectively the fifth time) was legally 
meaningless for the African slaves in Tejas, but it was symbolically powerful amongst 
voters. It gave voters something to be outraged at, to rally around, and to get emotional 
about—it pulled law out of its normative status and reinvigorated it as a 
contemporaneous political issue. This, thus, became a political realm manipulation of the 
normative realm—not a new thing in and of itself, but new in the domain of rationality in 
which it was applied. Bustamente's goal was not to strengthen Mexico; he did not do it as 
a prince to make Mexico more powerful or to make his community better, he did it to 
manipulate voters. And the result was a restriction on Mexico's existing legal-normative 
framework: that same year Bustamente banned new Anglo immigration to Texas—not to 
Mexico, just to the Tejas part of Caohuila y Tejas, effectively putting a legal boundary 
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into place that had not to that point existed. Again, such law would have no impact on the 
Mexican public, and such a law would be unenforceable with the porous border that 
demarcated it, no border police, and no real government presence in Tejas. So why pass 
such a law? The answer is straightforward: cynical manipulation of voters by using the 
emotional issue of immigration (xenophobia).3  
This historical situation has its analogues today; not much has changed. What this 
sort of move in the political realm creates is an electorate that is not motivated by rational 
interests, nor by what benefits the community, but simply by emotions, heuristics, and 
non-issues. As this kind of normative-political shift operated in Mexico to prepare the 
way for an eventual split between Mexico and Texas, so, too have electoral politics over 
the last two hundred years have become less and less dominated solely by rationality. 
Increasingly, political and economic market rationalities split from the normative to open 
out different patterns for political action. 
But the colonization of the normative realm by the political realm or the 
economic realm, or the political realm by the economic realm, these shifts of rational 
motivations, are lubricated by another category of thing: advertising. Advertising, by its 
very nature, manipulates the normative realm, the realm of values and meanings. An 
advertiser, happily manipulates any aspect of normative life in order to sell a product, or 
a policy. The advertiser pinpoints the normative value which needs to be titillated and 
highlighted in order to generate meaning and through this process subversively redefines, 
                                                 
3 For more on this see Rodolfo F. Acuna, Occupied America: The History of Chicanos, (London: Pearson 
Publishing, 7th edition, 2014), 62-80. 
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rescripts the normative. Buying a sporty car is connected to becoming more sexy, 
desirable, valued and ultimately finding greater meaning through garnering emotional 
security. Car commercials are an example of the economic realm colonizing the 
normative. The economic realm’s colonization of the normative realm can even turn over 
norms as solid as religion to the mercy of corporate profits. More will be said on this 
when we cover the case of Coca Cola and Santa Claus in the next Chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
As we have exemplified in this chapter, it is possible to trace cases where the 
rationality of domains can shift, as it did in the political realm in 1513 with the authoring 
of The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli, or when the rationality of the normative realm in 
the case Bustamente’s Mexico, was reconfigured to manipulate voters to create an 
electoral victory. 
That these shifts in domains of rationality have not been accommodated in today's 
theory is not surprising, given the origin of rational choice theory in logical assumptions 
forged by the Enlightenment. This situation probably rests on two factors.  
First, this speaks to the enormous breadth and power of the normative realm as 
the central factor in early modern political thought. The ability of normative systems to 
shape the way in which we think means that something had first to break the normative 
realm’s grip on how we perceived reality. Not just law, but also science and new 
religions came into the West in these eras as challenges to the single normative sphere 
that had been assumed since the Middle Ages. In effect, science altered norms of 
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experience in ways parallel to how the ethics of new religious systems did for morals. 
The application of observation and reason in an attempt at objectivity, an attempt to 
transcend the limiting effect of the arbitrariness of the normative realm on how we 
interact with each other and the universe.  
The second reason for a split of realms of rationalities lies with the fact that the 
economic realm starts out as the realm of instinct, passion, appetite, and the sort, and it is 
assumed to be at least somewhat natural. The idea of making it independent and rational 
took an enormous leap of faith. We had to believe in the “invisible hand” that could 
reshape the world. Calls like Adam Smith’s to partially free the economic realm from the 
control of the political realm had consequences that no one could have foreseen. It 
unleashed upon humanity an age ruled by animal laborans. 
With the pressure of emerging realms of rationality on the normative realm that 
came to its full swing by the early 19th century, new forms of rationality could challenge 
traditional ones. Just as economic realms of rationality put pressure on Italy, later 
political leaders found in rationalities like nationalism a mechanism to replace older legal 
norms with new ones and reinvigorate their legitimacy. Similarly, as the industrial 
revolution began to take off in earnest, political authorities turned increasingly to 
ideology to combat socialism. Some means of symbols and meaning structures needed to 
replace the old and no longer valid ones such as God, King, country, feudal lord, military 
pageantry, and the sort. In addition to "combatting" the decay of the normative realm, 
however, institutions evolved to enforce older norms or challenge them with newer ones. 
Thus, for instance, the state began to legislate on a grand scale. Laws needed 
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enforcement, so the age of policing was born. But then the egregious offenders needed 
more than fines, so the prison system was born.  
As I have outlined them here, each of the three realms has a different rationality 
through which they can affect the behaviors of those who would support norms, vote for 
or against them, or define their own motivations. In the political realm, new rationalities 
can lead to the sort of cynical politics that we call Machiavellian. In the normative realm, 
they can emerge to create philosophy and science. Such shifts, however, need not be 
coherent to anything but the current situation. And in the economic realm, new economic 
rationality can give new elites new ways to maximize profit and assert political power.  
To recognize the potentials for the shift in rationalities requires new analytical 
tools for understanding the behavior of individuals in political spaces, as I have argued 
here. It is why Hannah Arendt calls for the vita activa and not the vita contemplativa. She 
realizes that homo faber, the economic elites, are rational and thinking—which is part of 
the problem for scholars, since their rationalities are not permanent, but situated in the 
power relations of particular times and places. How many people in the US, for example, 
have converted to Buddhism and practice mindfulness as their normative ethics, but not 
the other traditions in Buddhism? Such movements, if general, may be signs that the 
rationalities controlling public life are shifting—they should not, I believe, be taken 
simply as anomalies.  
The truth of the situation needs to be seen as more encompassing. When the 
normative realm finds itself in the throes of reinterpretation, and the economic realm, 
exercising new found freedoms, the political realm may well itself be in a state of 
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weakness, because the norms to which it had attached its legitimacy were proving 
themselves to be insufficient (such as when a monarchy declines). When, as in the 
eighteen and nineteenth centuries, monarchy failed to hold onto power and was replaced 
at particular sites by republics, these new political formations were in turn subject to the 
whims of the economic elite and the frequent changing of political leadership. In effect, 
then, our understanding of how power is consisted within the state needs to be 
significantly refined. In such situations, as in Machiavelli's Italy, a new elite, the 
merchant class, found that it could exercise power directly over the political realm, as 
outlined above. The principal difference between the feudal system and republics was the 
way in which the elites resolved power disputes. Political power in the feudal system was 
redefined in terms of newer reward systems.  
Using historical data, I have argued for understanding Machiavlli's era as the 
beginning of the economic realm’s colonization of the political realm. In the next 
chapter, I will amplify how this economic realm dominates in the modern world, in very 
particular ways. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
The Contemporary Rise of the Economic Realm  
Through the Act of Colonizing the Political Realm 
 
This chapter will revisit examples from the economic realm’s rationalities, as they 
have emerged and been theorized in the twentieth century. Its first sections will amplify 
what kinds of pressure new economic realities can exert on the political realm. As we 
shall see, the economic realm’s conquest of humanity is not confined to the normative 
realm. The economic realm has also invaded and subordinated the political realm. 
Campaign financing, advertisements, and lobbyists all conspire to make electoral 
republics little more than corporate interest legislative machines. The cynical politicians 
in the US call it campaign finance when it is clearly overt bribery and yet the public does 
nothing in the face of this blatant corruption. This will lead into a set of brief examples 
demonstrating how the economic realm fosters particular kinds of choice. After that, the 
final, concluding section of the present study will take up a contemporary example of 
political choice in more detail, addressing the Occupy Movements of the twenty-first 
century in order to argue that the three-realm model helps explain the configuration of 
rational choice in the era of late capitalism and globalization. Together, the two phases of 
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my argument will make the case for my three-realm model as an improvement on 
understanding political behavior in the modern world.  
 
Amplifying Arendt's homo faber 
As I have implied in previous chapters, humanity often attaches normative values 
to our economic impulses through reification. This is especially true around currency and 
sex, but even things more basic like breathing are subject to this. For example, in cultures 
where stoicism is highly valued, children are not infrequently taught shallow breathing to 
stifle emotional responses. The stifled emotion is still there in all of its fury and force. 
However, rather than being released, it is stored up like a toxin in the pith of a tree. The 
subject can then be “rational” in the terms acknowledged within their group. Moreover, 
that transmutation (aside from leading possibly to Freudian repression) also sets up a 
version of economic rationalities, joining issues like a desire to survive, an urge to 
consume to survive, and various social behaviors (fornication, fight or flight, or location 
of shelter). In this sense however, animal laborans is not natural, if by natural we mean 
primordial. Instead, it is already a rationality, something that emerges as scripts for 
behavior.  
Arendt's idea of the homo faber needs here to be adduced as just as necessary for 
survival as animal laborans is, as the ego, the solution maker. Arendt notes that the 
image of the subject renders it the destroyer-creator: “homo faber, the creator of human 
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artifice, has always been the destroyer of nature.”1 Nature will dominate when the human 
destructive force is small—when human footprints are small, as are economic needs and 
political desires. Without assuming the role of homo faber, humanity would be less 
complex than the beaver. By the 19th and 20th centuries, however, homo faber had 
become something more than merely an economic agent, as the example of Venice has 
already shown. As center to the activities in the economic realm, homo faber changed its 
scripts according to economic/market rationalities, able to colonize and conquer the 
normative and political realms. In the process, the economic realm went beyond the 
simple logics of existence inherent in the notion of homo faber, just as homo faber 
exercised scripts of being-in-the-world beyond those of animal laborans.  
Here, we return to Habermas' idea of the public sphere. As Joseph Staats 
describes Habermas'e extension of the relation of a simpler life world to what I am 
calling the economic realm:  
The corporate sector with this kind of power can do much more than intrude upon 
lifeworld. It can as well transform lifeworld in its own image, wielding power of 
such consequences as to be constitutive of citizenship itself.2 
Habermas’ analysis cuts along a different dimension than Arendt's, given his terminology 
of Lifeworld and System, but his conclusion amplifies what is at stake in many modern 
incarnations of the economic realm, when (as is assumed in critiques of neoliberalism) 
the corporate sector colonizes the Lifeworld. This colonization leads to the type of 
reversed hierarchy where the power of the corporate business sector to cause citizens and 
                                                 
1 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 139 
2 Joseph L.Staats, “Habermas and Democratic Theory: The Threat to Democracy of Unchecked Corporate 
Power,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4. (Dec., 2004), pp. 585-594., p. 160.  
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their political leaders to think of themselves primarily as creatures of economics-the 
citizens first and foremost as consumers of goods and services; and the political leaders 
as stewards of the economy whose overarching political mission it is to ensure that more 
and more goods and services are available to be consumed.3 
The need to produce for unbridled appetites has become all-consuming. This 
redefined homo faber moves even further from animal laborans in seeking an endless 
supply of reified economic meaning through an obscene accumulation of wealth, limitless 
consumption, and the wild successes of unbridled market growth. Production ceased to be 
about fulfilling the needs of the many and it became about serving itself as its own ends. 
Over time, the ends of this homo faber's economic realm became the ends of the citizens 
of this market-driven state, as we saw in the case of Venice.  
Today, however, homo faber has come to seek economic growth not to satisfy 
some long-term goal, but rather to have economic growth, even to a greater degree than 
Venice did. The economic realm produces so that its subjects will consume, but never so 
that they will be satisfied. In fact, in this modern economic realm, it is commonplace to 
note that the producers must make certain that they never satisfy appetites, since 
satisfaction would halt further consumption. Hence "needs" for survival now are made 
strategically, incorporating devices like planned obsolesce, adding habit-forming 
substances to foods and drinks (e.g. caffeine and sugar), or the artificial association of 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 160.  
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needy emotions with a product (e.g. in advertising, such as associating sex with cars, 
drinks, or clothing).  
The challenge for a realm to impact the space of the political is its need to take 
concrete form as a comprehensible narrative that can be used by subjects to direct their 
action. Ideally, that narrative burrows into our desires and rescripts them or at least 
redirects them. In the case of a capitalist narrative, primal urges like consumption need to 
be conflated with items to be purchased. Fear, death, religion, democracy, nationalism, 
and morality all become things to be used by the economic realm, not the least by 
advertisers who hope to corrupt our "natural" patterns of consumption (those from earlier 
identities of homo faber, focused on more basic needs) by manipulating our behavioral 
patterns to correlate with scripts that conform to the newer economic realm. In most 
modern societies, critics of capitalism would insist that the economic realm gains access 
to our mind through advertising. As a tool, advertising is uniquely free, because it seems 
to apply to individual choice, and thus does not seem to be manipulating norms or 
emotions. 
Previously, various master narratives that constitute normative realms (ethics, 
religion, science, etc.) had developed and added to the political realm. In such cases, 
systems of norms were designed to create the sort of behavior which enhanced survival, 
prosperity, or order within the state. The source of such narratives was generally policy 
generated by the community or at least by its hegemonic representatives (purported or 
effectively real, as e.g. senators, nobles, kings, etc.). The goals of such manipulations 
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were overtly political, and even if cynical, they at least had the redeeming quality of 
being purposeful.  
Santa Claus is the classic example of how the economic realm can co-opt figures 
with narratives from normative realms (in this case, religious norms). Originally, in his 
representations in Europe, Santa Claus had been portrayed as a young man in green and 
brown. Yet in the US, his image was co-opted by Coca-Cola advertisers who wanted to 
promote more Coke consumption in winter-time. For the sake of branding, they changed 
Santa’s age, outfit, and size. He was decked out in company colors, even in the contrast 
of his cold pink skin and his aged white hair. And a whole new mythical system was 
eventually created around him, to include more marketing instruments in the form of new 
“Christmas” characters (e.g. Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer, Frosty the Snowman, 
polar bears, etc.). To make Santa Claus less the saint he had been at his origin (as Saint 
Nicolaus) and more appealing as a secular figure, they made him more generous. To 
make him more marketable, they made him jolly.4 His narrative had thus mutated 
completely: he ceased to simply be a device for getting children to behave—what his role 
had been in the Old World. Santa Claus in the US became a lever to get children to 
influence household consumerism. As the image and myth of Santa Claus was being 
rewritten100 years ago, so too was Christmas itself. Christmas was transformed from a 
                                                 
4 James Twitchell, Twenty Ads That Shook the World: The Century's Most Groundbreaking Advertising 
and How It Changed Us All, Three Rivers Press; Reprint edition (Dec. 2001). 
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Christian celebration of medium importance,5 commemorating the birth of Christ, to the 
most widely celebrated Christian event in the world, celebrated even by non-Christians. 
Clearly, the new narratives about and surrounding Santa Clause have goals in the 
economic realm, principal among them (for advertisers) the increase in Coke 
consumption. Yet Hannah Arendt points out another face of how these goals function. 
According to Arendt, there is a tradition of creating narratives for the sake of 
consumption and other instrumental forms, even in what is known as the vita 
contemplativa.6 However, she underscores, that defining such goals instrumentally does 
not exhaust what goals and their supporting narratives can do. As James T. Knauer 
defines Arendt's commitment to political action, her point is that master narratives (he 
calls them "general principles" shared within groups) do more for defining a political 
subject:  
Arendt's point is not that action must have no goals but that it cannot be defined in 
terms of them. The particular ends of action are always transcended by the general 
principles which give them significance and meaning. Insofar as a universal 
principle is manifested in a particular act, it becomes possible to judge that act in 
terms of what Arendt calls the "greatness" of the act, that is, the greatness of the 
manifestation of principle.7 
Where in a narrative aimed at fostering the economic goal of consumption is there 
meaning that can define such great acts?  
                                                 
5 Theologically, Easter is the most important moment in the liturgical year, when Jesus's resurrection 
provided him to be the Messiah.  
6 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 289. 
7 James T. Knauer, “Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt's Concept of Political Action” The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 3. (Sep., 1980), pp. 721-733. 
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Conventionally, consumption is considered to exist for the sake of consumption 
itself. It may bring pleasure, it may bring profits, but it hardly generates meaning—at 
most, the great ruthlessness of the advertiser comes to the surface in analyses of these 
narratives. The advertiser knows that there is no connection between Coke and Santa 
Claus (except to the extent that Coke recreated him), but the associations grounding this 
new narrative are artificially created through the repetition of pleasing images, catchy 
slogans, and emotional appeals, until in fact the victim of the advertising now falsely 
makes the association as an existing truth. Through such acts that virtually can be equated 
with brainwashing, the advertiser creates the illusion of meaning where there is no 
meaning whatsoever. The consumer is now tricked into believing that there actually is 
meaning in purchasing the product and consuming it. In the rudimentary form of such 
narratives, their meaning exists primarily in the anticipation of the purchase; it may also 
linger during the act of consumption, but as soon as the act of consumption is done, the 
illusionary meaning will start to decline.  
Here, the traditional interpretation of the economic realm needs revision in the 
current day. It has long been assumed that such economic narratives cannot function with 
the same strength as narratives referencing other norms (law, religion) can, because there 
is no culture or symbol set in place to reinforce the illusionary meaning’s existence by 
anchoring it in the sphere of public politics. The comparison is facile, but understandable. 
If I go to a religious ceremony I will likely see icons, hear pleasant sounds (singing, 
chanting), enjoy pleasant smells (incense), and interact with a community. Through this 
coherent realm of cultural acts anchored by narratives exemplifying various norms, I will 
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likely acquire a feeling of belonging, greater purposes, and love even if I am not a 
believer.  
To be sure, such feelings may begin to dissipate as soon as I leave the ceremony, 
but they will do so only slowly. They may in fact persist for a long time to influence my 
future acts, predisposing me to affirm their reality, even if I do not attend another service 
for years. The normative realm of that religion remains available through such 
institutionalized experience, and my participation in it has anchored me to its "thick 
description" of experience and society. In contrast, it is easy to presume that meaning 
generated by consuming is shallow in comparison, guaranteed only in a false or 
ephemeral association of symbols with the item being consumed. This illusionary 
conflation will thus only trick the consumer briefly.  
Here, however, the conventional model for narratives created in the economic 
realm may in fact be seriously lacking. The pleasure created in the series of acts leading 
from the anticipation of buying and consuming a product to its actual consumption will 
remain in memory. And at moments when other systems of normative value break down, 
such associations and memories of pleasure will likely be enough to encourage the 
consumer to purchase and consume again—to use that pleasure as a new norm, as the 
heart of a new realm of meaning based on narratives created by forces like advertising 
that give shape to an economic realm with new normative force.  
Certainly, Santa Claus and Coca Cola were not the first times Christmas and 
religion were addressed in non-normative ways. For instance, on December 25, 800 CE, 
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Charlemagne was crowned as the Holy Roman Emperor.8 In one fell swoop, he made 
December 25 Christmas, co-opted the Celtic winter solstice death ceremony into 
Christianity, and managed to associate himself with the birth of Christ. In this case, 
Charlemagne operated from within the political realm and altered the normative realm on 
a large scale by associating religious norms with his rule rather than with church norms. 
Christianity's dogma was straightforwardly used to encourage unquestioning 
subservience to Christian sovereigns, not just to the Church. By conflating the Celtic 
Winter Solstice celebration, with Christianity, and with himself, Charlemagne sought to 
not merely convert more Gauls and Germans to Christianity, but to also gain a bit of the 
fanatic zeal of Christians to use in establishing his own normative use of religious 
language to set and fulfill his own secular, political goals.  
What the economic realm has accomplished over the last two centuries, however, 
is not exhausted by Charlemagne's example. Since Venice's transformation, the entire 
normative realm, our very fabric of our social being, has moved on another stage, in 
which it has arguably been eviscerated by advertisers for the sole purpose of increasing 
consumption and maximizing profit. This constitutes a set of arbitrary norms aimed at 
consumption rather than more traditional value norms. That transformation has not been 
accomplished without resistance. The right wing vilifies the loss of narratives from 
religion and ethics in the normative realm. They blame the left for this what they consider 
moral deviation. and see themselves as standing for what’s “right” and “the good old 
                                                 
8 François L Ganshof, “Charlemagne,” Speculum, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Oct. 1949), pp. 520-528, specifically p. 
524. 
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days.” Ironically, however, this shattering of the normative realm is precisely the result of 
the economic realm’s colonization of it. The deeply lamented destruction of the 
normative realm by the economic realm is the result of its colonization by capitalism.  
Not only has the economic realm reshaped the normative realm, it has gotten rid 
of what was not profitable in the process, as homo faber turns into the modern consumer. 
The economic realm of the twentieth century has become a hyperrational realm, yet using 
a rationality that would have been decried in earlier iterations of the political realm. 
Through television, radio, the newspaper, the internet, telemarketers, door-to-door 
salespeople, the work place, movies, billboards, and all other media, this new economic 
realm has set up a new set of norms that can ground a complete revision of narratives in 
the political realm.  
 
The Emergence of Alternate (Non-)Rationalities 
The affective dimension of this process should never be undervalued. What we in 
the West, since the age of the Greeks, call "the rational" has been fundamentally reshaped 
in the last decades, incorporating what in the past would have been called non-sense 
rather than rationality. Rationality, therefore, needs to be reconsidered historically, as it 
has not been in models for rational choice, which assume greater stability in the 
normative realm. Rationality was the fuel used by Machiavelli and his Venice to turn the 
realms upon their heads—to insert norms from the economic realm into politics. But with 
the intervention of the economic realm into the normative realm, individuals are forced to 
accept rationalities in forms that had not been acceptable in earlier political spheres, less 
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controlled by forces like advertising. To understand that requires more than absolute 
rationality, which as Feyerabend point out: 
refuses to recognize the many ideas, actions, feelings, laws, institutions, racial 
features which separate one nation (culture, civilization) from another and which 
alone give us people, i.e. creatures with faces. This is the attitude that destroyed 
Indian cultural achievements in the USA without so much as a glance in their 
direction, this is the attitude that is now destroying nonwestern cultures under the 
guise of development.9  
Any single rationality does not encompass Arendt's vita contemplativa, which has 
difficulty dealing with transformations in emotions, magic, faith, Geist, intuition, desires, 
drives, passion, and plain old-fashioned irrationality. 
From its perspective, the innovations that I have been addressing have a different 
claim to truth in sponsoring narratives in public politics. They are no longer guaranteed 
by normative institutions, as narratives from faith and science have been. With respect to 
science, the questions in the normative realm can be of quite different sources and types:  
By science, in this context, Feyerabend means all those modern institutions which 
claim a rational and objective basis for their authority; for instance, the medical 
establishment, and much of the educational establishment. … Needless to say, 
Feyerabend's analysis is not identical with that of either Weber or Marcuse. 
Weber ultimately embraces the secular standards of the modern world as the locus 
of a type of existential freedom within the "iron cage" of rationalization. Marcuse, 
on the other hand, strongly objects to Weber's accommodation, and seeks to 
replace one-dimensional scientific reason with objective "Reason."' Feyerabend 
chooses neither of these alternatives. But he would seem to share Weber's 
concerns when he focuses on an "imperialism" of scientific reason that drives out 
and renders insignificant other, especially traditional, ways of apprehending the 
world, and in so doing renders human existence less full and meaningful.10 
 
                                                 
9 Paul Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason, (London: Verso, 2002), p. 102. 
10 C. Fred Alford, “Epistemological Relativism & Political Theory: The Case of Paul K. Feyerabend,” 
Polity, Vol. 18, No. 2. (Winter, 1985), pp. 204-223. 
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As Michael Oakeshott points out, “moral ideals are sediment; they have significance only 
so long as they are suspended in a religious or social tradition, so long as they belong to a 
religious or social life.” 11 Without the fluidity of the normative realm, any distilled 
“truth” runs the danger of becoming incapable of providing meaning. Moreover, 
economic rationalities are just as powerful as earlier ones in providing grounds for 
narratives to help individuals understand their worlds. 
What we must return to, however, is the question of how norms are enforced after 
they have become parts of a realm that can provide narratives guiding human action. That 
is how are norms enforced after these new narratives changed how we saw the universe 
and thus the normative realm. The 20th and 21st century individual has the right to ignore 
norms previously regarded as “universal” at least within the boundaries of his or her 
culture. This was only exacerbated by the liberal mythology of democracy where each 
person’s voice is presumed to be equal to all other voices. Those establishing themselves 
as subjects within the political realm are accustomed to accepting different rationalities, 
and to constitute themselves as publics both inside and outside of traditional institutional 
guarantees—they are used to assuming roles conforming to institutions implementing 
standard norms.  
All the advertisers have to do to discard one system of norms and implement 
another is show their audiences that the norm is based on faulty reason—they are here 
held into place by use and custom, not institutional force. The results can be startling 
                                                 
11 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other Essays, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1962), p. 41. 
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breaks of logic. For instance, cigarettes could be marketed to women based on the 
suffragist movement. The association of voting and smoking would allow a female 
smoker to feel a sense of liberation with every puff she took, even if those puffs had no 
direct impact on the political realm; even if those puffs served only to expend money, 
give her a buzz, and accelerated her approach toward her own mortality. The norms 
against women smoking withered away just as the norms repressing women have 
lessened—the imagery helped individuals claim the agency of subjectivity, based entirely 
on group decisions. Market forces of course supported the sexual liberation; sex sells, 
prudery does not.  
Such movements of norms in the economic realm do not, however, have to be 
negative, but they are always fragile and subject to abrupt shifts of taste and practice—
publicity can alter norms. For example, a political speech today that spoke of Heracles’ 
heroics would be received by laughter. Strangely enough, at the same time, that same 
audience might find a speech talking of the heroics of three captured soldiers reasonable. 
During the war against Yugoslavia it was announced, on April 1, 1999, that three U.S. 
soldiers accidentally wandered into Yugoslavia from Macedonia. They were captured and 
beaten in the process. After being fired upon without returning fire, the three men 
surrendered to the Yugoslav army. They put up no resistance and they were not on any 
sort of dangerous mission.12 The three men blundered into Yugoslavia and the US press 
and government spoke of them as heroes. US citizens put up yellow ribbons. Public 
                                                 
12 “Captured U.S. soldiers face military court in Yugoslavia” CNN, April 2, 1999, accessed April 4, 2017  
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.05/. 
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opinion polls, media discussions, presidential speeches, and threats of retaliation all 
followed. Was this an April Fool’s gag? What is amazing is the belief that these men 
become heroes, in the US media. They were each given purple hearts and five other 
medals. For what? What did they do to earn any of those medals? The inability to read 
maps (stupidity) and quickly surrendering (cowardice) has somehow become equated 
with heroism in the US. They unintentionally crossed an international border; they did 
nothing that saved the lives of civilians; they did not fight off the enemy, yet they have 
been transformed through media spin into icons. Spectacle gets more people tuned in. 
Indeed, this is an example of the power that the economic realm has over the normative 
realm. The very term “hero,” so critical in our understanding of history, myth, and stories 
of the self ala Joseph Campbell13, has been distilled down by a news media eager for 
ratings and a government eager for propaganda to no longer have any meaning 
whatsoever. 
But the economic realm’s invasion of the other two realms has done more than 
just rewrite and erode the normative realm in such cases. It has gone so far as to replace 
the normative realm with a reified economic version of itself. People who would have 
pursued meaning through God, art, war, mysticism, or some other non-rational meaning 
structure in the medieval or ancient world are today more likely to pursue economic 
means, such as a career. In this sense, the economic realm has become itself confused 
with the normative realm as far as meaning generation goes. That normative realm, the 
                                                 
13 Campbell, Joseph. The Hero with a Thousand Faces. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949). 
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realm of meaning and raison d’être, in turn, emerges as a means to an end. In other 
words, the normative realm only serves as a means when it is used to justify the 
application of the political and economic realms.  
Such reciprocities are not random; I posit them as indicative of the epistemology 
of the normative realm when it is opposed by a potentially equally forceful economic 
epistemology, controlled by acts of signification, like advertising or declarations of 
heroism. 
To reinforce this point, let’s consider a person who ideologically falls into the 
conservative category of the New Right14 who by current definition espouses lessening 
government regulation and overturning Roe v. Wade (1973). Such a person might be 
loathe to have the government regulate the safety of a product, because such regulation 
puts a burden on profit as well as limits potential market size. Yet, such a person might at 
the same time be inclined to have that same government regulate the reproductive rights 
of a woman. Indeed, overturning Roe v. Wade would actually necessarily result in an 
increase in regulation to force the practice of abortions to stop in conservative states. 
Such contradictions between normative value systems are resolved only from within 
various systems at play. One norm system is the faith in the market’s ability to sort out 
defective products or at least discourage their production; the other norm is the belief that 
their God told them to control female sexual organs.  
                                                 
14 John W. Sloan, The Reagan Effect: Economics and Presidential Leadership, (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press, 1999) pg. 58-59. 
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And here we arrive back at the question of rationality correlated with the 
normative and economic realms of public decision-making. It is too easy to assume, in 
cases such as advertising, that it is non-rational when subjects believe narratives with 
specific norms drawn from the rationalities of the economic realm. For instance, there is 
this non-rational “myth” that honor will somehow overcome greed in the market place. 
Such narratives can and do guide individual choice, even though capitalism easily 
transforms itself into a system that rewards greed and not honor, thereby promoting greed 
as its chief virtue. But such conventionally non-rational narratives can be absorbed into 
the normative realm. Indeed, in order for a consumer to discover what products are better 
in a system without regulations, they would have to expend resources on trial and error 
and possibly even risk life and limb. In actuality, then, government regulation may 
increase the efficiency of the market by regulating it, but such realizations have little 
bearing on the ideology of the kind of conservative market rationality at play here (in this 
case, free unregulated markets).15 People do not search for the most rational set of values 
and then construct their ideology to be rational. The more likely scenario is that people 
have preferences and construct an ideology that serves to justify those preferences after 
the fact. “Markets are to remain free, even if they are not always efficient (in sorting out 
bad versus good products, for instance),” says this system of norms, drawn from the 
principals of market economics. The other norm at play in this situation concerns the 
regulation of a woman’s reproductive ability. This assumption is based on a set of 
                                                 
15 John Braithwaite, “The Limits of Economism in Controlling Harmful Corporate Conduct,” Law & 
Society Review, Vol. 16, No. 3. (1981 - 1982), pp. 481-504.  
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religious norms that to a degree relegates women to the status of incubators (that is to 
say: if they get pregnant, they no longer have personal choice over that status). This 
phrasing is intentionally prejudicial because it helps to clarify how norms based on ideal 
values are transacted before they acquire distinctive institutions.  
With this, then, we return to the fundamental association of the economic realm 
with individual choice in decision-making. People seek a raison d’être in their lives, in 
order to make sense of all the essentially arbitrary fortune, misfortune, talent, handicaps, 
and virtue that they practice and encounter. They find in the narratives of the three realms 
such raisons d'être and guide their choices and lives. People need some cause to be, some 
meaning to accept mortality as a reasonable end to it all, and motivation to get up in the 
morning. Norms help to construct narratives directing choice and self-understanding, 
helping us to make sense of a world of experience that would otherwise be filled with 
irrationalities or non-rationalities. We understand our lives in terms of “reasons” that 
derive from narratives in the three realms: “I live so that…” In the era of advanced 
capitalism, the economy has become a source for such narratives, much as a game with a 
scoreboard, rules, referees, and cheaters. The non-rational and arbitrary rules and 
enforcement of those rules can be taken as norms, and in this way, they help us pretend 
that we are all rational participants in public life. But in the era of neoliberalism, instead 
of the economy being used to give us the means to fulfill our goals, the economy has in 
itself, become our goal. As in the case of advertising, economic behavior has come to 
guide lives: I work not to have money to buy those things that I need, but rather I work 
not just so I can buy things I need but also so that I can accumulate money and goods 
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(whether used or not). With the help of advertisers, the economic realm becomes the 
backbone for new narratives in the normative realm and for political decision-making it 
that realm, as illusionary and fleeting meaning is attached to them through narratives.  
As Marx noted over a century ago, this commodity has a dual, fetishized nature. 
The car is not merely a tool to get to work and to serve my traveling needs, it is in fact 
why I work –– I work to have a car. By having a car, I can get to work, but that is for 
consumer-subjects in the economic realm not the reason why I have the car (a convenient 
but essentially expensive tool for getting places). We have come to put value on those 
things (in the form of commodities in the economic realm) that are actually means to 
ends as if they were the ends themselves.  
Here, I also recall how economic narratives colonize not only the normative 
realm, but also the political one. Situations like the US invasion of Iraq can be 
rationalized as protecting the US economy (meaning the supply of oil at reasonable 
prices). That commodity-based set of norms help the public look away from war deaths 
and from effects of sanctions on the civilian population in Iraq. Older norms like national 
sovereignty or the morality of civilian deaths in wartimes simply are not applied to 
understand the war: even the anti-war protestors are too invested into the system to break 
away from the oil/economy narrative and discuss human rights and sovereignty. John 
Locke’s philosophy anticipated these point: so “[t]hat every Man, that hath any 
Possession, or Enjoyment, or any part of the Dominions of any Government, doth thereby 
give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that 
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Government, during such Enjoyment, as anyone under it.”16 That is, to truly break 
support with the state, those in opposition to the state would need to give up benefits 
from that state, an act that Locke surely must have known was intractably difficult. Thus, 
even the most ardent of war resistors is trapped by Leo Strauss’ esoteric discovery that 
Locke was more Hobbesian than previously thought.17.  
My point here is again that historical evidence supports my theoretic point about 
the ability of the economic realm to generate norms and act as a new political space. The 
way we have currently configured our society and its overwhelming reliance upon 
petroleum moves morality into the economic realm, with the result that divesting from 
petroleum seems essentially the same as divesting from the social contract. In the minds 
of those constructing their lives and political choices on the basis of narratives from the 
economic realm, resistance to "big oil" is not like giving up your favorite drink or 
boycotting a shoe company. Giving up petroleum would mean having to give up 
everything gained from civil society: our food, our transportation, our goods, our 
services, and our information network, to say nothing of the roles it plays in our houses, 
our clothes, or our medicine. All in all, then, it is entirely possible to reconfigure our 
individual internal scripts for political agency around such scripts from other realms.  
I believe it is worth also stressing how completely situationally bound such 
options are—they are neither non-rational nor irrational, but systematic rethinkings of the 
narratives inherent in different realms' political thinking. A historical example can 
                                                 
16 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 348. 
17 Patrick Coby, “The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?” The Review of 
Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1. (Winter, 1987), pp. 3-28.  
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underscore the rationality of choices that are completely functional within one realm as a 
decision-making narrative, but possibly almost incomprehensible within another. At the 
core of the Iroquois Confederacy’s Great Law is the belief that, “in our every 
deliberation, we must consider the impact of our decisions on the next seven 
generations.”18 That kind of long-term thinking used as the basis for political thought 
could indeed serve as the motto for many, if not all environmentalists, while looking non-
rational to supporters of the economic narratives of big oil. The Iroquois Confederacy 
uses as its fundamental narrative for political choice a consciously normative law, with 
political and economic implications. It dictates to the Iroquois that they cannot create 
laws without considering the impact of those laws for at least the next 140 years or so. 
Indeed, it tells the Iroquois that, when they legislate, those future generations must be in 
counsel with them even though they may not yet be born. They are to consult with the 
unborn who will be affected and yield decision-making power to them.  
Such a system is not a rational law, if rationality means "complying with best 
economic principles" for today's political choices, since much in it is speculative. Clearly, 
there is no way to know what the world will look like in 140 years, let alone to consider 
in any realistic sense the implications of those laws passed today for the next 140 years. 
Even extrapolations from known facts are based more on faith than reason, in such time 
frames. For example, we can understand that global warming exists now, and that, over 
                                                 
18 For the Iroquois Confederacy constitution or Great Law see: 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/iroquois.htm. For more on the historical impact of the Great Law see: 
William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010). 
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coming years, if nothing is done to reverse ongoing trends, water levels will rise even 
further as the polar ice caps continue to melt, the ocean temperatures will rise, coral reef 
systems will be destroyed, bodies of water will have their oxygen and salt levels drop, 
fish populations will shift and some will die off, etc. We can even imagine a world where 
major coastal cities are partially submerged (New Orleans or Venice) or parts of Europe, 
currently inhabited, under a new glacial ice cap.  
But environmental science is in its infancy for such speculation on the global 
scale, and randomizing factors might intervene in those scenarios. What if we are on the 
verge of another ice age, because a giant volcano might throw dust into the air that lowers 
global temperature for decades (something that has indeed happened, such as in the case 
of Krakatoa)? In this case, the plant might win a reprieve: a convergence of misfortunes 
might cancel each others' effects out. Even with modern technology, we are dealing in 
projections far beyond what the Iriquois might have expected. We may use meteorology, 
chaos theory, complexity theory, very sophisticated computing, and very high-powered 
computers to perhaps create a fairly reasonable model of our environment, but then 
model sunspots, orbital perturbations, and countless other factors might intervene. Even 
with tools like climateprediction.net,19 science comes down to a probabilistic embrace of 
dominant assumptions—as climate-change deniers remind us all the time. As individuals, 
                                                 
19 “Climateprediction.net is the largest experiment to try and produce a forecast of the climate in the 21st 
century. To do this, we need people around the world to give us time on their computers - time when they 
have their computers switched on, but are not using them to their full capacity.” 
(http://Climateprediction.net). 
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we will not be held accountable for such "accidents," but only for our normative political 
decisions about the "right thing to do." 
Such decision-making strategies and debates about long-term effects and 
randomness are not troubling within the Iroquois framework for generating politically 
necessary rationalities. Their narratives require them to think long-term as well as short 
term. Thus, for them, it was logical not to strike an alliance with Great Britain in the 
revolutionary era, because such treaties might have guaranteed short-term peace, but in 
their calculation, ten years later it might have led to disaster (a surrender of sovereignty 
would more likely produce long-term significant effects for the Iroquois than the British). 
This is not a political choice based on short-term situations, but on longer-term narratives 
about identity and responsibility to those coming after us. Of course, this is a speculative 
situation: when the Iroquois Confederacy created its Great Law somewhere between 
1,000 and 550 years ago, they had not crafted it to answer to such modern considerations 
of war and dominance, but that does not mean that they could not use to Great Law as 
normative in dealing with a rapidly changing chaotic world. This law was intended to 
force its legislative body to deal with those uncertainties within defined parameters of 
desired rationality, and it was intended to be taken literally, even though it could not 
possibly predict such misfortune as the coming European invasions.  
Such examples suggest again that "non-rational" laws might appear as such only 
to out-groups, to those espousing narratives from different normative realms. This law 
serves a purpose just by being a basis for the vita contemplativa, even if it cannot truly be 
applied, by the judgment of European diplomats who might have thought the Iroquois 
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were behaving irrationally. Yet it gives the Iroquois a sense of a future that guarantees the 
meaningfulness of their own laws: even in situations with clear short-term loss 
predictions, they feel secure in their actions if they consider the seven generations. 
Following that law increases legitimacy of the Confederacy’s rulers and increases the 
over-all sense of community and continuity within this political community. Even if 
sacrificing a present for that future seems a folly to outsiders, that political choice may 
still, even if by accident, lead to better legislation within the Iroquois community because 
it helps define the community's purpose and identity in a narrative sustaining a difficult 
but necessary perspective.  
The self-interests involved clearly differ; the economic and normative realms are 
not configured similarly. If the Iroquois Confederacy’s law were applied today, it would 
require that we create a law that would force us to dramatically cut our fossil fuel 
consumption. This is an action that, considering how dependent we are on petroleum in 
the US, could potentially harm our economy, lead to massive unemployment, 
malnutrition if not starvation (the US dependency on petroleum for food production is 
enormous), and maybe even cause civil unrest or wars. But even if it were in our long-
term interests, we would not be able to avail ourselves of this option, given that we exist 
in a realm where economic norms dominate all other. 
Here, we return to the crux of the matter for the latter twentieth century. The 
economic realm’s conquest of humanity is not confined to the normative realm, it has 
also invaded and subordinated the political realm. What roles advertising plays in 
securing norms based on economics also transfer almost seamlessly to a political realm 
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guided in terms of campaign financing, political advertisements, and lobbyists. Indeed, 
the system of corporate influence and corruption through economics in the United States 
has become so fine-tuned that campaign finance reform has remained unresolved on 
Congress' agenda for the entirety of the twentieth century and so far into the twenty first. 
In 1907, the Tilman Act was the first attempt at some sort of campaign financing 
reform. Even that early in the century, Congress made it a crime for corporations to make 
financial contributions to candidates for federal office.20 Laws were passed in 1910 and 
1911 creating spending limits for Congress. Then came the Federal Corrupt Practices Act 
(1925), and it was then that the dominant political science position on the matter was 
formulated by Louise Overacker in her book Money in Elections.21 In it, she argued that 
the solution was not banning corporate money, but rather making sure that everyone got 
some of it. In effect, banning the corporate money just meant that there would be more 
unaccounted for corruption and those with fewer resources would be less capable of 
getting funding. More campaign financing came in the form of an amendment to the 
Hatch Act of 1939, the Smith-Connally Act (1943), Taft-Hartley Act (1947), the Federal 
Elections Campaign Act (1971), and, most recently, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(2002).  
But what has all this accomplished? We have not been able to rid the political 
system of economic influence; all we did was regulate it (perhaps in hope of mitigating 
                                                 
20 Robert H. Sitkoff, “Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate 
Charters,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 3. (Summer, 2002), pp. 1103-1166, p. 
1103. 
21 Thomas E. Mann, “Linking Knowledge and Action: Political Science and Campaign Finance Reform,” 
Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Mar., 2003), pp. 69-83, p. 70. 
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the influence of moneyed interest). It is possible to see this as simply an evolution, as 
many scholars do: 
There were two major factors: a substantial increase during the 1960s in the costs 
of campaigning, especially those associated with media advertising, and the emergence of 
wealthy, self-financed candidates. Since both developments threatened incumbents, 
members of Congress began to consider new regulatory initiatives. The Revenue Act of 
1971 created a presidential public-financing system funded with an income tax 
checkoff.22 
Yet such an analysis, I contend, ultimately missed a central part of the dynamics 
between the economic and political realms as we know them today. It is generally 
assumed that, without some sort of government finance system (like those in Maine and 
Arizona),23 politicians would likely not win election without corporate assistance; Here, 
we must, however, return to the question of the economic realm actually re-scripting the 
normative realm. It is not that campaign financing necessarily determines who wins and 
who loses. In fact, several studies have shown “that funding source impacts are of a much 
lower level of magnitude, although still relevant in the heated competition of an open seat 
House race when even a slight edge matters.”24 A study by Brad Alexander found that:  
                                                 
22 Thomas E. Mann, “Linking Knowledge and Action,” p. 71. 
23 Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act of 1998 “created full public funding of campaigns to qualified 
candidates who wish to run for statewide and legislative offices” 
(http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecweb/ccecays/home.asp). As such, it is an attempt to draw politicians away 
from corporate money. Maine also has such a system of election management 
(http://www.maine.gov/ethics/mcea/index.htm) and in 2005 Connecticut enacted similar legislation.  
24 Brad Alexander “Good Money and Bad Money: Do Funding Sources Affect Electoral Outcomes?,” 
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 2. (Jun., 2005), pp. 353-358, p. 356.  
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campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless 
of incumbency status… An extra $100,000 (in 1990 dollars) in campaign spending 
garners a candidate less than 0.33 percent of the vote. Controlling for candidate 
quality and district fixed effects reduces estimates of the value of challenger 
spending to only one tenth of the level typically obtained in previous cross-
sectional studies. Despite relatively small standard errors on the estimates, I am 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that campaign spending has no effect on 
election outcomes. Second, while I find challenger spending to be marginally more 
productive than incumbent spending, the difference is greatly reduced compared to 
previous studies.25  
 
In fact, Levitt goes on to endorse a "Floors without Ceilings" type of public financing that 
was endorsed 80 years ago by Overacker. His reasoning goes along the lines of since 
spending at the top has little impact on the election campaigns, by creating minimum 
funding the effects of money in campaigns would be lessened.26  
Of course, one is left wondering, if money does not make a difference in election 
outcomes then why is there so much money spent on them? Levitt offers one possible 
explanation: 
Perception, however, is everything. The belief that money is the key to electoral 
success is almost as damaging as a scenario in which money really does matter. 
As long as conventional wisdom views money as critical, the patterns of behavior 
that have led to widespread criticism will remain.27 
 
Indeed, there is a debate about whether campaign financing is a bribe or extortion—a 
moral/normative debate, rather than an analysis based in numbers. Do donors give to 
politicians to change or influence the votes of legislators, do donors give to support the 
                                                 
25 Steven D. Levitt “Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election 
Outcomes in the U.S. House,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 4. (Aug., 1994), pp. 777-
798, p. 780.  
26 Ibid. p. 794. 
27 Ibid. p. 796. 
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politician that they prefer, or do donors give because the politicians demand it? If the 
money does not make that much difference, then the politicians are not as vulnerable to 
the influence of corporate interests. In any case the effect is the same. If politicians need 
the money, then they change their votes to suit their donors. If the politicians don’t need 
the money, but they are holding their votes ransom, then they still change their voting 
once the money is in their hands.  
The reality is that our politicians have everything to gain from campaign finance 
strategies, no matter where the money comes from. The ultimate point is normative, 
rather than economic: the perception that the money is corrupt forces them to 
occasionally address public concerns. This they do with occasional campaign finance 
reform that does not, at the end of the day, get rid of corporate backing. Rather it allows 
the economic realm free access to humanity’s scripts from the normative realm, for a 
perpetual redrafting of the differentiation between "corrupt" and "honest" politicians. By 
definition, however, corporate finance of elections will alter politicians' behaviors, no 
matter which side of the corrupt/honest script they lie on. We must understand, therefore, 
that the three realms have now achieved some kind of parity: the norms that defined the 
political realm in the early modern periods have come to be defined as much by the 
economic realm, and the political realm has taken on a dual face, thoroughly colored by 
economics. 
What, then, remains of the value of three realms for analyzing decision-making 
and rationality of individuals making choices, political or otherwise? 
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Some Conclusions: The Three Realms and Rational Choice Theory  
What I hope to have shown here is that the "game theory" of rational choice 
cannot be modeled as a closed system based on interests taken as a set of relatively 
consistent abstractions. To assume that, means ignoring that myths are at the core of any 
state’s symbolic structure, and hence of the definitions of "interest" that are at play for the 
state or individuals in it.  
The examples I have provided suggest that stories a people tell of their origin and 
needs are certainly as important as the stories they tell about their activities. These stories 
need not be factual, they must simply serve as narratives to impel and unify scripts that 
can be shared by individuals and groups. They can, in some cases, legitimize actions 
from the political realm by creating illusions of norms. Yet even Machiavelli already 
realized that, when a civilization’s symbolic structure falls into decline, the state’s 
political legitimacy itself must also fall into decline.28 And when the stories that provide 
norms and guidelines for behaviors and expectations fail, “[t]he inevitable result is the 
phenomenon of ‘being lost’ in a world that has no more fixed points in the myth.”29  
In the modern world, the normative realm has lost some of its force in generating 
stories, because hegemonies have been called into question—the stories about rights and 
legitimacy fail. This has long been a rallying cry for the right. For instance, Michael 
Oakeshott, in his “Tower of Babel” essay, equates education, art, tradition, and habit with 
the development of morality, as institutions inculcating the narratives of acceptable 
                                                 
28 Machiavelli, Discourses, p. 250. 
29 Vogelin, Anamnesis, p. 26. 
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rationalities. In “Rationalism in Politics,” Oakeshott cries out that our “moral ideals are 
sediment; they have significance only so long as they are suspended in a religious or 
social tradition, so long as they belong to a religious or social life.”30 Rationalists 
decrying the downfall of the normative realm have constructed a new moral ideology that 
is based on “the reflective observance of moral rules” in order to fill the vacuum created 
in the normative realm. 31 As they see it, in effect, hyperrationality has removed from the 
normative realm the magic and the non-rational and as a result has left morality, as 
sediment, to fend for itself, which Oakeshott believes it cannot do. The normative realm 
has lost its validity because it “was derived from the experience of a world which no 
longer exists and which cannot be recaptured because it is in a strict sense invalidated by 
technological society.”32 
As I have traced it, the loss of power of the normative realm has transformed the 
political realm, as well. This, we see especially in the transformations of the electoral 
process, which is no longer driven by a sense of urgency and duty:  
U.S. elections now routinely draw only half of the electorate to the polls on 
election day. Perhaps even more startling, elections without the presidency at 
stake attract voters at a rate ranging from less than 40% when Congress is at the 
top of the ballot to under 20% for municipal or primary elections.33  
                                                 
30 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other Essays, p. 41. 
31 Ibid., p. 472. 
32 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 58. 
33 David Niven, “The Limits of Mobilization: Turnout Evidence from State House Primaries,” Political 
Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Dec., 2001), pp. 335-350, p. 335. 
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If we regress election years on voter turnout as a percentage of the eligible voting 
population since 1840, we get an adjusted R-squared of 0.67534—a simplistic model that 
suggests, some 67.5% of the decline of voter turnout is explained by a loss of narratives.  
Other explanations have been offered for this particular decline in the political 
realm, reaching beyond the idea of compelling symbols and narratives in the normative 
realm. According to Dugan and Taggart, there are two schools of thought that explain the 
decline in voter turnout. The first explanation is that “the introduction of the secret ballot, 
state registration laws reduced the extent of fraudulent voting practices (graveyard and 
repeat voting) and increased the cost of voting for peripheral voters, thereby lowering 
recorded levels of turnout.”35 Additionally, giving women, who were not in the habit of 
voting, the right to vote (1920) at least temporarily lowered voting levels.36 It is also 
plausible that extending the franchise to other groups in general has similarly contributed 
to the overall decline since such populations may have felt left out, not had a culture of 
voting, or merely just needed to warm up to the prospect of it. Such incidents include the 
extension to non-whites, especially newly freed slaves in 1870, the residents of the 
District of Columbia in 1961, poor and non-whites again in 1964, and in 1971, 18 to 20-
year-olds. “In contrast, the second approach contends institutional reform reflects a 
broader political environment responsible for shaping qualities of the electoral system in 
a variety of profound and permanent ways, including aggregate levels of turnout. The 
                                                 
34 I merely looked at the election turnouts since 1840 and regressed the data. 
35 William E. Dugan and William A. Taggart, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe 
Revisited,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 2. (May, 1995), pp. 469-482, p. 469. 
36 Philip E. Converse, “Change in the American Electorate,” The Human Meaning of Social Change, ed. A 
Campbell and P. Converse (New York: Sage), 1972. 
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causal factor is not legal reform but the party system functioning as an instrument of 
social organization and representation.”37  
As I have suggested, the rise of capitalism can also contribute to the 
marginalization of the electorate. Motives from the economic realm may either modify or 
supplant those in the normative realm, introducing different rationalities for choice 
(political or otherwise). To be sure, narratives from the normative realm are often more 
easily passed down from generation to generation because they are narratives, stories that 
can transcend the life of an individual operator. In contrast, stories from the economic 
realm exist so long as they are profitable (that is, conform to experience), while 
normative realm motives can exist as narrative rationalities, even if they are completely 
harmful or contrary to experience—non-rational or irrational. Thus, as vulnerable as the 
normative realm is to rational scrutiny, the economic realm is doubly so because of its 
ties to the rationality of experience. An actor can keep to the narrative of an irrational 
norm if for no other reason than he or she probably embraced the norm for non-rational 
causes to begin with. On the other hand, if an economic realm activity proves itself 
unprofitable and hence non-rational, it can likely be ended immediately with little 
sentimental attachment—its narrative will be less compelling.  
In other words, the narratives in these realms will not carry with them the same 
force of persuasion. A populace that acts and creates meaning out of economic realm 
rationalities is likely not going to be able to maintain its symbol systems for long. On the 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
 163 
other hand, the normative realm operators will be able to sustain their system so long as 
they can pass on their culture of narrative rationalities—the two realms enact rationalities 
in different time scales:  
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Figure 7: Longevity of and Persuasive Value of Economic and Normative Symbols 
 
 Effectively, the economic realm has for it a built-in bottom limit—that of 
survival. On the other hand, norms can completely cease to drive behavior.  
A last consequence presents itself: the economic realm is the least social of 
realms, because it is driven by narratives whose logic can lay outside the realm of social 
consensus. As the realm responsible for the basic necessities of life, the economic realm 
is itself ultimately private, even if done with others. Indeed, the Greek division between 
the public and private spheres puts the political realm into the public and the economic 
realm into the private sphere, with the normative realm straddling the two. This 
distinction has come down to us in many variants, with the private sphere eventually 
coming to be gendered female, and thereby marked as somehow less able to generate 
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norms because it is more concerned with survival. Women were relegated to the role of 
cleaning, shopping, mending, and cooking; men instead took up the role of builders, 
politicians, warriors, carpenters, and those sorts of occupations that created works that 
lasted over time. Marx's idea of alienation of labor from the products of its work only 
exacerbates this split; advertising in capitalism is aimed at reifying a least common 
denominator of the now gendered images in them. Yet Aristotle has the last word here: 
“[u]tility is an impermanent thing: it changes according to circumstances. So, with the 
disappearance of the ground for friendship, the friendship also breaks up, because that 
was what kept it alive.”38 If our only connection to the world and each other is through 
utility, we reify one another and try to make use of one another as we would make use of 
a tool. In contrast to the rationality of the economic sphere, then, reason in the narratives 
of the political or the normative realms reify rationalities that serve the community.  
And here we return to where this project began: with "rational choice theory." The 
critique of such theories now has a straightforward form: they have embraced rationalities 
of instrumentality and superimposed the economic realm’s behavioral paradigm onto the 
political realm. What I have been tracing, however, is the necessity to look at the basic 
scenarios of rational choice theory and realize that individual rationality must be seen as 
embedded in realms of narrative that overwrite individual scripts with other rationalities.  
Survival is the primary goal of the economic realm, but that is easily achieved in 
1st world states. The normative realm has been eroded in the twentieth century, because 
                                                 
38 Aristotle, Ethics, p. 262. 
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laws are no longer described the way Locke described them39: we are willing today to 
both invent and scrutinize laws:  
Good reasons must be given for prevailing practices as they must for potential 
improvements or reforms. They must be shown to be well-fitted to the ends in 
view. The very object of Enlightenment rationalism, the point of the ideal of 
individual detachment in liberal thought, was to assure that customs and usages 
[sic] were not simply taken for granted, but were constantly reassessed against 
criteria of inherent purpose.40  
 
Modernity screams for us to have purposeful behavior (instrumentality). It tells us that 
non-rational behavior, non-instrumental behavior, or behavior that cannot be justified 
through reason is behavior that should be improved upon or discarded and replaced.  
These are the fundamental assumptions of rational choice theorists that all 
behavior is rational or serve some utility (it must be instrumental). Yet as our initial case 
studies suggests, that version of the narratives in the normative realm can shift. The irony 
is Feyerabend’s charge that rationality “is now destroying non-Western cultures.”41 What 
we find, however, is that rationalities destroy laws and traditional narratives, even as they 
introduce alternate narratives that instantiate new rationalities to guide individual and 
group choice.  
When the normative realm ossifies, the political realm and the economic realm 
have the possibility of introducing new rationalities to motivate behaviors. In the case of 
Venice, economics came to redefine the political realm and in modern campaign 
                                                 
39 Patrick Coby, “The Law of Nature in Locke's Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?,” p. 4. 
40 Charles W. Anderson, “Pragmatism & Liberalism, Rationalism & Irrationalism: A Response to Richard 
Rorty,” Polity, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring, 1991), pp. 357-371, p. 368.  
41 Feyerabend, p. 102. 
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financing, economics created a new set of norms against which political actors are 
measured (according to their possible corruption).  
In conclusion to this discussion, I will again address a contemporary situation of 
political action that exemplifies how considering choice not as a static, instrumental 
rationality, but as a shifting play of the power in the three realms to generate new and 
competing rationalities that require choice to be redefined, is the more dynamic terms 
embraced here.  
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CONCLUSIONS:  
Understanding the Occupy Movement 
 
If the example with which I introduced the problem of rational choice theory was 
a case in which political action was guided by anything but instrumental rationality, I 
close with an example of economic/market rationality—an example from the economic 
realm that has colonized the political realm in new ways.  
In establishing the three realms model, I referred to different formulations of the 
economic human. In contemporary political action, the capitalist homo faber has emerged 
as a critical figure: the person who creates a product through destroying "natural" 
resources. Capitalist rationality rests on a specific kind of truth: to create lumber a forest 
must be destroyed. To rue the destruction of the forest would make the capitalist hesitate, 
and hesitation equals the loss of profit. In the last decades, however, that logic has come 
under investigation, with an emphasis on capitalism as a group motivation. In a real 
sense, we now realize that capitalism is akin to Hobbes’ State of Warre: 
Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are 
none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in 
a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are 
Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the 
same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine 
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distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can 
keep it.1  
 
In the most extreme reading, capitalism becomes equated not only with the destruction of 
natural resources, but also with fraud and the corruption of value. Hobbes, however, 
points out an additional feature: capitalism operates in terms of social virtue in the public 
sphere—it creates its own set of norms that can become reified, just as religion had done 
a millennium ago. He finishes the quote by pointing out that, in effect, capitalism does 
not reward according to a public sphere virtue, but according to what gets defined as 
private sphere concerns. The capitalist desires, whether by market forces or the “use of 
Violence [e.g. the US wars against Iraq], to make themselves Masters of other men, 
persons, wives, children, and cattell,”2  
The norms of what hard-working people "deserve" (in a prescription clearly 
alluding to the values of neo-liberalism) have in the last years come under scrutiny, 
because neither traditional economic-realm narratives nor normative-realm ones 
adequately describe what is at stake in this kind of political action or choice. Control of 
the economic realm has been ceded to capital interest, much as it was in Machiavelli's 
Venice, but with a much more conscious attempt to colonize the normative and political 
realms. To many, it may seem that we are in a condition more akin to that of Hobbes’ 
State of Warre, where people have no sovereign to keep them safe. A condition where 
every moment is one of peril, should you be a member of the working class that is.  
                                                 
1 Hobbes, p. 90. 
2 Ibid, p. 88. 
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The case study that I look at now is a movement that acknowledges that peril, that 
comes from the sense that the political and normative realms have been completely 
colonized by the economic realm, rather than simply being modified by it. The Occupy 
Movement was arguably the longest and largest US act of “political” activism in the 
United States since the Civil Rights Movement, and it is characterized by what seems to 
be affective responses to an extreme situation of capital concentration rather than to any 
extensive rationality. Occupy made demands for student debt relief, for the overturn of 
Citizens’ United (a Supreme Court that arguably opened the door for the complete 
colonization of the political realm by big capital), and for stronger banking regulations (so 
that consumer protections would not be further eroded).3 Yet the activist face of this 
movement did transcend affect and protest and made a concrete difference. Activists, for 
instance, helped homeowners battle unfair foreclosures across the country.4 For instance, 
with the help of Occupy, 78-year-old civil rights activist Helen Bailey was allowed to 
stay in her home indefinitely after facing foreclosure.5 There was also a more small-scale 
communitarian impulse within Occupy, a desire for less alienating and more human-
focused forms of social organization. This was very evident in the affective behavior of 
the leadership in Occupy Austin (which I observed personally) and in the way they 
managed the organization.6 
                                                 
3 See http://occupiedmedia.us 
4 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/09/occupy-wall-street-foreclosures_n_1412771.html 
5 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/07/helen-bailey-foreclosure_n_1260078.html 
6 I was the person who organized and invited the speakers for the teach ins for Occupy Austin. I believe 
that there was one professor who came, who was not part of our group. I brought in professors from UT 
Austin, St. Edwards, ACC, and the University of Houston. We numbered about a dozen and did about two 
dozen speaking events. I personally gave five. I have included the url for one such event as an example 
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Whether in Austin or in Zucotti Park, both impulses—the activism and the 
communitarian impulse—seem evident on the pages of The Occupy Wall Street Journal.7 
But perhaps the most important characteristic of the Occupy movement is that it 
happened under conditions of “governmentality” against the backdrop of a neoliberal 
system. At this point, an analysis from the point of view of the three realms begins to 
show how the movement was actually the emergence of considerably more nuanced 
rationalities behind choice. 
The rationalities at play at the start of the Occupy Movement ranged broadly 
across the economic realm. As Wendy Brown has pointed out, “neoliberalism is not just a 
series of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating free trade, maximizing 
corporate profits, and challenging welfarism.”8 Rather “neoliberal rationality, while 
foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; it 
involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social actions, 
even as the market itself remains a distinctive player.”9 I want to argue here that Occupy 
was a protest against this pervasive market rationality as it aimed at colonizing and 
                                                 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PW_hhYZxBZU. My role was to invite speakers and then coordinate 
with the Education Magnet, the person democratically elected to serve in that capacity by Occupy Austin. 
This was sometimes a messy process. On occasion Bob Buzzanco (UH) was double booked and on another 
occasion Harry Clever (UT Austin) was stood up. It is unclear what sort of an impact the teach-ins had, but 
it did provide for some measure of critique of market rationality, neo-liberalism, and the role of the 
government. For me it provided a window into how Occupy operated. It was an extremely democratic 
process. It intentionally avoided created leadership positions and prohibited people from speaking for more 
than five minutes. To conduct teach-ins we had to get Occupy to break that rule, which it allowed, so long 
as we did the teach-ins on the periphery of the City Hall. One of our explicit goals was to get Occupy to 
more clearly spell out is political objectives. This is something that I believe we ultimately failed to 
achieve. 
7 See http://occupiedmedia.us 
8 Wendy Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy” in Edgework: Critical Essays on 
Knowledge and Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 39. 
9 Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” 39-40. 
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destroying other forms of normative rationality. Occupy was a reaction against and 
rejection of neoliberal governmentality as a norm-generating concept precluding all 
others.  
Such extreme cases of market rationality are what I earlier called the colonization 
of the lifeworlds by the economic world. This way of being in the world exceeds 
particular positions on particular issues because of how pervasive it became. Its 
colonization of the political realm undergirds important features of not only the 
Republican Reagan-Bush and especially the G.H.W. Bush years, but also the Democratic 
Clinton and Obama decades. It is a rationality that not only reflects the model of 
individuality and autonomous sense of the self championed by rational choice theory, but 
it also positions the individual in a context of “governmentality” based on the 
instrumental logic of capitalism. I remind you that as a mode of governance, 
governmentality has become extreme, encompassing but not limited to a single state-form 
that produces subjects, forms of citizenship and behavior defined almost entirely by that 
logic. The very term "governmentality" points to a fusion of the economic and political 
spheres in this content: it refers to a new organization of the social, through a 
government's cooptation of practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) through 
which subjects are governed. It is the way governments try to produce the citizens best 
suited to fulfill those governments' policies, using its own tools (laws, policies, funding 
decisions).10 
                                                 
10 For more on governmentality see Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” trans. Rosi Braidotti and revised 
by Colin Gordon, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies 
in Governmentality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–104. 
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Governmentality is not a new theory or paradigm in the study of the state, social 
institutions and their relationship with the citizenry. Governmentality, like Orientalism,11 
is that paradigm-shifting lens through which things can be gazed at, as they seem to 
appear on the ground. This new lens, I believe, wishes to interrogate the very different 
rationalities that colonize our presuppositions about the gaze, about the normative realm: 
how is it possible to utter true statements about persons and their behavior? How are 
“truths” put into practice and by whom, through which conflicts, alliances, blackmails, 
forms of violence, seductions and subordinations, and as alternative to what other 
“truths?” Governmentality is the institutional side of what I have been presenting as a 
question of how choices are structured for voting publics, allowing those publics to 
transform the reality created by the governmental side by reinventing, contesting, and 
operationalizing new rationalities, thus altering behaviors inherent in governments' 
colonization of the realms of public norms, politics, and economic rationalities by re-
scripting behaviors.12 In short: Occupy tried to upend the strategies by which our 
neoliberal reality gets constructed by working within the three realms together to 
transform consciousness of choice, not just to protest the ground of governmentality 
constructed by neoliberalism since the late twentieth century.  
The Occupy movement was born into an ailing political realm. As Brown has also 
shown, neoliberalism resulted in a “powerful erosion of liberal democratic institutions 
and practices in places like the United States”—what she calls a “neglected dimension” 
                                                 
11 For more on Orientalism see Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon, 1978).  
12 (Rose, 1999: 20). 
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of neoliberal rationality.13 This political realm and its democratic ideals of liberty, 
equality, self-determination and justice for all are “submitted to an economic rationality 
where not only is the human exhaustively configured as homo economicus but all 
dimensions of human life are cast in terms of market rationality.” In this way of being, 
“every action and policy” has come to be submitted to considerations of profitability, 
where “all human and institutional action” is produced in the hopes that it manifests as 
“rational entrepreneurial action conducted according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or 
satisfaction against the microeconomic grid of scarcity, supply and demand and moral 
value-neutrality.”14  
What is important for our purposes in Brown’s analysis of neoliberalism is that 
neoliberalism becomes a constructivist project which perpetuates itself forward by 
rewarding those who live by its code. This market rationality Brown speaks of is not an 
ontological givenness of all domains of society. Since there is nothing natural about 
market rationality, Neoliberalism sees itself charged with the task of developing, 
disseminating and institutionalizing this way of being in the world.15 Part of this 
development, dissemination and institutionalization is rewarding folks who feel at home 
in the neoliberal system, and doing so by naturalizing scripts for norms and political 
action that favor the hegemony of the market inherent in the economic realm. The market 
colonizes the political realm by insisting on concepts like rational choice to analyze how 
individuals behave, which, in turn, create norms and scripts for behavior that consistently 
                                                 
13 Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” 38. 
14 Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” 40. 
15 Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” 40-41. 
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foster choices that encourage individuals to engage in political action that actively 
undercuts their best interests of being-in-the-world—to take on untenable debt, to 
maximize profit, to allow the destruction of national natural patrimony like national parks 
in the name of jobs that are defined by the corporations and which do not sustain 
communities over the long run (e.g. pipeline construction, which concentrates jobs in a 
region for a few years, then falls back to a small number of local maintenance workers at 
considerably lower wage).  
From this perspective, perhaps the most important effect of market rationality is 
how it erodes democratic ideals and the moral call which strives to restore it in the public 
sphere. The pervasiveness of neoliberal rationality, the sense of moral autonomy which is 
measured by the capacity of each political actor for “self-care” (in opposition to caring 
for the community’s needs or a communitarian understanding of the self), the drive to 
service one’s own ambitions, and provide for one’s own needs, this push to make every 
individual fully responsible for her- or himself, stunts ethical action and by extension 
political action taken to restore ethical modes of operation to the state and its 
institutions—it stunts the evolution of new norms for action in the normative realm to 
meet new community, individual needs, and various forms of sustainability. If the only 
rational action is self-serving and driven by a calculus of profitability, then anything else 
would be considered a mismanaged life—and a violation of "good government" as reified 
in an all-encompassing political realm.  
Consider the early days of Occupy. The opening salvo was a declaration of war 
by the bottom 99% (or so organizers hoped) against the ruling 1 %. The 99% attacked the 
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top 1 percent’s golden calf—wealth distribution. Yet it is hard to imagine a more 
powerful victory for the plutocracy than the Citizen’s United v FEC (2010) ruling. That 
corporation-sponsored ruling targeted campaign finance—a euphemism for legal 
regulated bribery—and deregulated it. After the Citizen’s United ruling, it became 
permissible for the wealthy to legally purchase members of Congress without any real 
restrictions—for the powerful in the economic realm to completely colonize the political 
realm, without meaningful opposition. This gap between the rich and poor political actors 
was made even wider after the economic crash of 2007-2008 and signs of what seemed 
like an impending doom for the 99% were everywhere to be seen. The "new norms" of 
capitalism were discussed by Occupy leaders as damaging the interests of the 99%: 
mortgages that improve housing but which cannot be paid, corporate profits that 
purportedly trickle down into the economy but actually only accrue to stockholders, and 
tax breaks that will “return” funds “seized” by the government (at the rate of a few 
hundred dollars to ordinary working families and billions for corporations).  
It is significant that this revolt against such an absolute collapse of the three 
realms was not modeled from within Western capitalism. The impetus for Occupy had 
been decades in the making, but the inspiration finally came from the Arab Spring and 
the Fall of Mubarak in Egypt and all its non-Arab outgrowths, such as the Indignado 
Movement (May 15, 2011) in Spain.16  
                                                 
16 For more on the Indignado movement see: Marcos Ancelovici, Pascale Dufour and Héloïse Nez, Street 
Politics in the Age of Austerity: From the Indignados to Occupy, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2016). 
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The lesson learned from Egypt's attempts to rescript its political realm was that a 
new narrative might emerge if a group grabs a single location and then occupies it. On 
September 17, 2011, after two months of planning, protestors began a permanent 
occupation of an area of Manhattan near the Wall Street financial center. The occupation 
of Tahrir Square, the brief Wisconsin capital occupation, and the Spanish Indignato 
(Indignant) occupations collectively taught the protesters one thing about the political 
sphere: it is public and can function the same way advertising does. Once you are in the 
streets and occupy a specific strategic location, it is critical that your movement maintain 
a permanent and fearless presence. If you go home for the evening, the result will be that 
security forces can themselves go to the location and occupy it, preventing the protestors 
from returning by removing the publicness from their potential in the political realm. 
That is, the community aspect of the event would get disrupted which, in turn, would 
hinder the evolution of “shared new narratives” about the norms and values appropriated 
for a capitalist state and about who should count as political actors. What is important for 
this study is that these “shared new narratives” needed a consideration of the other two 
realms in relation to the economic realm but in ways not completely colonized by it. 
The path for US citizens to discover these truths was not straightforward, 
Although, the Madison, Wisconsin capitol occupation in February 2011 was somewhat 
inspirational as one of the first conscious Occupy events, its real role was to indicate what 
not to do in later attempts to build narratives. First, the protestors got nervous. They 
chose to occupy the capitol building, as the Egyptians had done in Tahrir, but when the 
state indicated that it would not allow for a permanent occupation, organizers feared 
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retaliation. In effect, they were not ready to go all the way, but their symbolic action had 
connoted more: capturing the symbol and location of the government. Their choice of 
action was not adequate to the symbolisms they were evoking. In contrast, those 
occupying Tahrir Square captured the cultural and transportation center of Cairo as well 
as the symbolic center for Egypt’s previous two revolutions (1919 and 1952). The people 
in Wisconsin had pulled off something grand, but then proved that they did not have the 
stomach to maintain the fight. They had not yet understood what their claim to new 
choices implied for the political realm. 
The second mistake that the Wisconsin occupiers learned was that their 
occupation very quickly became associated with one of the two political parties—the 
Democratic Party. As such the movement seemed to be configuring itself as anything but 
an alternative, because the occupation seemed to be taking place within inherited norms 
defining appropriate political action. This meant that the leadership began to worry more 
about their own political careers and their own personal safety, above and beyond the 
movement itself; they reconstituted themselves as political actors in terms of a political 
domain that served corporations better than citizens. As the 2016 elections showed in 
another way, the Democratic Party is not exactly a revolutionary party, it is in fact a 
status quo party, albeit one that espouses some liberal norms for human rights so that 
capitalism has a few brakes on it.  
Wisconsin's Democratic Party, however, suddenly found itself as a member of the 
regime influencing a potential revolution. Although such elements within a local 
Democratic Party may wish to reform parts of the US economy, at the end of the day, 
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those elements remained part of the regime (part of a party establishment answering to 
the entire national party establishment, not only its local constituents), and thus they have 
a vested interest in making sure that the regime remains intact, as the institution in the 
political realm that sponsored their identities. In other words, such a national party, by 
definition, does not see itself charged with the task of exiting market rationality, but 
rather with making life more livable within its confines.  
A movement affiliated with the Democratic Party was not capable (without other 
encouragement) of making the kind of radical shift in affiliations that redefined the role 
of the soccer hooligans I began this project with. The Wisconsin demonstrators made the 
mistake of aligning themselves with members of the very government they were 
protesting against, instead of embracing a radically different narrative of identity. The 
Democratic Party talked the Wisconsin protestors into seeking recall elections on 
Republican politicians in office rather than pursuing their movement. In all likelihood, it 
was this redirection/misdirection by the Democratic party establishment that defeated the 
Wisconsin movement, leaving the narratives essentially intact that should have redefined 
political action, norms against which action was to be evaluated, and the rationalities of 
the economic realm in the twenty-first century. 
But this was by no means the last act in the Occupy Movement; the US equivalent 
of the soccer hooligans and their radical questioning of available public narratives was 
yet to come. The Occupy Movement in the US spread to many major and even minor 
municipalities, once it learned not to associate itself with the Democratic Party. In fact, 
subsequent protestors actively talked about the Democratic Party with disdain and 
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resisted the party’s desire to co-opt it. Yet ultimately, even the more effective events in 
the Occupy Movement more or less failed. Occupy’s goal was, of course, to create a 
sustainable movement, and hence a new vision of the choices that need to be made in 
political realm and its relation to economics and to "American values," but this did not 
happen. 
The specific history of the Austin, Texas, Occupy Movement events is indicative 
for understanding the dynamics here. During the teach-ins in Austin, there was talk of a 
new constitutional convention, how to create new regulations for corporations, or perhaps 
getting rid of corporations altogether. University faculty from several Austin-area 
institutions began to conduct Teach Ins, attempted at making the movement more 
coherent and at consolidating narratives which would redefine individuals' choices of 
political action. Occupy Austin held around two dozen teach-ins in October and 
November of 2011. Part of their message was clear: the one thing most of the teach-ins 
had in common was a direct assault against market rationality and neoliberal ways of 
being in the world as unsustainable models for human activity, on both moral and 
ecological grounds.  
It did not help that the most important media event of the national Occupy 
Movement had its symbolic or iconic power destroyed. After just fifty-nine days, on 
November 15, 2011, in New York City, police using riot gear and tear gas removed the 
protestors from Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and their Hooverville tent city from Zucotti 
Park, effectively ending the occupation which was so symbolically critical to the larger 
evolution of the movement. There was an attempt on December 31st to retake the park. 
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However, police using riot gear and pepper spray cleared the park again. On March 17, 
2012, protestors again attempted to retake the park. Again, the police responded with 
violence, and apparently, the violence was the worst the OWS had ever seen.17  
One May 1, 2012 a mass demonstration took place in NYC, and then again on 
September 17, 2012 protestors attempted to retake Zucotti Park. Again, police responded 
with violence. While the movement managed to fight for 367 days, the last 308 were only 
sporadic. The movement failed partially because, although it was against corporate greed, 
corporate corruption, and government complicity with that corruption, the general public 
could not be brought to support it—its narrative about the need for a new ethical norm for 
capitalism did not convince them. To be sure, the market crash and bank bailouts had 
given the public a whiff of the rotted core of the Capitalist system, but a public steeped in 
their rational entrepreneurial calculations, their market rationality, conducted according 
to a calculus of utility, benefit and odds of success, were at best having trouble 
connecting the dots because they could not step outside their neoliberal mindset, the very 
deeply entrenched place they found themselves occupying in the economic realm—a 
space that left little breathing room for the other realms. The public couldn’t be brought 
to care for those hurt most by the crash because they were trained in market moral value-
neutrality. Occupy was an effort to resist market rationality and overturn the economic 
realm’s colonization of other life-worlds, and it was the general public’s inability to step 
outside of this same market rationality that brought about its failure. 
                                                 
17 Ryan Devereaux, "Occupy Wall Street demonstrators march to protest against police violence," The 
Guardian (London), March 24, 2012, accessed April 7, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/25/occupy-wall-street-protest-police. 
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The absolute control of the narratives by the economic realm at the time can be 
fairly reliably confirmed by a parallel case. Contrast Occupy with the Tea Party 
Movement, which had been created to demonstrate against Obama raising taxes and thus 
to hold the current economic realm norms in place. During the campaign, it was revealed 
that his tax plan would have lowered taxes for everyone making $625,000 or less. In 
other words, the Obama tax plan would have given tax relief for the bottom 99%, and 
only raised them for less than 1% of the very wealthiest taxpayers.18 Nonetheless, the 
normative, neoliberal, self-interested discourse against taxes still shaped people’s outrage 
against Obama raising taxes. Raising taxes for those most imbued in market rationality 
was enough to blindside the Tea Partiers to the fact that the majority were getting a tax 
break. Punishing the 1% was equivalent to questioning the American way of life—and of 
course it was. The outrage was so great that it led to a movement even though Obama 
was cutting taxes. Although they admittedly played a minor role in the 2016 election, the 
Tea Party was a force to contend with, at least up until 2014; it was and remains a major 
narrative force influencing (non-rational but rational) choices made by individual 
taxpayers who are actually voting against their own best interests and for those of the big 
capital that, in another narrative, exploits them. 
The Tea Party Movements (TMP) thus had a message that fit in better with the 
prevailing market rationality the public is immersed in. The main objective of the TMP 
was to cut taxes, and it brought to the political discussion a well-formed symbolic 
                                                 
18 See http://taxfoundation.org/blog/monday-map-percentage-taxpayers-agi-over-500000. 
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narrative based on an economic calculation that was not what it was presented as. This 
was to enable each individual to spend their money as they themselves saw fit instead of 
abandoning it to a corrupt government which would waste it. This narrative of how to 
best choose politically follows along closely with the rules of self-interested rationality 
inherent in capitalism's version of the economic realm, even though it flies in the face of 
how taxes actually work to consolidate money to provide services. If no one paid taxes to 
the government, there would be no revenue and the state would not have the ability to 
provide adequate services that benefit the many who could not provide services for 
themselves. But the narrative of norms underpinning a normative realm colonized by 
neoliberal economic rationality dictates that each person is fully responsible for 
themselves and should not need assistance—anything less, and they would be accused of 
mismanaging their lives.  
Also, the question of control of public political space here arises—the question 
that was raised above in questioning the role of public image-making endeavors like 
advertising. Admittedly, the TPM has not received the sort of violence that Occupy 
endured, enabling it to consolidate its messages without seeming dangerous, but it is 
worth pointing out that the TPM has received much funding from the kind of rich donors 
which Occupy largely lacked, and that the major media focused in on the violence as 
much or more than on the potential new scripts that Occupy offered. Thus, there are also 
other causes for the failure of the Occupy Wall Street Movement. In the end, however, a 
better analysis of Occupy's failure comes from awareness of the role of narratives in the 
three realms. Simply summarized: while Occupy’s aim was to step outside of the market 
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paradigm, the TPM goal was to not only to stay within the neoliberal paradigm, but to 
perfect it. In the former, new narratives were needed, but there were no soccer hooligans 
to make the kind of visible public gesture that could have consolidated and distributed a 
new narrative through the media. The normative and economic realms remained 
impervious to the model of new political action. 
But perhaps that may not be entirely true. Although Occupy seems to have fizzled 
out today, and the ultimate success of what began in Zuccotti Park may be up for debate. 
It’s hard to deny that Occupy Wall Street brought attention to many issues that are now at 
the forefront of American politics. Income inequality, for example, has become a hot-
button political issue, in part, thanks to exposure brought by Occupy. While the 
movement’s seeming disintegration has been blamed on infighting and the lack of a clear 
set of demands, we cannot deny that the rhetoric of the “99 percent” was loudly reflected 
in Bernie Sanders’ campaign. The Occupy Wall Street Movement found its voice in 
Bernie Sanders’ social democratic platform and the TPM, while playing less of a role in 
2016, found a champion in Donald Trump. Even though both movements appear to be on 
the decline, they have now become part of mainstream party politics. That is, it may be 
the case that the economic realm has lost some control over the normative realm. It is, in 
this light, no accident that Trump has received support from the TPM (his running mate 
Michael Pence was a direct beneficiary of the TPM when he was running for governor of 
Indiana), and Bernie Sanders was fully endorsed by the Occupy movement, while both of 
them ran atypical candidacies, when it comes to economic support from the powers that 
be. Trump took no money from the Republican National Committee until late in the race; 
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Sanders, while no stranger to corporate money, consolidated his support from small 
donors.  
In effect, then, we may be looking at a profound shift in norms away from money 
per se: the Tea Party Movement successfully took over the Republican Party, despite the 
best efforts of establishment Republicans in 201419 and 2016. The Occupy Movement, or 
its ghost, came dangerously close to capturing the Democratic Party in the primaries, in 
the form of the Bernie Sanders campaign. However, it is difficult to imagine how either 
movement could truly win, when it has not found a way to consolidate rationalities of 
action in the political realm. Control of Congress is closely divided for the 115th 
congressional session, and as a result, the US will likely face more divided government 
and gridlock regardless of who actually became President. 
The choices made by many voters in the 2016 election seem irrational to the 
mainstream, but that is because that mainstream, as charged by many, is still thinking 
within the largely economic realm’s narratives: why would one vote for a candidate who 
promises to take away the benefits you yourself are using? The answer not heard by the 
neoliberal economic establishments of both parties lies in the persistence of scripts in the 
normative realm: "real America" is there defined as entrepreneurial, not requiring help 
from pooled public assets, and the dupes of politicians who treat the average flat-state, 
rural American as somehow requiring a nanny state. There is scarcely a counter-narrative 
in place in the normative sphere, because even calls like Bernie Sanders' for free public 
                                                 
19 E.g.: http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/07/politics/gop-establishment-tea-party-fights-ahead/ 
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education and universal health care are only partially heard because they do not factor in 
a narrative about economic interventions into the political sphere. Even the newest of 
narratives do not inform the average rural voter, for example, that his or her state quite 
likely gets more money back in taxes from the federal government than they pay in; at the 
same time, the average urban voter pays in more than they receive, but many do not 
understand the economic traps creating the urban poor or the moral imperative of choice 
calculated not around individual prosperity, but around the need for a prosperous shared 
environment of well-managed resources rather than "warre" (war and economic 
competition). 
 
Some Final Considerations 
With this, I reach the end of this experiment in how alternate philosophical texts 
might inform our models for politics, especially by overcoming the limitations of rational 
choice decision-making. What philosophy since 1945 offers is a panoply of models for 
alternate rationalities that may well better explain what Rational Choice Theory has 
declared irrational or non-rational. There remains much work to be done in incorporating 
not only the persistence of narrative as political force, as I have done here, but also the 
dynamics of forces like infrastructure (Foucault's work) or identity politics (Lacan's and 
Kristeva's) or globalization (Harvey's work that shows the limits of thinking within the 
nation-state) or center-periphery encounters or counter-publics.  
What I hope to have shown, first of all, is that static choice networks, no matter 
how often refined, will never be able to model the dynamisms inherent in the public 
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spaces I identify here and map (partially) in the three-realm model. I began this project 
with the goal of explaining why nonpolitical actors (as those with little or no-self-interest 
in particular political issues) nevertheless undertake political action. I want to summarize 
here my result: that if we use the device of the three realms of action and its rationalities, 
we can conclude that it is in fact active meaning generation in the Normative Realm that 
moves political actors.  
Normative rationality has not been treated like market rationality, as a source of 
self-interest that can in fact motivate political action. Yet new normative rationalities did 
indeed drive both sets of actors that I discuss—Ultras and the Occupy folk—out of their 
inaction—in one case, because of the relative failure of market economy in Egypt, and in 
another, because the economic realm had so successfully colonized the normative realm 
that their separation had become impossible. From the perspective pursued here, it is thus 
no accident that RCT has assumed the parallelism between Economics and Political 
Science in the modern era:  they both fail to exhaust motivations for political action in 
our era.  Yet one hopes that the general public experiencing the Occupy Movement saw 
the limits to modern capitalism, as is suggested by the widespread approval of social 
democracy and Bernie Sanders amongst Millennials and the Z generation. Perhaps, this 
may be an indication that the economic realm’s dominance over the normative and 
political realms has loosened somewhat—or at least it suggests that these realms need to 
be considered in a more dynamic relationship to each other.  
Publicly, however, we have not reached these conclusions: the Occupy Movement 
failed to counter the generalizing effects of the Tea Party Movement, which managed to 
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hold the current capitalist economic realm norms in place. Their narrative demanding 
outrage against any tax raises whatsoever suppressed the reality that Obama’s tax plan 
would have lowered taxes for everyone making $625,000 or less. In other words, the 
Obama tax plan would have given tax relief for the bottom 99%, and only raised taxes for 
less than 1% of the very wealthiest taxpayers.20  But TPM members still see no value in 
any taxes: punishing the 1% was, in their belief system, equivalent to questioning the 
American way of life (an attack on the normative realm heavily aligned with an 
economic realm defined by laissez faire ideology).  
The US had not yet reached the utter disenchantment of Egypt, where Medan 
Tahrir successfully moved enough of the Egyptian population to topple Hosni Mubarak, 
and so the Occupy movement fizzled out: its seems that Egypt is populated with many 
fewer believers in market rationality (à la Wendy Brown) than the US population is. The 
democracy of the Occupy organization never found an equivalency in a new picture of 
American “democracy” and individual responsibility that included structural economic 
biases rather than individual failure to thrive. In Egypt, failures of neoliberal economics 
were evident, and so did not need to be challenged. 
Yet I hope in this dissertation to not only have provided a model for 
understanding such situations better than we have to date as scholars and researchers. I 
hope also to have constructed a model that can contribute in a small way to political 
action itself. In effect, by seeing that the three realms can be freed from each other, we 
                                                 
20 See http://taxfoundation.org/blog/monday-map-percentage-taxpayers-agi-over-500000. 
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may also discover opportunities for them to compete with one another—we may see the 
importance of new narratives from three realms in motivating individuals and group 
political action.  
This is not to completely dispense with older models for political action:  even 
Adam Smith could not have foreseen was the power of the economic realm, or its ability 
to colonize both norms and inherited norms for political action. Or perhaps he thought 
more of individuals' abilities to resist the suasions of campaign financing, propaganda, 
and bribery, and their institutionalized corollaries in education and acceptable public 
speech and acts. Yet it is critical to pursue, both in research and teaching, the fact that, 
today, the least compelling of all rationality—that of market rationality—has replaced the 
potentially deeper rationalities of the Political and Normative Realms.  
Said more simply: instead of letting the mind and the heart rule, we have in effect 
surrendered ourselves to the stomach. In the case of the US, middle class was, in 2011, 
simply too steeped in market rationality to overcome it and join the Occupy Movement in 
sufficient enough numbers to make it sustainable. However, in Egypt the weakness of 
market rationality allowed the Arab Spring to enjoy more widespread support—for a 
time, at least. The challenge, then, that still remains for scholars of political action is to 
nuance our own analytic models, especially by somehow uncoupling the economic realm 
from its domination of our models, or at least by countering its power by looking for 
motivations in the other realms that can and do influence voters to become political actors 
(as in the 2016 presidential election). 
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